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STEP BY STEP: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
DISTRIBUTIVE CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE
IN NORTH CAROLINA
SALLY BURNETr SHARP*
In this Article, Professor Sharp examines recent changes and
developments in North Carolina's alimony laws and Equitable
Distribution Act. Multiple issues are addressed, including the
effect of the new statutes on dependency, the integration principle,
the definition of income, the role of marital fault, the
determination of amount and duration of alimony, the
determination of the standard of living, and the creation of
postseparation support. Regarding equitable distribution,
Professor Sharp reviews the new categorization of nonvested
pensions as martial property and the significant changes likely to
result from the creation of a new category of property-"divisible
property." Although the author notes that many would not
consider these changes to be ideal, she submits that they represent
a welcome step forward in North Carolina domestic law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A wholesale revision in North Carolina alimony laws in 1995,1
coupled with critical amendments to the Equitable Distribution of
1. North Carolina General Statutes sections 50-16.1A to -16.9 became effective on
October 1, 1995. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-16.1A to -16.9 (1995). Although parts of the
new statutes are perfectly straightforward, other sections create considerable confusion.
See, e.g., infra Part II.C.2 and accompanying text (discussing "rehabilitative" alimony).
Thus far there are no appellate cases addressing this confusion. The definitions of a
dependent spouse and a supporting spouse under § 50-16.1A are virtually the only
portions of the new alimony act, §§ 50-16.1A-to -16.9, that have remained in their original
form. But see infra Part II.B.1 (concluding that the calculation of dependent or
supporting spouse status may have broadened considerably under the new legislation).
Specific findings of fact that one spouse is dependent and that the other is capable of
providing support remain necessary elements of any support action. It should also be
noted that North Carolina statutes rarely refer to "maintenance," but instead to
"alimony" and "postseparation support," both discussed at length infra Parts II, III, and
IV.
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Property Act in 1997,2 have combined to create extraordinary
2. Act of July 16, 1997, ch. 302, 1997 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 57 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 50-20, -21 (Supp. 1997)). Sections 50-20 and 50-21 are the only two
sections of the General Statutes dealing with distribution of property upon divorce. The
two statutes are virtually always referred to as the "Equitable Distribution Act" and this
Article will follow that practice. The adoption of equitable distribution in North
Carolina, see infra Part V.A, and the virtually unheralded and unknown passage of true
no-fault divorce that closely preceded it are the two major elements of what may be
accurately termed a "revolution." North Carolina was one of only four states still strictly
wedded to the common law "title only" system when the Act was first adopted in 1981.
See Act for Equitable Distribution of Marital Property, ch. 815, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws
1184 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-20, -21 (Supp. 1997)). Under the
"title only" system, each spouse received only that which was titled in his or her name and
whatever he or she had earned the money to buy. See Leatherman v. Leatherman, 297
N.C. 618,256 S.E.2d 793 (1979); see also infra note 3 (discussing development of equitable
distribution).
Section 50-6 has long read that parties may be divorced, assuming one has resided in
this state for six months, "if and when the husband and wife have lived separate and apart
for one year." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1995). The appellate courts of this state had
consistently interpreted this section, however, to include the common law defense of
recrimination-i.e., that proof of marital fault by one spouse could defeat the other
spouse's claim for divorce. See, e.g., Pharr v. Pharr, 223 N.C. 115, 116, 25 S.E.2d 471, 472
(1943). More bluntly, "[r]ecrimination is the outrageous legal principle which ordains
that when both spouses have grounds for divorce, neither may have a decree." HOMER
H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 13.11, at
527 (2d student ed., 1988). Although the legislature amended § 50-6 in 1978 to bar the
use of recrimination defenses in such a fashion, the use of recrimination as a defense to
divorce continued to the point that appellate action became necessary to clarify the
demise of the defense. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Sawyer, 54 N.C. App. 141, 282 S.E.2d 527
(1981); Morris v. Morris, 45 N.C. App. 69, 262 S.E.2d 359 (1980). The effect of this
interpretation, which was quite unrecognized by most commentators outside North
Carolina, see, e.g., Doris Jonas Freed & Henry H. Foster, Jr., Divorce in the Fifty States:
An Overview, 14 FAM. L.Q. 229, 250 (1981); Laura Gatland, Putting the Blame on No-
Fault, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1997, at 50, was clearly to enable one spouse to preclude the other
from obtaining a divorce, even though each had lived separate and apart for the requisite
one year period. In 1979, however, the following amendment to the statute was passed:
"A divorce under this section shall not be barred to either party by any defense or plea
based upon any provision of G.S. § 50-5 or G.S. § 50-7 [setting forth the fault grounds for
divorce for bed and board], a plea of res judicata, or a plea of recrimination." Act of May
30, 1979, ch. 709, § 1, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 775, 775 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-6 (1995)).
As the cases cited above illustrate, it took several years for the appellate courts of
the state to emphasize that the statutory amendment really meant what it said. Section
50-6 thus became what it had appeared to be all along-a true "no fault" divorce statute.
However, North Carolina had absolutely no provision for distribution of marital
property-indeed the term was unknown within the General Statutes-at the time that
no-fault divorce became available. As noted previously, North Carolina was certainly one
of the last "title only" states. See Sally Burnett Sharp, The Partnership Ideal. The
Development of Equitable Distribution in North Carolina, 65 N.C. L. REv. 195, 198, 201
(1987). Other states once labeled as "title only" did in fact allow for the transfer of
property as alimony, an option never before available in North Carolina. See, e.g., De
Milo v. Watson, 143 N.E.2d 707, 709 (Ohio 1957) (" '[S]uch alimony may be allowed in
real or personal property, or both.'" (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.18
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changes and potential developments in the domestic law of North
Carolina? Although these new developments still fall short of what
most commentators in the field would regard as ideal,4 they
nonetheless symbolize a welcome recognition and understanding of
the fundamental principles that underlie the economic consequences
of divorce-redistribution of wealth5 and minimization of loss for
(Anderson 1953))). Thus, the supporting or employed spouse might freely obtain a
divorce, for which the only economic consequence might be alimony. See, e.g.,
Leatherman, 297 N.C. at 622,256 S.E.2d at 796 (denying even equitable rights to a wife in
her husband's separately titled business, in which she had worked diligently throughout
their long marriage). The possibility that a dependent spouse, not eligible for alimony,
might be "discarded" by the other spouse, regardless of the degree to which the "non-
owner" spouse had contributed to the business or the marriage, was so palpably apparent
that the Equitable Distribution Act, extremely narrowly drawn in its original form, was an
almost irresistible force at the time it was adopted in 1981. It should also be noted that
the North Carolina General Assembly had narrowly defeated the Equal Rights
Amendment in 1981. See Sharp, supra, at 196 n.6.
3. The Supreme Court of North Carolina initially played an extremely active and
salutary role in the interpretation of the Equitable Distribution Act shortly after its
enactment. See Sharp, supra note 2, at 210-20. And in many instances the court of
appeals had already directed this development. See Wade v. Wade, 72 N.C. App. 372,
378-80, 325 S.E.2d 260,267-68 (1985) (interpreting the statutory mandate in § 50-20(b)(2)
(Supp. 1983)-that all income and increases in value of separate property would remain
separate property-to apply to increases in value of such property that occurred during
the marriage and that were deemed to be the product of "active" marital efforts). In
more recent years, however, the supreme court has declined to heed many opinions, or
dissents, from the court of appeals. The court of appeals thus has been relatively
restricted in the scope of what it may do. See, for example, Sonek v. Sonek, 105 N.C.
App. 247, 412 S.E.2d 917 (1992), in which Judge Greene's concurrence failed to persuade
the majority with its suggestion that the increase in value of a professional degree should
receive treatment similar to other types of separate property. See id. at 255-57, 412
S.E.2d at 922-23 (Greene, J., concurring in the result).
4. For example, traditional marital fault has in no way been banished by the
enactment of the new alimony statutes. See infra Part II.A.2. Moreover, distribution of
pensions was strictly limited to those that were deemed "vested" by the employer
(including the U.S. Military) until passage of § 50-20.1 in the summer of 1997. See Act of
July 16, 1997, ch. 212, § 3,1997 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 57, 62 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
50-20.1 (Supp. 1997)); infra Part V.B.1 (discussing this critically important revision which
classified nonvested pensions as marital property); see also George v. George, 115 N.C.
App. 387, 444 S.E.2d 449 (1994) (holding that because the husband had only served in the
military for 17 years, his pension was "unvested" and that his wife was thus not entitled to
any division of such pension rights as marital property). The new alimony statutes'
continued insistence that a spouse meet the very technical definition of dependency,
regardless of health or other circumstances, before even becoming eligible for an alimony
award exemplifies the short-sighted approach of the legislature. There are many
instances in which a spouse who is not technically dependent may nonetheless be
deserving of maintenance. See Sonek, 105 N.C. App. at 255, 412 S.E.2d at 922 (Greene,
J., concurring in the result) (noting that the non-dependent wife had "'severe chronic
active rheumatoid arthritis'" that would leave her totally disabled (quoting the trial
court)).
5. It appears that no group has found a wholly satisfying definition of the "goals" of
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both parties.6
Additionally, the new legislation lays the foundation for the
development of many fundamental principles thus far unknown to, or
underutilized by, North Carolina domestic law. A new category of
property-divisible property--has been created that largely
distributing assets (through either alimony or property division) at divorce. The term
"equitable distribution," for example, has very little meaning without reference to what
may be or is divided. The rationales underlying alimony awards are even more at odds.
6. The American Law Institute has worked for many years, and with extraordinary
diligence, to produce PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Proposed Final Draft Part I, 1997) [hereinafter ALI
PRINCIPLES]. Part I deals solely with property division and spousal support. As the
Foreword takes pains to make very clear, the "idea of [ALI] Principles gives greater
weight to emerging legal concepts than does a Restatement." Id. at xiii. The significance
of this thoughtful and analytically sound work by the Institute cannot be over-estimated.
It is the product of many of the leading scholars in the field of family law, and it is hoped
that it will indeed help bring some consensus, at least as to general principles, in the
notoriously confused disarray in family law among the states. This disarray is particularly
evident in the area of alimony, for which no principled analytical foundation has ever
really been developed. Although need ("a residual category to provide remedies ... that
do not share any consistent pattern that can be captured in a sensible definition of need,"
id. at 8) is the guiding principle in most states, the ALl PRINCIPLES have developed the
concept of "loss" instead; i.e., allowing alimony or maintenance, at an analytical level, to
function as a vehicle for replenishing what a spouse has "lost" through divorce-
education, lost earning capacity, pension and medical benefits, etc. In short, the
"payment's true justification is as a remedy for an unfair loss allocation." Id. The loss
principle seems particularly appropriate in marriages wherein the parties have made a
joint decision to concentrate marital resources on the career of one spouse, at the expense
of the other's career opportunities, including decisions that one spouse will be a
homemaker or will work to afford the other the funds for a professional degree or license,
etc.
7. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(4) (Supp. 1997). This is not to be confused with
vhat is often referred to as "new property." See Patrick N. Parkinson, Who Needs the
Uniform Marital Property Act?, 55 U. IN. L. REv. 677,707 (1987) ("[T]he 'old property'
of tangible assets is declining in importance while the 'new property' of entitlements-
against insurance companies, employers, and the state-has become the focus of attention
on divorce."); Jane Rutheford, Duty in Divorce: Shared Income as a Path to Equality, 58
FORDHAM L. REv. 539,576 & nn.242, 577 (1990) (listing four states, Arkansas, Michigan,
New York, and Pennsylvania, that had recognized professional degrees, goodwill,
licenses, or partnerships as marital property, but noting that states that allow recovery
only to spouses who have financially contributed to their partner's acquisition of
education or skills are rewarding "'breadwinners' at the expense of 'homemakers' ");
Helen A. Boyer, Recent Development, 60 WASH. L. REv. 431, 441 & nn.78-81 (1985)
(noting jurisdictions that have held career assets such as a law practice (Todd v. Todd, 78
Cal. Rptr. 131, 135 (Ct. App. 1969); Litman v. Litman, 463 N.E.2d 34 (N.Y. 1984)), an
accounting practice (Heller v. Heller, 672 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984)),
partnership interests (Balogh v. Balogh, 356 N.W.2d 307, 311-12 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)),
and employee stock options (Callahan v. Callahan, 361 A.2d 561, 563 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1976)), to be property subject to distribution); see also MARY ANN GLENDON, THE
NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY (1981) (discussing the failure of family law in
this country and others to reflect the realities of family economic structure); Susan
Klebanoff, Comment, To Love and Obey 'Til Graduation Day-The Professional Degree
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ameliorates one of the more draconian features of existing property
division law. Indeed, the very definition of property itself has
arguably been expanded not just by statute, but, oddly enough,
through the revised alimony statutes, to include the value of health
insurance.8 It also has clearly been extended to include unvested
pension benefits 9 and many employment benefits received after
separation as marital or divisible property.10 The alimony statutes
create both a new category of support11 and opportunities for the
imposition of disclosure duties, 2 a less restricted definition of
dependency, 3 a critical departure from reliance upon the previous
standard of living as the sole guide for amounts of alimony,14 greater
flexibility in determining the amount and duration of alimony, 15 and a
decreased emphasis upon fault. 6
In the aggregate, these changes and potential changes are
nothing short of breathtaking, creating an impact that can best be
appreciated by a knowledge of (1) the arcane and woeful state of
previous alimony laws in North Carolina,17 and (2) the exceptionally
narrow definition of marital property that was inherent in the original
version of the statute and that had become even more deeply
in Light of the Uniform Marital Property Act, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 839 (1985) (tracing the
inability of American law to take into account the "losses" of one spouse who has
supported the other through a professional degree, only to receive a divorce summons as
a reward).
8. For a discussion of the importance of medical insurance coverage, see infra Part
III.C.2.
9. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b); see also infra Part V.B.1 (discussing these
changes); supra note 4 (discussing George).
10. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(4); see also infra Part V.C (discussing divisible
property). One of the more salutary effects of these amendments is that the following
observation is no longer correct: "The North Carolina statute is the least protective of a
homemaker spouse and the statute least likely to carry out the objectives of equitable
distribution." Emily Osborn, Comment, The Treatment of Unearned Separate Property at
Divorce in Common Law Property Jurisdictions, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 903, 925; see also Sally
Burnett Sharp, Equitable Distribution of Property in North Carolina: A Preliminary
Analysis, 61 N.C. L. REV. 247, 253 (1983) (observing that North Carolina then had the
broadest definition of separate property among all states).
11. See infra Part IV (discussing postseparation support).
12. See infra Part III.B.3 and accompanying text.
13. See infra Part II.B.1. For the proposition that a spouse deemed non-dependent
on the date of separation may well, as a result of divisible property accrued after that
date, qualify as a dependent spouse by the date of distribution, see discussion infra text
accompanying notes 98-103.
14. See infra Part III.C.3.
15. See infra Part III.C and accompanying text (discussing factors to be considered in
determining amount and duration of alimony).
16. See infra Part II.A.1.
17. See infra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
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embedded in case law since the initial enactment of equitable
distribution in North Carolina.18 The latter, in particular, invited not
only unconscionably unjust "equitable" distributions of property,19
but created almost endless opportunities for "divorce planning" to
accomplish the same unjust results.20 Such laws and opportunities,
used and misused of course, were hardly wasted upon the growing
number of exceptionally skilled domestic practitioners in this state2
Gradually, however, North Carolina legislation and case law-never
notable for being on what one might call the "cutting edge" of
divorce lawn-have begun to reflect a somewhat lesser emphasis
18. The entrenched position that only property actually received before the date of
separation may be marital property is perhaps the best example of this statement. See
infra notes 512-20 and accompanying text (discussing Truesdale v. Truesdale, 89 N.C.
App. 445,366 S.E.2d 512 (1988)). In several respects, however, a generous interpretation
of the original statute by the courts had already obviated portions of the Equitable
Distribution Act that, if interpreted literally, would have changed the previous "title
only" status of property upon divorce very little, if at all. See, e.g., Sharp, supra note 10,
at 259-63.
19. Unquestionably, the worm in the "apple" of equitable distribution has long been
the statutory mandate in § 50-21 requiring, as do virtually no other states, that marital
property "shall be valued as of the date of the separation of the parties." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-21(b) (Supp. 1997). For example, in Nye v. Nye, 100 N.C. App. 326, 396
S.E.2d 91 (1990), the value of the husband's business at the date of separation was zero.
See id. at 327, 396 S.E.2d at 92. By the date of divorce, the business was valued at
approximately $500,000, none of which was considered marital, and thus divisible,
property. See id. at 326-27, 396 S.E.2d at 91-92.
20. One of the most egregious examples of divorce planning is well illustrated in
Sonek v. Sonek, 105 N.C. App. 247, 412 S.E.2d 917 (1992). A gynecologist in private
practice closed down his practice shortly before separation, becoming a salaried employee
of a gynecological clinic (thus shedding any goodwill assets he would have had in his
private practice), and then reopened his own practice within a few months of the division
of property. See id. at 248-49, 412 S.E.2d at 918.
21. As of 1996, there were 86 Board Certified Family Law Specialists in the state, the
largest number among the 14 areas of specialization recognized by the North Carolina
State Bar. See FAMILY LAW SECTION, NORTH CAROLINA BAR ASSOCIATION,
MEMBERSHIP DIRECTORY 79-84 (1996). This number reflects not the litigiousness of the
family law bar, but the complexity and confusion of much of the law in this area. As
examples of their ingenious use of the statute to create manifestly unjust results, see
Chandler v. Chandler, 108 N.C. App. 66, 69-70, 422 S.E.2d 587, 590 (1992) (holding that
over $140,000 in rental income from marital assets, received and controlled exclusively by
the husband after separation, could only be considered as a factor in distributing marital
property equitably but could not be distributed as marital property), and Smith v. Smith,
336 N.C. 575, 579, 444 S.E.2d 420, 423 (1994) (requiring the trial court to make a written
finding of whether postseparation appreciation of marital property is passive or results
from the efforts of one or both spouses) The post-separation increase in value in Smith
was over $6,000,000. See id.
Many of this author's comments throughout this Article derive from her long-
standing and varied roles within the Family Law Section of the North Carolina Bar
Association and her close and rewarding association with these fine lawyers.
22 See supra note 10 (observation of Osborn); see also supra notes 19-20 and
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upon fault in the area of spousal support, at least in the early stages
of the divorce process,23 and have incorporated many potentially
exciting and expansive maintenance concepts and property division
principles that have been sorely lacking in this state.2 a Thus, the
revisions and amendments that form the focus of this Article may
well be far from incremental.
The amendments to the Equitable Distribution Act not only
rectify what have been the major deficiencies in property divisions,
and reflect principles that are clearly more consistent with the stated
purposes of property distribution goals, 25 but additionally include
more expansive definitions of property subject to division, according
to principles that have long been accepted by the overwhelming
majority of states.26  The new statutes also reflect the growing
sophistication of the judiciary regarding property distribution and the
growing frustration of the public and the bar with the blatant
accompanying text (providing additional examples).
23. See infra Parts IV.A-B (discussing postseparation support and the elimination of
date of postseparation marital misconduct).
24. See, for example, the discussion of concealment of assets, infra Part III.B.3, and
the analysis of valuation of medical benefits, infra Part III.C.2. There continue to be
exceptions to this favorable development, of course. For example, from the author's own
knowledge, in the summer of 1997, the Family Law Section of the North Carolina Bar
Foundation could find no legislator willing to introduce a bill, already approved by the
governing board of the state bar association, that would have abolished the archaic torts
of alienation of affections and criminal conversation.
25. Most authors in this field argue that no laws governing the distributional
consequences of divorce will ever be truly "equitable" so long as the "human capital"
concept is not included in the context of both maintenance and property definitions. It
has been noted that many states have "devised doctrines that permit courts to
compensate a spouse in some manner for helping to increase the human capital of the
other partner, most commonly by bearing the costs of putting the partner through
professional school." David L. Chambers, What If. The Legal Consequences of Marriage
and the Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REV. 447, 478 n.128
(1996) (citing Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law:
Children's Issues Take Spotlight, 29 FAM. L.Q. 741,774, app. tbl. 5 (1996) (listing 24 states
as considering "contribution to education" in determining property division)); see also Ira
Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV 1, 40-53 (1989) (arguing that
alimony should compensate a spouse for losses in earning capacity caused by the
economically rational allocation of marital duties, in which the wife typically makes
household-related investments of little market value that enable the husband to invest in
his earning capacity); Allen M. Parkman, The Recognition of Human Capital as Property
in Divorce Settlements, 40 ARK. L. REV. 439, 440, 454 (1987) (characterizing human
capital as an asset owned by an individual and recommending an approach to divorce
settlement that focuses on compensating a supporting spouse for her sacrifice of human
capital to the marriage). Also particularly important in this context is the ALI
PRINCIPLES' concept of alimony as a means to compensate for "loss"-particularly
including human capital. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 5.02, at 259, § 5.15, at 383-
87.
26. See, e.g., infra Part V.B.1. (discussing "nonvested" pension rights).
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inequities built into the core of the prior statutory scheme.27
Moreover, the concepts and principles embodied in the new
laws, particularly after judicial clarification and interpretation, will
obviously shape the overwhelming number of divorce settlements
reached through private agreements between the parties. It is a legal
and common sense truism that private agreements are virtually
always negotiated "in the shadow of the law."'  Reason would seem
to dictate, and experience in other states supports the proposition,
that the greater the uncertainty in the law, the more likely it is that
disputes will be litigated instead of settled.29 Conversely, greater
certainty in the law clearly promotes more private settlements. In
this sense, it is the law that "deals the cards" that parties to divorce
may play." In part in recognition of this, and in part as a result of
considerable public pressure,31 the new legislation has dealt
27. See supra notes 19-20.
28. The now famous phrase derives from the landmark article by Robert H. Mnookin
& Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88
YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979).
29. A good comparison that bears out this conclusion is the experience that North
Carolina and other states have had with child support guidelines. One study illustrated
that the national experience with these guidelines has been that they "have reduced the
number of cases litigated; those that the parties do not settle are litigated more quickly
and with less expense." Jane C. Murphy, Eroding the Myth of Discretionary Justice in
Family Law: The Child Support Experiment, 70 N.C. L. REV. 209, 242 (1991); see also
Linda Henry Elrod, The Federalization of Child Support Guidelines, 6 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIMONIAL L. 103, 126-27 (1990) (noting that "many states have seen a substantial
shift from judicial participation to an administrative or quasi-judicial approach, using
referees, court trustees or hearing officers to set child support").
The author's caveat to this proposition, however, is that utter uncertainty in the law
may have the opposite effect: lawyers may shy away from litigation under new statutes
until there exists at least some appellate guidance.
30. This is not to say, of course, that parties always "play" the cards they are dealt.
Absent egregious unconscionability, almost always accompanied by what Arthur Leff
called "bargaining naughtiness," Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The
Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 539 (1967), parties may freely contract to
reflect their own motivations, and often to their own economic detriment, to be as
vengeful, guilty (and thus overly generous), or even as stupid as they please. See Sally
Burnett Sharp, Fairness Standards and Separation Agreements: A Word of Caution on
Contractual Freedom, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1451 (1984). But without a fair "dealing"
of the cards, parties have precious few options in any bargaining process.
31. A four day series of newspaper articles in a major state newspaper is just one
example. See Nancy Stancill, Starving the Wife, CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, Oct. 23, 1994, at
1A; Nancy Stancill, Starving the Wife: N.C. Alimony Is a Question of Blame, CHARLOTCE
OBSERVER, Oct. 24, 1994, at 1A; Nancy Stancill, Starving the Wife: Divorce Lawyers'
Tactics Go Largely Unchecked, CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, Oct. 25, 1994, at 1A; Nancy
Stancill, Starving the Wife: Forsyth Speeds Divorce-Court Property Cases, CHARLOTrE
OBSERVER, Oct. 26,1994, at 1A. This series greatly helped to galvanize groups of women
throughout the state who did, in fact, become quite effective lobbyists for the recent
changes in the Equitable Distribution Act.
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significantly more equitable and realistic, albeit somewhat confusing,
cards to the parties to divorce.32
Although this Article will in no fashion enter the fray begun
many years ago as a result of the work and conclusions of Lenore
Weitzman,3 3 it is certainly beyond dispute that women and children
32. The "card game analogy" is by no means intended to minimize the often
traumatic experience of divorce. In particular, the confusion almost always created by
new laws leads, more often than not, to increased legislation and expenses for both
parties. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 28, at 979.
33. The conclusion reached in LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION
(1985) that, largely as a result of the widespread enactment of no-fault divorce beginning
in California in the 1960s, the standard of living of women decreased by 73% in the year
following divorce, whereas that of men increased by 42%, see id. at 337-56, has been the
subject of severe criticism, especially with regard to the cause and effect relationship she
purported to find, and careful scrutiny. The latter has, in broader terms, generally
confirmed that divorce hardly enriches women and children. For extensive criticism of
Weitzman's study, see Jed H. Abraham, "The Divorce Revolution" Revisited: A Counter-
Revolutionary Critique, 9 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 251, 296 (1989) (asserting Weitzman's study
is flawed by "skewed statistical analyses, unfounded working assumptions, one-sided
presentations of the evidence, and hostility toward husbands and fathers"); and Richard
B. Peterson, A Re-Evaluation of the Economic Consequences of Divorce, 61 AM. SOC,
REv. 528, 532 (1996) (arguing persuasively that the means/income ratio is but 10% higher
for men in the year subsequent to divorce and 27% lower for women). However, other
commentators at least agree with Weitzman's conclusion that women and children are
clearly economically disadvantaged by divorce. See, e.g., Joan M. Krauskopf, Theories of
Property Division/Spousal Support: Searching for Solutions to the Mystery, 23 FAM. L.Q.
253, 271 & n.65 (1989) (citing additional sources and noting that even critics of
Weitzman's figures differ on amount, but not on the significant disparity in the standard
of living between ex-husbands and ex-wives); James B. McLindon, Separate But Unequal
The Economic Disaster of Divorce for Women and Children, 21 FAM. L.Q. 351, 391, 395-
96 (1987) (concluding from a New Haven study that "[b]y any measure, men emerge from
their divorces in far better economic shape than their wives do," but that the decline in
the value of settlements is better explained by changing perceptions of the earning
capacity of women than by the passage of a no-fault divorce statute); Jana B. Singer,
Alimony and Efficiency: The Gendered Costs and Benefits of the Economic Justification
for Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2423, 2426 n.14 (1994) (noting that while "the results of
Weitzman's studies have been questioned, a number of more recent studies have
confirmed her basic conclusion-that women and children are disproportionately
disadvantaged in financial terms as a consequence of divorce"); Jana B. Singer, Divorce
Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1103-14, 1121 (1989) (agreeing that the
economic consequences of divorce are far more devastating for women and children than
for men, but rejecting that the no-fault divorce revolution is the primary cause). For
further support of Weitzman's findings, see Rosalyn B. Bell, Alimony and the Financially
Dependent Spouse in Montgomery County, Maryland, 22 FAM. L.Q. 225, 281-85, 299-308,
318 (1988) (finding consistencies between Montgomery County study results and
Weitzman's California study results, and concluding that "unless the problems [of the
system] are identified ... poverty will become the special resting place for these
[displaced homemakers and the financially dependent] women and children"); and
Heather Ruth Wishik, Economics of Divorce: An Exploratory Study, 20 FAM. L.Q. 79,
96-97 (1986) (explaining that the data from a Vermont study "suggest post-divorce living
standard changes in Vermont are similar to changes found by Weitzman in California").
See also Review Symposium on Weitzman's DIVORCE REVOLUTION, 1986 AM. B.
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bear the brunt of the economic losses34 consequent to divorce. In
addition, because women are indeed more likely to receive the'
primary custody of children of a marriage,35 it follows that greater
harm is caused to children of divorce whose standard of living is
drastically lowered by the distributional consequences of that
process. Partly as a result of this decreased standard of living,
children of divorce face infinitely more psychological difficulties than
do children whose economic lifestyles are relatively unaffected. 6
The new alimony and postseparation laws hold out great promise
that throughout and beyond the divorce process, much of this
economic loss, and consequent harm, may be alleviated by the
changes in the distributional consequences of the breakup of
marriages. 7
FOUND. RES. J. 757 (providing additional critiques); Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead?
Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 GEo. L.J. 2227, 2227 n.1 (1994) (listing additional
critiques in a summary of the controversy over Weitzman's conclusions).
34. These losses include not merely the other spouse's income, but a cumulative loss
of earning capacity, medical benefits, opportunities, etc. Many of these "losses" are now
recognized quite explicitly by the new alimony factors. See infra Part III.C.
35. Commentators have reported for years that approximately 90% of divorcing
mothers receive custody of their children. See Monica J. Allen, Child-State Jurisdiction:
A Due Process Invitation to Reconsider Some Basic Family Law Assumptions, 26 FAM.
L.Q. 293, 293 n.2 (1992) (citing WErrZMAN, supra note 33, at 358); June Carbone, Income
Sharing: Redefining the Family in Terms of Community, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 359, 385 n.135
(1994). This figure is, of course, misleading without a recognition that at least 90% of all
custody issues are settled between the parties. See Sally Burnett Sharp, Modification of
Agreement-Based Custody Decrees: Unitary or Dual Standard?, 68 VA. L. REV. 1263,
1263 (1982).
36. The number of studies that reflect this hardly surprising conclusion is virtually
overwhelming. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and
Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9, 29-37 (1990); Cheryl Springer & Judith S. Wallerstein, Young
Adolescents' Responses to their Parents' Divorces, in CHILDREN & DIVORCE 15, 15-27
(Lawrence A. Kurdek ed., 1983); Judith S. Wallerstein, Child of Divorce: An Overview, 4
BEHAV. Sci. & L. 105, 112-16 (1986); Joan G. Wexler, Rethinking the Modification of
Child Custody Decrees, 94 YALE L.J. 757, 784-88 (1985); Judith Younger, Marital
Regimes: A Story of Compromise and Demoralization, Together with Criticism and
Suggestions for Reform, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 45, 85-90 (1981). It should also be noted
that the "income shares" model for establishing child support, adopted in the majority of
states, see Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law: Of
Welfare Reform, Child Support, and Relocation, 30 FAM. L.Q. 765, 805 app. tbl.3 (1997),
clearly does not take into account non-income producing property such as home
ownership and, in the great majority of states, makes no provision for higher education,
see id. (listing only 11 "income shares" states that make provisions for college support and
34 states that have adopted the income shares model).
37. According to the State Center for Health Statistics, the total number of divorces
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Part II of this Article will examine potential problems and
possibilities with the new alimony statutes, including particular
emphasis upon postseparation support, dependency issues, the
integration principle, expansion of the definition of income, and
marital fault .38 The fifteen statutory factors to be used in determining
the amount and duration of alimony present especially interesting
opportunities for expansion of the law in this area,39 most notably
including the conclusion that the "previous standard of living" can no
longer function as the "ceiling" for the amount of an alimony award.4"
Although postseparation support and alimony are often difficult to
discuss separately, Part III will nonetheless discuss alimony and the
role of fault,4' while Part IV will focus on postseparation support,
including again the role of fault, procedural issues, termination
events, and cohabitation.42 Finally, Part V will examine the changes
in the Equitable Distribution Act, including nonvested pension and
other employment enhancements, the potentially expansive concept
of "divisible property," and the much expanded freedom for truly
equitable distributions now available with "in kind" property
divisions.43 The combination of the revisions to the alimony and
equitable distribution statutes constitutes a sizable and exciting, if
none too gradual, move forward in North Carolina domestic law.




See STATE CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, N.C. DEP'T OF ENV'T, HEALTH, &
NATURAL RESOURCES, 1 NORTH CAROLINA VITAL STATISTICS 2-1 (yearly editions for
1992 through 1996). These figures represent, of course, only the tip of the iceberg with
regard to domestic cases in general.
38. See infra notes 44-198 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 292-374 and accompanying text.
40. It had long been the rule that the previous standard of living formed, in effect, a
"ceiling" with regard to spousal support. See Long v. Long, 71 N.C. App. 405, 407, 322
S.E.2d 427, 429 (1984). But see infra notes 364-68 and accompanying text (noting that this
ceiling is no longer determinative under the new statutes).
41. See infra notes 199-374 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 374-466 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 467-659 and accompanying text.
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II. NEW RULES FOR AN OLD GAME-ALIMONY
A. General Background
1. Marital Fault-Old and New
The history of the domestic laws of the State of North Carolina
presents an interesting, albeit somewhat unusual, pattern of stability
that lasted for decades, followed by the interjection of radically new
laws and different jurisprudential concepts.' The same pattern is
quite clear with alimony laws, which remained essentially unchanged
from the nineteenth century until the major codification and revision
in 1967.4 That law, in turn, underwent only minor changes for at
least three decades46 before it was basically replaced in October
1995.47
At this point in the Article, however, it is critical to note that the
new statutes apply only to cases that were initially filed after October
15, 1995.48 The "old" 1967 laws remain applicable to all actions filed
before that date.49 The rather burdensome effect of this statutory
mandate is two-fold, the latter easily being the more burdensome:
(1) there has been no small amount of confusion as to what
44. In the domestic law area, treatment of antenuptial agreements also follows this
pattern. For example, until passage of the Uniform Pre-Marital Agreement Act in 1987,
Act of June 25, 1987, ch. 473, 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 644 (codified as amended at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 52B-1 to -11 (1987 & Supp. 1997)), which imposes few to no restrictions
upon freedom to contract prior to marriage, North Carolina continued to follow the rule
that any antenuptial agreement that "looked" to divorce, rather than to death of one of
the parties, was void as contrary to public policy. See, e.g., Motley v. Motley, 255 N.C.
190, 193, 120 S.E.2d 422, 424 (1961) (holding invalid a provision that neither party would
demand any form of support from the other in the event the marriage terminated for any
reason other than by death).
45. See 2 SUZANNE REYNOLDS, LEE'S NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW (5th ed.
forthcoming 1999) (alimony chapter).
46. See 2 i&
47. See Act of June 21,1995, ch. 319, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 641 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 50-16.1A to 16.9 (1995). This replacement involved the repeal of several
portions of Chapter 50, including § 50-16.1 (alimony pendente lite), § 50-16.2 (grounds for
alimony), and § 50-16.3 (grounds for alimony pendente lite), plus the addition of several
new sections (§§ 50-16.1A to 16.3A), and revisions of §§ 50-16.4 to 16.8. Overall,
however, the enactment of §§ 50-16.1A to 16.3A constitutes the heart of the "new"
alimony laws.
48. See Act of June 21, 1995, ch. 319, § 12, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 641,649 (noting that
each of the new statutes, or portion hereof, "shall not apply to pending litigation, or to
future motions in the cause seeking to modify orders or judgments in effect on October
15, 1995").
49. See id.
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constitutes an "action" filed before the new laws went into effect,50
and (2) the "old" laws will continue to be applicable for motions to
modify or terminate alimony awards or actions that were rendered or
pending before October 15, 1995.51 Thus, practitioners and judges
must contend with two sets of potentially applicable alimony laws.
As to the first issue, what constitutes an action or an independent
action has often created confusion in North Carolina, but sensible
statutory interpretation has resolved the issues. 2 Even given the
frequently extraordinary length of time that transpires between the
filing of an action and its completion, 3 time will certainly alleviate
the first problem. Motions to modify permanent alimony awards
entered under the previous law, however, will undoubtedly continue
to haunt this area, perhaps for decades to come.
5 4
A brief discussion of the major statutory goals regarding the role
of fault in general is also necessary in order to understand better the
purposes of the new alimony laws55 and as an introduction to a closer
50. The basis for this confusion arises from the unsettled question of whether, for
example, a spouse who filed for equitable distribution (clearly an independent action
under the 1995 version of § 50-21, which states that the action "may be filed, either as a
separate civil action, or together with any other action brought pursuant to Chapter 50 of
the General Statutes," N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-21 (1995) (amended 1997)) prior to October
15, 1995, could file for alimony under the new statutory provisions after that date. Under
§ 50-19(b), it appears that alimony may also be brought as an independent action. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-19(b) (1995). But see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(a) (1995)
(stating that in "an action brought pursuant to Chapter 50 ... either party may move for
alimony").
51. See supra note 48 (quoting this requirement).
52. See supra note 50. The "sensible statutory interpretation" is simply the one
adopted by virtually all district courts.
53. In a manuscript presented to the state district court judges in October, 1994, A
Search for Solutions: A Report Prepared by the Committee to Assess Equitable
Distribution Procedures and Dispositions in the North Carolina District Courts, it was
reported that after divorce (a process requiring that the parties live separate and apart for
one year before a complaint for absolute divorce can be filed under § 50-6), the average
age of pending equitable distribution cases was 290 days in fiscal year 1984-85. By 1993-
94, the average age of pending cases was 395.8 days. In many instances, cases have lasted
for a considerable number of years. See, e.g., Tucker v. Miller, 113 N.C. App. 785, 440
S.E.2d 315 (1994) (7.81 years); Judkins v. Judkins, 113 N.C. App. 734, 441 S.E.2d 139
(1994) (3.11 years); Minter v. Minter, 111 N.C. App. 321, 432 S.E.2d 720 (1993) (4.42
years); Godley v. Godley, 110 N.C. App. 99, 429 S.E.2d 382 (1993) (4.46 years); Prevatte
v. Prevatte, 104 N.C. App. 777,411 S.E.2d 386 (1991) (7.12 years).
54. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
55. See Ira Mark Ellman, The Place of Fault in Modern Divorce Law, 28 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 773 (1996) (presenting a fair, but generally quite negative, assessment of the role of
fault). The initial assumption about the role of fault is that one can identify the "fault"
and the party which caused the break-up of the marriage. In Williams v. Williams, 299
N.C. 174, 261 S.E.2d 849 (1980), the Supreme Court of North Carolina rather blithely
made the following assumption:
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examination of the new laws. Clearly North Carolina has been
unwilling to separate itself from the long-embraced concepts that (1)
marital "fault" can be identified, a proposition with which most
courts and commentators would strongly disagree,56 and (2) such fault
should, in most circumstances, maintain most of its traditional role as
the single most critical factor, at least in alimony determinations.5 7 A
more painstaking analysis of what these new laws may-or may not-
portend for the State is all the more necessary, given the lack of
appellate guidance dealing specifically with the new laws thus far.5" It
is clear, however, that in many instances case law and principles
developed under previous law will still be applicable. 9 It is also clear
that in many instances the previous case law will be totally
inapplicable to the new statutes6 -because the new laws repeal much
of previous law and because they add principles, concepts, and
directives that are inconsistent with previous case law and with which
our courts have never before been confronted. What remains both
perilously and promisingly unclear, however, is the continuing
viability of the often inconsistent case law in the large middle ground
between the two extremes. The appellate courts now have the
opportunity not only to reconcile previous inconsistent case law, but
also to utilize both the concepts and tools barred under previous case
law,61 to develop the many new concepts and laws embodied in the
new statutes.
Nor do we find the option of fault repugnant to sound public policy ... [which]
would dictate that the party who violated that binding [marriage] contract
should continue to bear its financial burden when he or she can reasonably do so
and where that is necessary to prevent a relatively greater economic hardship on
the party without fault.
Id. at 188,261 S.E.2d at 859.
56. See In re Cosgrove's Marriage, 103 Cal. Rptr. 733, 739 (Ct. App. 1972); CLARK,
supra note 2, § 17.5, at 256 ("Since facile judgments about who is responsible for the
breakup of a marriage are notoriously unreliable, basing alimony awards upon such
marital fault risks being guided by nothing more substantial than prejudice or
sentimentality."); Ellman, supra note 55, at 808-09.
57. See Williams, 299 N.C. at 188,261 S.E.2d at 859.
58. Cf. supra note 2 (discussing the development of no-fault divorce).
59. See infra notes 150-78 and accompanying text (discussing Potts v. Tutterow, 340
N.C. 97, 455 S.E.2d 156 (1995) (per curiam)), regarding the long-standing principle of
reciprocal consideration).
60. The now-repealed "recapture" provision for alimony pendente lite awards is an
unlamented example of this. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.11 (1995), repealed by Act of
June 21, 1995, ch. 319, § 1, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 641, 641.
61. There are countless examples of this: the classification of nonvested pensions as
separate property, see infra Part V.B.1, the inability of courts to divide property in kind,
and the treatment of increases or decreases in value of property after the date of
separation. These issues and many more are discussed in detail in Part V of this Article.
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As with most things in life and the law, the "old" alimony law
certainly reflected its age, particularly with regard to its
preoccupation with fault. Although there had been occasional
revisions of the previous laws prior to 1995,6 alimony remained,
without equivocation and without exception,63 totally fault-based.64
Assuming proper procedure and pleading, alimonyO was available to
a spouse regardless of any conceivable set of circumstances6 6 only
upon a finding of (1) dependency67 (a determination that remains the
62. Surprisingly enough, there were no specific grounds for alimony until 1967,
although it was certainly available so long as a wife proved that she was entitled to an
absolute divorce or a divorce from bed and board (i.e., proved that she was the
"innocent" spouse and that her husband was at fault). See 1 SUZANNE REYNOLDS, LEE'S
NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW § 6.3, at 542-47 (5th ed. 1993).
63. This is not to imply, of course, that imaginative lawyers could not "stretch" the
traditional fault grounds for alimony. In Ellinwood v. Ellinwood, 94 N.C. App. 682, 381
S.E.2d 162 (1989), for example, a physician's extraordinary lengthy absences from the
home, coupled with his almost total withdrawal of care of, or interest in, his wife and
family, were held to constitute constructive abandonment, see id. at 684-85, 381 S.E.2d at
164-a common fault ground (in this case for a divorce from bed and board), but one
which had previously required findings of considerably more offensive behavior from the
defendant spouse and the lack of provocation on the part of the complaining spouse. See
1 REYNOLDS, supra note 62, § 6.14, at 574-77.
64. In the majority of other states, and in North Carolina now, consideration of fault
in determining the eligibility for, or amount of, alimony or maintenance is certainly
permissible. See Elrod & Spector, supra note 36, app. tbl. 1 at 804 (listing 27 states that
permit consideration of fault).
65. The rules were virtually the same for alimony pendente lite.
66. A common example of this strict rule-possibly not even changed by the new
statutes, incidentally-is well illustrated by the case of Kuder v. Schroeder, 110 N.C. App.
355, 430 S.E.2d 271 (1993), in which a wife supported her husband through business
school, law school, and a failed attempt to set up his own legal research business. After
he obtained a lucrative position with a large law firm, she was nonetheless held to be the
"supporting spouse" because he had not yet begun his new job. See id. at 357, 430 S.E.2d
272-73.
67. A dependent spouse, under § 50-16.1(3), essentially unchanged by § 50-16.1A(3),
is and was defined as "a spouse, whether husband or wife, who is actually substantially
dependent upon the other spouse for his or her maintenance and support or is
substantially in need of maintenance and support from the other spouse." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50.16.1(3) (1987) (repealed 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1A(3) (1995). This
rule establishes a two-part eligibility test: "Actually substantially dependent" continues
to mean that the spouse "must be entirely without the means to maintain the pre-
separation accustomed standard of living." Hunt v. Hunt, 112 N.C. App. 722, 726, 436
S.E.2d 856, 859 (1993); see also Lamb v. Lamb, 103 N.C. App. 541, 547, 406 S.E.2d 622,
626 (1991) (same holding). "Substantially in need" considerably reduces the burden of
proof of dependence. It also, however, requires a much more detailed inquiry into the
precise previous standard of living, the assets, and the incomes of the parties. See
Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 261 S.E.2d 849 (1980). In Williams, a wife with
substantial property of her own was nonetheless held to be dependent, on the grounds
that she could not be forced to deplete her assets in order to maintain her previous
standard of living. See id. at 187, 261 S.E.2d at 858. For a more detailed illustration of
this point, see 2 REYNOLDS, supra note 45 (alimony chapter). See also infra Part II.A.2
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province of the judge68), (2) a finding that the other spouse was the
supporting spouse,69 and (3) by a further finding, by either a judge or
a jury,70 that the supporting spouse had committed one of the ten,
largely traditional, fault grounds set forth under the now repealed
North Carolina General Statutes § 50-16.2.71 Even with such findings,
a dependent spouse's claim to alimony might still be defeated by
(providing further discussion of the dependency issue).
68. See Vandiver v. Vandiver, 50 N.C. App. 319, 328,274 S.E.2d 243,249 (1981). The
basic rationale behind this rule is that the issues of dependency and supporting are mixed
questions of fact and law. See id.; Long v. Long, 71 N.C. App. 405, 408-09, 322 S.E.2d 427,
430-31 (1984) (clarifying that the correct procedure is to "allow the jury to render its
verdict on the 'fault' issues of divorce, and then, and only then, to move to a bench
hearing on dependency and the proper amount, if any, of alimony"); see also N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-16.8 (1995) (providing that upon application for postseparation support "the
court may base its award on a verified pleading, affidavit, or other competent evidence").
69. See infra note 87. Jury trials for alimony hearings, under both the old and new
laws, are not mandatory, but either party may request (and be granted) such. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 50-10(c) (1995).
70. Section 50-16.3A(d) allows either spouse to request a jury trial on the issue of
marital misconduct. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(d) (1995). Jury trials have never
been mandatory. As a practical matter, however, a lawyer representing a supporting
spouse faced with an alimony claim may often request a jury. There is no reason to
expect this practice to change under the new laws. When there is clear proof of a spouse's
adultery, most parties will simply stipulate that grounds for alimony exist.
71. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3 (1987) (repealed 1995). These grounds, many of
which are incorporated into the new statutes, were as follows:
(1) The supporting spouse has committed adultery.
(2) There has been an involuntary separation of the spouses in consequence of a
criminal act committed by the supporting spouse prior to the proceeding in
which alimony is sought, and the spouses have lived separate and apart for
one year, and the plaintiff or defendant in the proceeding has resided in this
State for six months.
(3) The supporting spouse has engaged in an unnatural or abnormal sex act with
a person of the same sex or of a different sex or with a beast.
(4) The supporting spouse abandons the dependent spouse.
(5) The supporting spouse maliciously turns the dependent spouse out of doors.
(6) The supporting spouse by cruel or barbarous treatment endangers the life of
the dependent spouse.
(7) The supporting spouse offers such indignities to the person of the dependent
spouse as to render his or her condition intolerable and life burdensome.
(8) The supporting spouse is a spendthrift.
(9) The supporting spouse is an excessive user of alcohol or drugs so as to render
the condition of the dependent spouse intolerable and the life of the
dependent spouse burdensome.
(10) The supporting spouse willfully fails to provide the dependent spouse with
necessary subsistence according to his or her means and condition so as to
render the condition of the dependent spouse intolerable and the life of the
dependent spouse burdensome.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.2 (1987), repealed by Act of June 21, 1995, ch. 319, § 1, 1995
N.C. Sess. Laws 641,641.
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common law defenses, most commonly, recrimination.' More
notably, a finding that a dependent spouse had committed adultery,
during the marriage or even during the one-year separation waiting
period, would automatically bar such spouse from obtaining an award
of alimony,73 regardless of dependency, health, or any other factor.74
2. Adultery and the Irrelevance of Need
As noted previously, the new alimony laws have not shed
themselves of the notion of fault,75 and in particular the role of
adultery.76 Need on the part of a non-adulterous dependent spouse,
for example, may still be rendered somewhat irrelevant in
determining both the duration and amount of a support award,
depending upon what other forms of marital misconduct the
adulterous spouse may have committed.77 More to the point,
however, need may be trumped altogether by proof that such spouse
committed adultery on the day of separation or at any time prior to
the parties' separation.78
72. See infra note 73.
73. See, e.g., Adams v. Adams, 92 N.C. App. 274, 278-79, 374 S.E.2d 450, 452-53
(1988) (making the not quite corollary point that adultery by the supporting spouse after
the date of separation but before divorce would give rise to a ground for alimony).
Adultery by the supporting spouse was never a statutory guarantee of alimony for an
otherwise eligible dependent spouse, however. But see infra note 205 and accompanying
text (discussing § 50-16.3A(a), which mandates an alimony award to the dependent
spouse if a supporting spouse has committed adultery). Section 50-16.4 of the General
Statutes does provide for "reasonable attorney fees" for a dependent spouse, but only
after it is determined that such spouse would be entitled to postseparation support or
alimony. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.4 (1995).
74. In one case with which the author was involved, for example, a dependent wife
undergoing kidney dialysis three times a week was denied alimony on the basis that she
had committed adultery. See also Coombs v. Coombs, 121 N.C. App. 746, 468 S.E.2d 807
(1996). In Coombs, the wife was denied permanent alimony, after obtaining a divorce
from bed and board from her husband, because she had committed adultery during the
separation period. See id. at 748-49,468 S.E.2d at 808-09.
75. See supra notes 2, 4. A settlement or separation agreement between the parties
would, however, so long as the parties were in compliance with it, insulate the parties
from the effects of adultery, either as a bar to or ground for alimony. Section 50-16.6(b)
states that "[a]limony, postseparation support, and counsel fees may be barred by an
express provision of a valid separation agreement or premarital agreement so long as the
agreement is being performed." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.6(b) (1995)
76. Section 50-16.3A(a), for instance, continues to bar alimony to a dependent spouse
who has committed "an act of illicit sexual behavior ... prior to or on the date of
separation." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(a) (1995). What is strikingly new under § 50-
16.3A(a), is that if the supporting spouse is the adulterous party, it is mandatory that the
dependent spouse be awarded alimony. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(a); see also
discussion infra note 205 and accompanying text (quoting statute).
77. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(b)(1).
78. See id. § 50-16.3A(a). The only caveat to this statement, now codified under the
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Despite this tenacious obsession with adultery, however, the
1995 statutes certainly have diminished the role of fault, at least in
the early stages of the divorce process,79 when dependent spouses are
most likely to suffer economically and are often almost totally unable
to confront the other spouse on anything approaching an equal
footing. 0 Most significantly, the new statutes limit admission into
evidence only that fault (as defined in § 50-16.3A(b)) 81 that occurred
before or on the date of separation, a radical and extremely salutary
change from previous law.8 Because the date of separation of the
parties has consistently been used as symbolic of and virtually
identical with, the cessation of the marriage,83 the new rule governing
the effects of the behavior of the parties during the one-year waiting
period prior even to filing for divorce' represents both consistency
and common sense. At both a practical and analytical level, it is a
development long overdue in North Carolina jurisprudence85-and
new Act, is that adultery that was "condoned" by the innocent spouse could not be used
against the offending spouse. See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing condonation).
79. See infra Part IV (discussing postseparation support).
80. See supra notes 33-34 (discussing the decline in economic circumstances for
women, who are much more likely than not to be the dependent spouse).
81. Section 50-16.3A(b) lists 15 factors to be considered in determining the amount
and duration of alimony, including "[a]ny other factor relating to the economic
circumstances of the parties that the court finds to be just and proper." N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 50-16.3A(b) (1995). For a complete listing of these factors, see infra text accompanying
note 295.
82. In effect, there is no "legal separation" in North Carolina, unless or until one
party obtains a bed and board divorce, or until the parties execute a separation
agreement. See Benfield v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 82 N.C. App. 293,294,346 S.E.2d 283,284
(1986). When one party separates from the other, with or without the other's consent, the
necessary "separation" has occurred. See supra note 2 (discussing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-
6 (1995). The change is also quite consistent with the policy expressed in the rule that
marital property must be determined and valued as of the date of separation. See infra
note 83. If the marriage ends for purposes of accumulation and valuation of marital
property, the same rationale should certainly apply to the parties' non-economic behavior
as well.
83. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-21(b) (1995) (amended 1997) ("For purposes of
equitable distribution, marital property shall be valued as of the date of separation of the
parties."). The recently amended version of this statute is basically the same. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 50-21(b) (Supp. 1997).
84. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.2A, -16.3A (1995) (limiting respectively acts of
"marital misconduct" (for postseparation support) and acts of "illicit sexual behavior"
(for alimony) to those acts that occur "during the marriage and prior to or on the date of
separation").
85. Allowing parties to separate at the will of one, see supra note 82, and to file for
equitable distribution at any time after separation under § 50-21(a), see N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 50-21(a) (1995) (amended 1997), yet punishing them for forming a relationship after
separation has long been a glaring inconsistency in North Carolina law. Absent a
separation agreement, adultery after separation clearly fell into the "a rose is a rose"
category. See, e.g., Coombs v. Coombs, 121 N.C. App. 746,748-49,468 S.E.2d 807,808-09
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one that is likely to be welcomed equally by both spouses. At a
minimum, the mandate that postseparation fault may not be
considered for either postseparation support or alimony8 6 brings
North Carolina one step closer to a considerably more rational, non-
punitive approach to spousal support.
B. Definition Changes
1. Alimony-Old and New
Although the actual definitions of dependent and supporting
spouses87 are precisely the same under the new laws as they formerly
were,18 these terms nonetheless warrant considerable discussion,
beyond that already provided,89 for at least two reasons. First, the
intricacies of the law of dependency were somewhat unclear under
the old laws and are even more unclear in some respects now.9"
Secondly, apart from the definitional section, other portions of the
new act do appear to answer some of the older issues, while
simultaneously raising new ones-very prominently including an
expansion of the manner in which dependency itself is determined,
discussed more fully in Part III of this Article. 91 Leaving that core
issue aside for now, also of particular importance is the issue of when,
(1996) (applying § 50-16.6(a) to hold that voluntary sexual relations with a non-spouse
during separation pursuant to a decree of divorce from bed and board constituted
adultery and thus was a defense to the payment of permanent alimony).
86. There is a caveat to this statement, however. Both § 50-16.2A(e) (postseparation
support) and § 50-16.3A(b)(1) (alimony) state, "Nothing herein shall prevent a court
from considering incidents of post date-of-separation marital misconduct as corroborating
evidence supporting other evidence that marital misconduct occurred during the marriage
and prior to date of separation." N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-16.2A(e), -16.3A(b)(1). Thus,
embarking on a Caribbean cruise with one's paramour the day after separation is still ill-
advised.
87. Although there must be a finding of fact that one spouse is the supporting party,
as a practical matter, the dependency issue is much more significant. In Long v. Long, 71
N.C. App. 405, 406-07, 322 S.E.2d 427, 429 (1984), for example, the court of appeals
squarely held that the issue was not whether the alleged supporting spouse had the ability
to pay, but whether the spouse seeking support was in fact dependent. Moreover,
intentional depression of one's income in order to avoid being the supporting spouse will
likely result in the application of the earning capacity standard. See Beall v. Beall, 290
N.C. 669, 674,228 S.E.2d 407,410 (1976).
88. See supra notes 1, 67.
89. See supra notes 67-69.
90. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Cunningham, 121 N.C. App. 771, 468 S.E.2d 466 (1996),
rev'd on other grounds, 345 N.C. 430, 480 S.E.2d 403 (1997); infra text accompanying
notes 106-10 (discussing Cunningham).
91. See discussion infra Parts III.C.2-3 (discussing other alimony factors).
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or possibly how often, dependency must be proven.92
Dependency is a requirement that is, at a minimum, "first among
equals" as a prerequisite for obtaining either alimony or
postseparation support.93  But assuming that an order for
postseparation support for a period of six months is entered, and that
no further progress is made towards resolution of equitable
distribution or other issues remaining in the case by the termination
of the six month award, does that postseparation award automatically
terminate? 94 Clearly, a reservation of continuing jurisdiction over the
issue would resolve the question in the negative.95 Indeed, it is
analytically reasonably safe to conclude that courts already have such
jurisdictional power, as they clearly do with all issues of continuing
support for a spouse or child.96 Assuming such jurisdiction exists, if a
dependent spouse filed a motion to extend the time frame for a
postseparation support award, or, even a new motion for
postseparation support, would the dependency finding from the
original motion have some kind of res judicata or "carry-over" effect
in the second?
97
It would appear that the logical solution would be to simply
extend the protection of the changed circumstances standard to the
92. This is an issue that generally did not arise under the old alimony pendente lite
statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3 (1987) (repealed 1995). That law specifically stated
that the amount and payment of alimony pendente lite "shall be in the same manner as
alimony, except that the same shall be limited to the pendency of the suit in which
application is made." Id. Thus, a termination of alimony pendente lite at a "date certain"
was impossible under the old statutes. See Hunt v. Hunt, 112 N.C. App. 722, 730, 436
S.E.2d 856, 861 (1993) (stating specifically that North Carolina does not recognize the
concept of rehabilitative alimony). Postseparation support, as previously noted, however,
may be brought "[iln an action brought pursuant to Chapter 50." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-
16.2A(a) (1995). And it may clearly be ordered for a specific time period only. See id.
93. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-16.2A(c), -16.3A(a) (1995).
94. It seems obvious that the duty to pay will terminate at the conclusion of the
specified time period-one of the few instances in which "self-help," cessation of
payment, unaccompanied by any motion to modify, can operate in the area of support.
95. See infra text accompanying notes 106-07.
96. Although postseparation support is a new statute, not a revision of or
replacement of the now-repealed alimony pendente lite statute (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-
16.3 (1987), repealed by Act of June 21, 1995, ch. 319, § 1, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 641, 641),
the analogy to alimony pendente lite cannot be ignored, nor can the substantial body of
case law developed under the former action. Alimony and child support may be modified
at any time, upon a showing of changed circumstances. See e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-
13.7, 50-16.9 (1995).
97. The term "res judicata" here is used in a very limited and loose form. As in other
contexts in family law, notably child support and custody, "findings" never have a true res
judicata effect and are always subject to change upon a showing of changed
circumstances. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.7 (1995) (entitled "Modification of Order for
Child Support or Custody").
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initial dependency finding to any subsequent postseparation support
action or to a motion to extend an initial award for a set period of
time, particularly if one spouse were intentionally foot-dragging to
delay the process.9s This conclusion would appear to be strongly
supported, and limited in its effect, by the fact that if events that
would "disqualify" one as a dependent spouse had occurred,99 a
supporting spouse could always move to modify or terminate any
award of postseparation support. 00 The same somewhat tenuous
effect would of course operate in reverse, in the event that a non-
dependent spouse became dependent during the one-year separation
period. Thus, not only would the moving spouse have the burden of
proof and the opportunity to contest the dependency issue at any
time in any event, but denying the dependency issue a "quasi" res
judicata effect could certainly lead to a rather large, and unnecessary,
expenditure of judicial resources.101 The same logic does not indicate
that a judicial finding of dependency at the postseparation support
stage would sustain the dependency characterization through an
alimony hearing as well."~ Thus, it appears clear that a dependency
finding will be subject to re-examination prior to the final alimony
hearing; what remains unclear is if such a new finding will be
98. The discovery process is most often the source for such delays. Granting of
continuances is also a culprit. A strong analogy may be found in the sanctions to be
imposed in an equitable distribution action for similar types of recalcitrant behavior. See
id. § 50-21 (Supp. 1997).
99. Section 50-16.9 states in part:
(a) An order of a court of this State for alimony or postseparation support
... may be modified or vacated at any time, upon motion in the cause and a
showing of changed circumstances by either party or anyone interested....
(b) If a dependent spouse who is receiving postseparation support or
alimony from a supporting spouse under a judgment or order of a court of this
State remarries or engages in cohabitation, the postseparation support or
alimony shall terminate. Postseparation support or alimony shall terminate
upon the death of either the supporting or the dependent spouse.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9 (1995). Of course, acquisition of substantial amounts of
money, through an equitable distribution award, inheritance, etc., may constitute
"changed circumstances" and thus render a spouse no longer dependent. See, e.g.,
Sayland v. Sayland, 267 N.C. 379,383, 148 S.E.2d 218,222 (1966).
100. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9(a).
101. This is in fact a supposition-but one well supported by the experience of anyone
involved in this area of the law: if parties can fight about something, they will surely do
so. Unnecessary repeated litigation of the dependency issue would also greatly increase
attorney fees, usually to the detriment of the dependent spouse.
102. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9. But see infra note 103 (explaining why two
hearings may be necessary). In many cases, parties will simply stipulate as to
dependency.
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required.103
Support for the proposition that dependency status must surely
be redetermined at the time of an initial alimony hearing or after a
final distribution of property derives as well from the "entitlement"
section of the new alimony statute."° This section not only
authorizes a hearing on the merits of an alimony claim prior to the
entry of an order for equitable distribution, but goes on-quite
significantly-to state that if alimony is awarded, "the issues of
amount and of whether a spouse is a dependent or supporting spouse
may be reviewed by the court after the conclusion of the equitable
distribution claim."'1 5 It is also worthy of great note that this portion
of the statute would appear to end the controversy created by the
recent decision in Cunningham v. Cunningham,0 6 in which the court
of appeals rather mysteriously held, in effect, that once adjudicated
"dependent," a spouse would not lose that status, even though she
might have alimony reduced to zero. °7 This holding, contradicted by
previous case law,0 8 would be tantamount to treating a dependency
finding at least at the alimony stage of the divorce process as an
unremovable birthmark. More noteworthy is the point that the new
statutes authorize a revisitation of the dependency issue, at least in an
alimony claim, only after equitable distribution of property has been
effected-a redundancy of sorts, in view of the fact that a property
distribution sufficient to disqualify a party as dependent is simply a
changed circumstance. 0 9 The critical point is that the issue of
103. The issue may be the same, but the actions-postseparation support and
alimony-are clearly different, so that it appears likely that a new hearing on the
dependency issue might well be required. This conclusion draws support from the facts
that postseparation hearings are often quite limited in scope and that the parties will
obviously have had no meaningful opportunity for discovery prior to the postseparation
support hearing.
104. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(a) (1995).
105. Id.
106. 121 N.C. App. 771, 468 S.E.2d 466 (1996), rev'd on other grounds, 345 N.C. 430,
480 S.E.2d 403 (1997). For a further discussion of this case, see infra note 240.
107. See id. at 774, 468 S.E.2d at 468.
108. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text (quoting relevant statutory
provisions).
109. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(/). In some instances, moreover, it is impossible
to identify the factors that the court is directed to consider in determining the amount and
duration of an alimony award until after an equitable distribution is concluded. Both
statutes make specific reference to modification of alimony, for example, after entry of an
equitable distribution judgment. The statutory provision governing entitlement to
alimony states that "if awarded, the issues of amount and of whether a spouse is a
dependent or supporting spouse may be reviewed by the court after the conclusion of the
equitable distribution claim." Id. The Equitable Distribution Act also provides that
"[a]fter the determination of an equitable distribution, the court, upon request of either
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dependency may still be revisited (certainly after a property division
has occurred, including any divisible property that has accrued), or
may disappear altogether in the event that other statutory
termination events occur.110
Thus, there are two points being made: (1) that courts have
continuing jurisdiction over a postseparation or alimony award
whether or not the award specifies a particular termination date
(assuming that courts do not already have such power, they can
certainly create it in any or all orders), and (2) that for reasons of
common sense and judicial economy, dependency status should be
afforded the protection of quasi "res judicata" principles, unless the
law specifies to the contrary, or circumstances of the parties have
undergone a significant change to warrant revisiting the issue. Both
law and principle dictate that these points become a part of North
Carolina's jurisprudence. Moreover, the last thing that our already
overburdened courts need is an additional burden imposed upon
them.' In brief, continuing jurisdiction over any "specified term"
award of postseparation support or alimony would appear to be a
"win-win" situation: if continuation of either is warranted,"2 state
public policy and statutory goals would be better served by the
adoption of such a position, particularly in the postseparation support
context. If not warranted, the burden lies on the spouse seeking
continuation beyond the "specified term" to explain and justify his or
her continuing need."' It is well worth noting, that this issue, at least
in the postseparation support context, could be avoided by initial
awards specifying continuance until the date of distribution or final
alimony hearing.114
party, shall consider whether an order for alimony or child support should be modified or
vacated pursuant to G.S. 50-16.9 or 50-13.7." Id. § 50-20(f) (Supp. 1997). And a
dependent spouse who is not entitled to alimony will clearly have fewer resources, which
is a factor in determining whether or not an equal division of property is equitable under
§ 50-20(c). It is obvious that one cannot know the extent of one's assets, or dependency
status, until after equitable distribution is concluded.
110. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9 (1995).
111. In fiscal year July 1, 1995, to June 30, 1996, for example, there were over 158,000
civil actions filed in the district courts of North Carolina. Some 50,000 of these involved
child support collection, but 59,370 were "other domestic relations" actions-divorce,
alimony, property division, etc. Of that number, 21,529 of the actions were still pending
as of June 30, 1996. See N.C. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, SUMMARY OF JULY 1,
1995-JUNE 30,1996 NORTH CAROLINA TRIAL COURT CASELOAD (1996).
112. See supra text accompanying notes 98-100.
113. This is, in fact, the position that the majority of courts have taken. See infra Part
II.B.2, dealing with rehabilitative alimony, but closely akin, both practically and
analytically, to postseparation support.
114. Section 50-16.1A(4) already specifies that a postseparation support award will be
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2. Procedural Issues
The more important and more glaring changes within the new
alimony laws have necessitated a more subtle, although very
significant, revision of the definition of alimony itself. In fact, to a
somewhat surprising degree, many of the more profound changes
wrought by the new alimony laws lie within the basic definition
changes themselves. For instance, the new § 50-16.1A(1) states that
alimony is "an order for payment for the support and maintenance of
a spouse or former spouse, periodically or in a lump sum for a
specified or for an indefinite term in an action for divorce, whether
absolute or from bed and board, or in an action for alimony without
divorce." 5 A remarkable number of issues arise from what appears
to be a rather simple revision of the definition section of the statute,
and the first two of these issues are procedural.
First, the action for alimony without divorce was repealed in
1967,116 a point that seems to have escaped the attention of virtually
all judges, lawyers, and legislators. In one sense, the practical and
economic effects of this overlooked repeal are rather negligible.1 7
Nonetheless, if orders awarding alimony or postseparation support
are available only incident to an absolute divorce, or to a divorce
from bed and board, certain problems-at least at an analytical
level"'-are created by this section. Perhaps the more obvious
difficulty is that, unless a "qualified""' 9 dependent spouse has lived
separate and apart for one year, such spouse will not be able to file
continued until a final alimony hearing. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1A(4) (1995).
Because equitable distribution orders may render a spouse non-dependent, in most
instances a post-separation support order should endure until the time of distribution.
This suggestion has the added advantage of creating incentives to speed up the often
protracted equitable distribution process.
115. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1A(1) (1995) (emphasis added). The italicized portion
of the statute reflects the new portions. The former section, now repealed § 50-16.1(1),
referred only to "a spouse, either in lump sum or on a continuing basis." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-16.1 (1987) (repealed 1995). Note as well that alimony without divorce was
repealed in 1967, thus apparently leaving only absolute divorce and divorce from bed and
board as the only actions in which alimony may be ordered. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16
(1966), repealed by Act of July 6, 1967, ch. 1152, § 1, 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws 1766, 1766.
116. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16 (1966), repealed by Act of July 6, 1967, ch. 1152, § 1,
1967 N.C. Sess. Laws 1766, 1766.
117. One can still obtain an award of alimony or postseparation support and never
seek to obtain a divorce. As we have seen, however, either spouse may sue for a divorce
after living separate and apart for one year. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1995); supra
note 2.
118. See infra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
119. See infra Part III.A (discussing the role that "marital misconduct" may play in the
context of qualification of a dependent spouse).
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for absolute divorce, thus leaving a divorce from bed and board-
available solely on fault grounds120 -as the only apparent basis for an
award of alimony. This apparently common-sense reading of the new
statute leaves an award of postseparation support prior to absolute
divorce still held firmly in the embrace of the traditional fault
grounds for bed and board divorce-a result clearly at odds with the
goals of the new laws.' 2 1 As a practical matter, however, one can
clearly file for alimony-ignoring the now-repealed "alimony without
divorce" action-and postseparation support simultaneously, as the
next paragraph will explain.
In part because the interpretation initially discussed above
appears clearly to undermine one of the major purposes of the new
laws, a very different statutory construction may arise when the
definition of alimony under § 50-16.1A()-apparently limiting an
order for alimony to actions for divorce or divorce from bed and
board-is compared with § 50-16.2A(a)'2 and § 50-16.3A(a), both of
which authorize bringing an action for postseparation support or
alimony "[i]n an action brought pursuant to Chapter 50."
123
Although the elementary statutory construction rule is that the more
specific provision is preferred over the more general,"4 both types of
actions for support may well be interpreted as being brought under
"any action brought pursuant to Chapter 50""--an outcome much
preferred over the more limited option and much more consistent
with the purposes of the new law. The specific-over-general statutory
construction rule, moreover, has frequently yielded to the principle
that the broader statutory purposes should not be undermined by
120. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-7 (1995).
121. An award of postseparation support, however, may be brought in "an action
brought pursuant to Chapter 50 of the General Statutes." Id. § 50-16.2A(a).
122 See infra note 377 (discussing § 50-16.2A(a)).
123. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-16.2A(a), -16.3A(a). These provisions are clearly and
considerably broader than the definitional provisions.
124. See Trustees of Rowan Technical College v. J. Hyatt Hammond Assocs., 313 N.C.
230,238,328 S.E.2d 274,279 (1985) ("Where one of two statutes might apply to the same
situation, the statute which deals more directly and specifically with this situation controls
over the statute of more general applicability."); see also National Food Stores v. North
Carolina Bd. of Alcoholic Control, 268 N.C. 624, 629, 151 S.E.2d 582, 586 (1966)
(explaining that two statutory provisions "can be harmonized with a view to giving effect
to a consistent legislative policy by holding, as we do, that the specific provisions ...
prevail over the general provisions").
125. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-16.2A(a), -16.3A(a); see, e.g., Sharp, supra note 10, at 271-
73 (discussing at length the freedom with which the supreme court interpreted the
Equitable Distribution Act-an interpretation certainly necessary to fulfill the basic
purposes of the statute).
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strict adherence to the general rule of interpretation.
126
A somewhat similar construction problem exists within the
definition of alimony, which states that payments may be made
"periodically or in a lump sum, for a specified or for an indefinite
term."2 7 Although these forms of payment are discussed in more
detail further in this Article," it is important to recognize that a later
part of the statute, and one which quite specifically deals with the
determination of the amount and duration of alimony, could well
appear to be inconsistent with the four payment options above. That
section directs that "[t]he duration of the award may be for a
specified or for an indefinite term."2 9 Thus, the broader list of what
appears to be four payment options is narrowed to only two options
in the more specific portion of the statute.
In this instance, however, the more common "specific-over-
general" rule of statutory interpretation may well be the preferred
solution to this apparent inconsistency. The rationale underlying this
interpretation, however, does not rest solely upon such statutory
interpretation principles.130  Under previous law, it was clear that
"periodic" alimony payments were in fact payments for an
"indefinite" term,'3 so these two provisions are likely to be
interpreted as simply duplicative of one another.
At first glance, the authorization of lump sum alimony in the
definitional portion of the statute and the omission of the lump sum
payout option in the latter and more specific section, may appear to
be more difficult to reconcile. 32  However, it appears that
reconciliation is indeed quite reasonable, again relying in part upon
126. See, e.g., Merritt v. Edwards Ridge, 323 N.C. 330, 337, 372 S.E.2d 559, 563 (1988)
(stating that the general rule of statutory construction should be applied "absent a clear
legislative intent to the contrary"); Hayes v. Fowler, 123 N.C. App. 400, 404-05, 473
S.E.2d 442, 445 (1996) ("The basic requirement is that we 'ascertain and effectuate the
intent of the legislative body' as indicated by 'the language of the statute ... the spirit of
the act, and what the act seeks to accomplish.'" (quoting Coastal Ready-Mix Concrete
Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 299 N.C. 620, 629,265 S.E.2d 379,385 (1980))).
127. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1A(1) (1995).
128. See infra notes 145-78 and accompanying text.
129. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(b).
130. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
131. See Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 189, 261 S.E.2d 849, 859 (1980) (vacating
the trial court's designation of its order for alimony of $1000 per month, among other
awards, as "permanent lump-sum alimony" and holding that "[c]learly, the trial court
here has ordered periodic payments"); White v. White, 37 N.C. App. 471, 478, 246 S.E.2d
591, 595-96 (1978) (recognizing an order for the husband to pay the wife $100 per week
until her remarriage or death to be an award of periodic permanent alimony payments).
132. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(b) ("The duration of the award may be for a
specified or for an indefinite term.")
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the above analysis.133  Under the predecessor statute, alimony
payments could be made only via lump sum awards or "on a
continuing basis."'" But well-established case law on lump sum
alimony awards-to the effect that an award of alimony for a
specified period is clearly a "lump sum" award 13--should resolve the
apparent ambiguity or inconsistency. Thus, it is not unreasonable to
suggest that lump sum awards are virtually synonymous with awards
for a specified term and that because indefinite term alimony must
clearly be paid periodically, the seemingly inconsistent statutory
terminology may be reconciled. The result is that there are in fact
only two options for the method of payment of alimony, lump sum
(specific term) and periodic (indefinite term). Greater simplicity,
logic, and previously established law would all appear to recommend
this resolution of what is actually only an apparent conflict in the
types of alimony payment options.
C. Other Alimony Issues
1. Integration Revisited
At some risk of repetition, not to mention the dangers of
reopening what has long been a Pandora's box of sorts, a discussion
of lump sum alimony cannot avoid another issue about which there
has been considerable controversy. 36 The core of the problem is the
true meaning of "lump sum" alimony: whether or not in substance
and in particular, such alimony may be subject to judicial
modification. This question was the subject of considerable
controversy even under the previous law.137 But the combination of a
133. See supra notes 127-31.
134. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1(1) (1987), repealed by Act of June 21, 1995, ch. 319,
§ 1, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 641, 641.
135. See Mitchell v. Mitchell, 270 N.C. 253, 257, 154 S.E.2d 71, 74 (1967) (determining
an order that plaintiff pay defendant a specified sum on the fifth of each month for a
specified period, while not denominated "alimony," to be an award of alimony in gross or
lump sum alimony, "which is fundamentally the award of a definite sum of money for the
wife's support and maintenance"); Potts v. Tutterow, 114 N.C. App. 360, 367, 442 S.E.2d
90, 94 (1994) (Greene, J., dissenting) (explaining that "an award of a definite sum payable
over a specified period of time ... is an award of lump sum alimony" (citing Mitchell, 270
N.C. at 257, 154 S.E.2d at 74; Whitesell v. Whitesell, 59 N.C. App. 552, 552, 297 S.E.2d
172, 173 (1982))), affdper curiam, 340 N.C. 97, 455 S.E.2d 156 (1995); see also infra notes
145-78 (discussing lump sum alimony as part of a property division).
136. See Sally Burnett Sharp, Semantics as Jurisprudence: The Elevation of Form over
Substance in the Treatment of Separation Agreements in North Carolina, 69 N.C. L. REV.
319 (1991).
137. See infra notes 146-58 (discussing the controversy).
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careful analysis of existing case law and the new definition of alimony
offers considerable, and much needed, guidance in this area.
138
To start at the beginning, however, and with the fervent hope
that this long-standing confusion may be resolved, case law in North
Carolina had long held that a lump sum payment to a spouse or ex-
spouse could in fact be paid out in periodic form.' So long as these
payments were actually alimony, they would be treated as such and
thus could always be terminated or modified on motion in the cause
and upon a showing of changed circumstances. 40
"Actual alimony" was meticulously defined in Marks v. Marks4'
to require two elements: (1) that there must be an order of a court,
and (2) that the order must in fact be for the support of a dependent
spouse and not part of a property settlement.1 42 In stating this rule,
the supreme court merely reiterated and clarified a well-established
principle in North Carolina and other jurisdictions: that an
"integrated" separation agreement that becomes an order of the
court-i.e., an agreement in which the payments labeled "alimony"
are in fact reciprocal consideration for a property division 4 -wffil not
be considered "true" alimony, and thus not subject to the exigencies
of termination and modification that almost always accompany
conventional alimony payments.'"
138. The author of this Article is much tempted to say "solution."
139. See, e.g., Marks v. Marks, 316 N.C. 447,449,342 S.E.2d 859,860 (1986); Rogers v.
Rogers, 111 N.C. App. 606, 612, 432 S.E.2d 907, 910 (1993); Hayes v. Hayes, 100 N.C.
App. 138, 142, 394 S.E.2d 675, 679 (1990). True alimony, like other support duties, is
virtually always modifiable. This is a principle to which the public policy of North
Carolina is strongly devoted. See Rowe v. Rowe, 305 N.C. 177, 183-84, 287 S.E.2d 840,
844 (1982), appeal on remand, 74 N.C. App. 54, 327 S.E.2d 624 (1985); Frykberg v.
Frykberg, 76 N.C. App. 401, 410, 333 S.E.2d 766, 772 (1985); Acosta v. Clark, 70 N.C.
App. 111, 113-14, 318 S.E.2d 551, 553 (1984).
140. See Morrison v. Morrison, 102 N.C. App. 514, 519, 402 S.E.2d 855, 858 (1991);
cases cited supra note 139.
141. 316 N.C. 447,342 S.E.2d 859 (1986).
142. See id. at 452-54, 342 S.E.2d at 862-64. For a time the confusing, and confused,
decision of Walters v. Walters, 307 N.C. 381, 298 S.E.2d 338 (1983), cast doubt on the
validity of the integration principle. For a detailed discussion that concludes that the
principle fully retained its viability after Walters, see Sharp, supra note 136, at 331-41.
143. See Sharp, supra note 136, at 341-47.
144. This principle had been well-settled in North Carolina case law since the 1940s.
See, e.g., Stanley v. Stanley, 226 N.C. 129, 133, 37 S.E.2d 118, 120 (1946). However, it
received considerable elaboration in later years. For example, in White v. White, 296 N.C.
661, 252 S.E.2d 698 (1979), the supreme court carefully explained that periodic payments,
even if labeled alimony, "may not be alimony within the meaning of the statute ... if they
and other provisions for a property division between the parties constitute reciprocal
consideration for each other." Id. at 666, 252 S.E.2d at 701. The White court went on to
hold that in the absence of a clear indicia to the contrary, provisions for support and
property division should be presumed to be non-integrated. See id. at 672, 252 S.E.2d at
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Such a common sense principle, well-rooted in contract law, 145
but mistakenly deemed to have been undermined by a 1983 North
Carolina Supreme Court decision, 46 is an eminently sensible solution
to the common problem that one spouse's share of marital property,
were it mandated to be paid in true lump sum, could well have the
effect of, for example, forcing a sale of a profitable business, or
creating such a debt load that the business would fail in any event.14 7
The solution to avoiding an impossible or possibly ruinous one-time
payment was patently obvious: an economic entitlement that was in
fact part of a property division that could be structured to be paid out
over a specific period of time.48 Another clear advantage of this
integration principle is that a property division falling under the
"support" or alimony rubric may be treated as alimony for federal
income tax purposes, regardless of state law, so long as the Internal
Revenue Code's functional and definitional requirements for
"alimony" are met.149
704. That presumption made considerable sense at a time when there was no provision
for any property division upon divorce-but would make considerably more sense if it
were reversed now. See Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C. 67, 136 S.E.2d 240 (1964), overruled in
part by Walters v. Walters, 307 N.C. 381, 298 S.E.2d 338 (1983). In fact, the Walters
decision does not mention the integration principle and makes no reference at all to
White.
145. Consideration is a necessary element of contracts, and "[t]he essence of
consideration ... is legal detriment, that has been bargained for by the promisor and
exchanged by the promisee in return for the promise of the promisor." JOHN D.
CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACrS § 4-2(c), at 189 (3d ed. 1987) (footnotes
omitted).
146. See Walters v. Walters, 307 N.C. 381, 298 S.E.2d 338 (1983). That poorly
analyzed, confusing, and internally inconsistent case was initially treated as having
overruled the integration, or reciprocal consideration, principle. Later cases have begun
to rectify that error. See, e.g., Marks v. Marks, 316 N.C. 447, 342 S.E.2d 859 (1986);
Morrison v. Morrison, 102 N.C. App. 514, 402 S.E.2d 855 (1991). For a laborious
treatment of the Walters case and the ensuing confusion it engendered, see Sharp, supra
note 136, at 333-41.
147. As I have frequently cautioned my classes, no matter how heinous a goose may
be, do not kill it so long as it continues to lay eggs-gold or otherwise.
148. See Sharp, supra note 136, at 341-47.
149. See LR.C. §§ 71(b), 1041 (1994) (setting forth the requirements for "alimony"
treatment of periodic payments). Probably the most significant points to note in this
context are the absence of any requirement that the payments cease upon remarriage of
the recipient and the requirement under § 71(b)(1)(D) that payments must not survive
the death of the payor. Agreements incorporated or merged into a decree that payments
will continue after the remarriage or death of the payee are classic indicia of true
property settlements, but payments that survive remarriage will not disqualify a periodic
payment from receiving treatment as "alimony" under the Internal Revenue Code
("I.R.C."). It is thus not difficult to suggest that the I.R.C. has implicitly recognized
affixing the alimony label to what is clearly a property division, assuming the other
requirements of § 71 are met.
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As soon as the renewed vitality of the integration principle had
begun to take place,150 the supreme court handed down Potts v.
Tutterow, 5 1 a case that not only seems strongly to solidify the
integration principle, 52 but that may also provide some guidance for
the interpretation of the effects of the payment options under the
new statute. The danger in the Potts case, however, is that, without
careful analysis, it might just as easily engender yet more, albeit
needless, confusion and thus it warrants further discussion.
53
The supreme court's per curiam opinion in Potts necessarily
compels an analysis of the more lengthy opinion of the court of
appeals, in which the central issue was the nature of a district court
order that the plaintiff husband pay " 'lump-sum alimony of $54,240,
payable in semi-monthly installments of $452.' "5' The lower court
noted in its conclusions of law that the above sum, "'together with
the equity in the house and lot shall be the only and entire alimony
obligation of Plaintiff.' , Defendant wife remarried just under a
year after this order was entered, plaintiff ceased making the bi-
monthly payments, and his ex-wife filed for contempt, contending
150. See, e.g., Marks, 316 N.C. at 455,342 S.E.2d at 864; Williams v. Williams, 120 N.C.
App. 707,715,463 S.E.2d 815, 821 (1995).
151. 340 N.C. 97, 455 S.E.2d 156 (1995) (per curiam). The case itself is similar to
Hayes v. Hayes, 100 N.C. App. 138, 394 S.E.2d 675 (1990). In Hayes, the husband ceased
making "alimony" payments as provided for in a consent judgment upon the wife's
remarriage. See id. at 140, 394 S.E.2d at 676. The trial court found that the payments
were reciprocal consideration for a property division, were part of a property division,
and thus were nonmodifiable. See id. at 145, 394 S.E.2d at 679. The court of appeals
remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of the intentions of the parties, but
unequivocally held that the integration principle was the governing rule on this issue. See
id. at 146-48, 394 S.E.2d at 679-80.
152. See infra note 153. As the leading authority has aptly put the matter, "[i]f the
spouses' separation agreement contains both property division provisions and alimony
provisions, and both types of provision are 'integrated,' that is each is arrived at in
consideration for the other, then neither the property division nor the alimony is
modifiable when the agreement is merged in the divorce decree." CLARK, supra note 2,
§ 19.14, at 466.
153. Potts simply upheld the court of appeals ruling that a wife's lump sum alimony
could be terminated upon her remarriage. See Potts, 340 N.C. at 97-98, 445 S.E.2d at 156-
57. In so doing, it affirmed the court of appeals which had held that the wife's payments
were not integrated and so could be modified. See Potts v. Tutterow, 114 N.C. App. 360,
365, 442, S.E.2d 90, 93 (1994), affd per curiam, 340 N.C. 97, 455 S.E.2d 156 (1995). The
critical fact is not that a lump sum award was modifiable, but that the payments were so
structured as not to overcome the White presumption of the severability of support and
property division. See supra note 144 (discussing White). As discussed infra note 156, the
court's introduction of the concept of "vesting" into this area, at the same time as it
disavows any insurance analogy, might prove to be confusing. See Potts, 114 N.C. App. at
364,442 S.E.2d at 92-93.
154. Potts, 114 N.C. App. at 361,442 S.E.2d at 91 (quoting district court order).
155. Id. (quoting district court order).
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that the lump-sum alimony was "vested ' 156 at the time it was ordered
and therefore not subject to termination, as the district court had
ruled it was.
15 7
The court of appeals wisely rejected the dissent's5 8 attempt to
characterize the issue as whether or not the original order was in the
nature of a "lump sum" or a "periodic payment." '159 Instead, the
majority correctly focused upon whether the award was "vested" or
not-and used as the touchstone for that determination the issue of
whether the lump-sum amount of the award was in fact "alimony" or
was in fact part of a property settlement.160 In what is probably the
most critical but overlooked portion of its opinion, the court of
appeals went on to state that North Carolina courts "have held that
support payments which constitute reciprocal consideration for a
property settlement are not alimony in the true sense of the word and
are not subject to modification."'' In other words, integrated
agreements, whether or not payments of money to a spouse in a lump
sum, periodic payments, or both, are not modifiable precisely
because they are not alimony in the first instance. 62 The brief
156. The term "vested" is frequently used by courts in other states. "Vesting" in other
states, however, is basically defined in a fashion identical to integration. See, e.g., Cheek
v. Cheek, 500 So. 2d 17, 18 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986) (identifying "alimony in gross" as a
property settlement (and thus nonmodifiable) and stating the rule that alimony in gross
must satisfy two requirements: "(1) the time of payment and the amount must be certain,
and (2) the right to alimony must be vested"); Skvarch v. Skvarch, 876 P.2d 1110, 1112
(Alaska 1994) ("Alimony" is not modifiable "'where the award is an integral part of a
property settlement and thus a property right vested in the dependent spouse.'" (quoting
Voyles v. Voyles, 644 P.2d 847, 850 (Alaska 1982))). As in Potts, the wife in Cheek
satisfied the first requirement, but not the integrated agreement principle.
157. See Potts, 114 N.C. App. at 363,442 S.E.2d at 91-92.
158. See id. at 366-67, 442 S.E.2d 93-94 (Greene, J., dissenting).
159. Obviously, the award was a periodic payment of a lump sum amount labeled
alimony, thus lending strong support to the suggestion that the central issue was
somewhat miscast by the dissent. The issue, it should be emphasized, is whether the
payments are integrated or not integrated with a property division-not whether they are
"periodic" or "lump sum."
160. See Potts, 114 N.C. App. at 364-65,442 S.E.2d at 92-93.
161. Id. at 365,442 S.E.2d at 93. The great majority of states agree with this principle.
As noted by Clark, "if the decree orders the payments as a means of carrying out a
division of the parties' property, under many statutes and the majority of cases, it may not
be modified." CLARK, supra note 2, § 16.5, at 657; see also id. § 18.8, at 784; Keffer v.
Keffer, 852 P.2d 394, 397 (Alaska 1993) (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting) ("Integration ... is
grounded on the theory that spousal support was, at least in part, negotiated as a 'trade
off' [for other property benefits] .... "); Williams v. Williams, 120 N.C. App. 707,715,463
S.E.2d 815, 821 (1995) (reaffirming the integration principle and emphasizing the critical
importance of the specific language necessary to overcome the White presumption of
severability); infra notes 169-70 (discussing the importance of clear wording).
162. The author must confess that the majority of these "other words," insofar as
North Carolina law is concerned, are her own. See Sharp, supra note 136, at 333-51.
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supreme court opinion in no way undermined the affirmation of the
integration principle, but elaborated slightly on payments that would
otherwise be treated as modifiable unless vested-i.e., true alimony
payments, whether lump sum or periodic, that have been ordered,
not paid, and were due and owing at remarriage of the recipient
spouse are "vested.' 16 3 On the other hand, those payments that are
integrated with a property settlement are already a vested right, due
and owing, whether a lump sum or not, and thus not subject to
termination.16
Thus, Potts should be viewed as an affirmation of the traditional
rule that lump sum "alimony," even if paid out periodically, may
nonetheless be nonmodifiable so long as it is in fact part of a property
division. As a corollary, "true alimony"-as payments in Potts were,
and as the earlier court in Marks took great pains to define 6 5-- may
be modified or terminated, under both the old and new statutes, so
long as the statutory requirements for such modification or
termination are met. 66  This rule prevails whether the alimony
payments are lump sum, periodic, for a specified period, or for a
nonspecific period. 67 So long as there exists a court order (whether
entered by consent or not) and a provision truly intended to provide
for maintenance of a spouse (whether denominated alimony or
postseparation support), a court will treat the provision, as it should,
as "true" alimony, complete with all the incidents thereto.68
Somewhat unfortunately, the majority also relied on a weak analogy that only past due
alimony could support execution. See Potts, 114 N.C. App. at 364, 442 S.E.2d at 92-93.
The court was certainly not incorrect in this statement. Indeed, under § 50-16.7(i) of the
North Carolina General Statutes, past due alimony payments must be reduced to
judgment before becoming a lien on real estate. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.7(i) (1995).
Quite fortunately, the gravamen of the Potts decision does not rely upon this portion of its
analysis.
163. This statement is not inconsistent with holdings of other states. See supra note
156 (citing cases).
164. See Potts v. Tutterow, 340 N.C. 97, 97-98, 455 S.E.2d 156, 156-57 (1995) (per
curiam). Again, this follows well established law on arrearages. See, e.g., N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 52C-3-305(b)(4) (1995) (authorizing a court to determine support arrearages (for
child support or alimony) and a method for compliance). This is part of the Uniform
Interstate Family Support Act. See id. § 52C-1-100.
165. See supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text (discussing Marks v. Marks, 316
N.C. 447,342 S.E.2d 859 (1986)).
166. This refers largely to the issues of dependency and the absence of compelling
"illicit sexual behavior" on the part of that spouse. See infra Part III.A (discussing illicit
sexual behavior).
167. The "lump sum" in Potts was terminated only because it was true alimony-albeit
in a form that more commonly points to a property division. See infra note 172 and
accompanying text.
168. Although less likely to occur, postseparation support does fit within this analysis,
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Conversely, if payments to a dependent spouse or ex-spouse are
in fact part of a property division (and if they are, any agreement
certainly ought to so state in no uncertain terms1 69), then the
payments become reciprocal consideration for the property division.
When this occurs, the payments become part of an integrated
agreement-and are not modifiable, nor terminable upon the
remarriage of the payee, 7 although the payments may yet receive
alimony treatment by the Internal Revenue Service.1
71
Owing to the fact that North Carolina's rules for what is or is not
"true" alimony are actually rather simple, there is no reason
whatsoever to overreact to the Potts" decision. The supreme court
because it too may be terminated by a dependent spouse's cohabitation. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-16.9; infra Part IV.D (discussing cohabitation).
169. Unlike years past, there are no "magic words" involved in this admonition. The
admonition itself, it should be recalled, stems from the White presumption, discussed
supra note 144, that the property and support provisions of a settlement agreement are
separable. A simple statement to the effect that "in return for [or in consequence of, or in
consideration for] the wife's agreement to relinquish any and all rights in XYZ Company
that may have arisen from the marriage, husband promises to pay wife the sum of
$1,000,000 [during the next five years, two years, 48 months, or $100,000 per year]"
should easily establish that the "alimony" payments are part of a property division. If the
agreement itself bluntly denominates the payments "as property division," of course, the
payor would lose the right to claim the payments as alimony. See I.R.C. § 71(b) (1994);
supra note 149 (discussing § 71(b)). For examples of such clauses, see infra note 170.
170. An excellent example of an integrated agreement clause appears in Henderson v.
Henderson, 55 N.C. App. 506, 286 S.E.2d 657 (1982), affd, 307 N.C. 401, 298 S.E.2d 345
(1983), in which the agreement provided simply that it was an "'integrated agreement of
the parties, that each provision contained herein is intended to be in consideration for
each of the other provisions.'" Id. at 507, 286 S.E.2d at 659 (quoting consent judgment).
For a nonintegration provision, see Britt v. Britt, 36 N.C. App 705, 711, 245 S.E.2d 381,
385 (1978): "'The provisions for the support ... of wife are independent of any division
or agreement for division of property between the parties, and shall not for any purpose
be deemed to be... integrated with a property settlement of the parties.'" Id. at 711,245
S.E.2d at 385 (quoting separation agreement). In Jones v. Jones, 42 N.C. App. 467, 256
S.E.2d 474 (1979), the court recognized that the following factors were indicia of the
parties' intent to create an integrated agreement: that the payments were contingent
upon the wife's leaving the house and conveying her half of the house to her husband, that
the payments were limited to 32 months duration, that there was no finding that grounds
for alimony existed, and that there was no finding that the wife was a dependent spouse.
See id. at 471,256 S.E.2d at 476.
171. In essence, then, the Service has virtually invited parties, to some degree to
structure property divisions as alimony, without so much as any consideration of what
various state laws require for a payment to qualify as alimony. The anti-frontloading
provisions of I.R.C. § 71(f) (1994) do limit the degree to which a spouse can transfer cash
to the other spouse during the first three years after divorce and still have such payments
qualify, under IRS rules, as alimony. At the same time, the section is also a clear
recognition that property divisions are often structured as alimony.
172. Potts v. Tutterow, 114 N.C. App. 360, 364, 442 S.E.2d 90, 92-93 (1994), affd per
curiam, 340 N.C. 97, 455 S.E.2d 156 (1995). Many practitioners, however, have in effect
over-reacted to the decision, largely because most lump sum "alimony" payments are
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merely restated the requirements for what is not true alimony and
held, in complete conformity with previous law, that remarriage will
terminate all "true" alimony payments that have not already become
due, including lump sum awards.' Although most lump sum
payments are more often than not actually reciprocal consideration
for a property division 74 and thus not true alimony, the payments in
Potts were not part of a property division, as the lower court held and
the supreme court affirmed. 75 There would appear to be, moreover,
no statutory or analytical reason why these same rules should not
apply with alimony for a specified term,76 in lump sum, or on a
periodic basis. 77 The manner of payment is neither indicative of
what the substance of the payment truly is, nor of the intentions of
the parties. Rather, it is the intention of the parties as to the true
actually property divisions. As the decision by the court of appeals made clear, however,
the payments in Potts were deemed not to be part of a property settlement. See id.
173. See Potts v. Tutterow, 340 N.C. 97, 98,455 S.E.2d 156,156-57 (1995) (per curiam);
see, e.g., White v. White, 296 N.C. 661, 665-66, 252 S.E.2d 698, 700-01 (1979). White is the
leading case, but because there was no equitable distribution at the time it was decided,
its holding was that there is a presumption that the support and property division portions
of a settlement agreement are not integrated. See id. at 672, 252 S.E.2d at 704. The
presumption should either be reversed or done away with altogether now that alimony
and property have become almost interchangeable with one another in so many instances.
See Rowe v. Rowe, 305 N.C. 177, 183,287 S.E.2d 840, 844 (1982) (holding that whether or
not payments labeled "alimony" could be enforced by contempt depended solely upon
whether or not there was a court order, not upon whether the agreement was integrated
or not), appeal on remand, 74 N.C. App. 54, 327 S.E.2d 624 (1985); Henderson, 55 N.C.
App. at 512,286 S.E.2d at 662 (1982) (same).
174. The very nature of true alimony-providing for the needs of a dependent spouse
on a continuing basis-usually involves indefinitely continuing payments. There are
certain non-contingent events, however-for example, reaching retirement age or
receiving the corpus of a trust-that would render lump sum awards for support both
sensible and appropriate.
175. See Potts, 340 N.C. at 97,455 S.E.2d at 156.
176. Several states do in fact authorize modification of rehabilitative alimony awards,
either expressly by statute, or by reserving jurisdiction over the action. See CLARK, supra
note 2, § 16.4, at 653-54. Indeed, Professor Clark goes on to emphasize that in "cases
involving installment payments the alimony-property distinction is neither sensible nor
workable and in fact is largely illusory." Id. at § 18.8, at 785. But see Skvarch v. Skvarch,
876 P.2d 1110, 1112 (Alaska 1994) (holding that a rehabilitative alimony award was in fact
nonmodifiable because it was part of an integrated agreement).
177. The new alimony laws do not, unfortunately, authorize awards of what are often
called "restitutional" or "reimbursement" payments. See discussion supra note 66, of
Kuder v. Schroeder, 110 N.C. App. 355, 430 S.E.2d 271 (1993), wherein the wife was not
only denied alimony but also unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, or other equitable
remedies, on the alternative grounds that her services (supporting husband through two
advanced degrees) were either presumed to be a "gift" to her husband or were rendered
as part of her duty of support. See id. at 356-57, 430 S.E.2d, at 272-73. But see Suggs v.
Norris, 88 N.C. App. 539, 543-44, 364 S.E.2d 159, 162-63 (1988) (holding that such
equitable remedies were available upon the death of the plaintiff's long-time cohabitant).
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nature of the payments ("true" alimony or part of a property
settlement) within an incorporated separation agreement that
controls the modifiability, or non-modifiability, of payments labeled
as "support" or alimony.
178
2. "Rehabilitative" Alimony?
Beyond these admittedly elongated initial observations, the first
significant point to note regarding the new definition of alimony is
that it clearly authorizes awards 179 of alimony for a "specific
term" 8 ---a form of support quite similar to that known elsewhere as
"rehabilitative alimony."18' The concept was hailed in most other
states as a mechanism by which dependent spouses, particularly those
who have put the other spouses through a professional degree and/or
had young children, could "rehabilitate" themselves and rejoin the
marketplace as productive and no longer dependent citizens.112 As
178. See supra note 170 for examples of appropriate language to indicate the intention
of the parties.
179. There has never been any specific reference to "rehabilitative alimony" in the
North Carolina General Statutes, although no section of the old statutes prohibited such
an award. In fact, cases stretching from at least Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 184,
261 S.E.2d 849, 856-57 (1980), to Potts v. Tutterow, 340 N.C. 97, 455 S.E.2d 156 (1995)
(per curiam), have discussed alimony awards as being "rehabilitative" in nature. See
Potts v. Tutterow, 114 N.C. App. 360, 362, 442 S.E.2d 90, 91 (1994), affd per curiam, 340
N.C. 97,455 S.E.2d 156 (1995).
180. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1A(1) (1995). "Lump sum" alimony, specifically
authorized by the old and new alimony statutes, may function in a fashion that is very
similar to, if not identical with, rehabilitative alimony-i.e., a support award that is
capable of being reduced to a sum certain and deemed sufficient to ease the dependent
spouse through the transition period, after which she can pursue her own career.
181. But see Hunt v. Hunt, 112 N.C. App. 722,730,436 S.E.2d 856, 861 (1993) ("North
Carolina law does not embrace the concept of 'rehabilitative alimony,' the purpose of
which is to enable a spouse who has foregone economic opportunities during the marriage
to acquire the market skills necessary to obtain employment which will allow her to
support herself.").
181 See Mertz v. Mertz, 287 So. 2d 691, 692 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (characterizing
rehabilitative alimony as assisting a divorced person "in regaining a useful and
constructive role in society ... [and] preventing financial hardship on society or the
individual during the rehabilitative process"); Turner v. Turner, 385 A.2d 1280, 1285 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1978) (observing that rehabilitative alimony is a "valuable technique"
and that a "judgment that will motivate a woman to seek employment" will bring societal
and individual benefits); Molnar v. Molnar, 314 S.E.2d 73, 76 (W.Va. 1984) (explaining
that the premise of rehabilitative alimony is to encourage self-reliance); see also Cynthia
L. Greene, Alimony is Not Forever: Self-Sufficiency and Permanent Alimony, 4 J. AM.
ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAWv 9, 14-19 (1988) (citing several cases treating permanent
alimony negatively and favoring rehabilitative alimony); Nora J. Lauerman, A Step
Toward Enhancing Equality, Choice, and Opportunity to Develop in Marriage and at
Divorce, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 493, 500-01 (1987) (suggesting that by authorizing
rehabilitative alimony, the law recognizes that women are capable of financial
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happens so frequently with social and domestic law experiments,
however, the best of intentions can go astray, and the tide and
experience quickly turned against "rehabilitative" alimony, as its
analytical foundations often proved to be baseless, 3  and its
implementation on a practical level proved to be woefully
inadequateY 4
In part because of these deficiencies, many states allow
rehabilitative alimony to be extended beyond the initial order,
depending on a variety of circumstances that are impossible to
anticipate 85 at the time of entry of the order.18 6 Particularly because
independence). But see Arnold v. Arnold, 901 A.2d 262, 262-63 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1979) (disagreeing with Turner).
183. Reality dashed the hopes of many feminist writers in a very short time, as judges
and commentators began to realize that rehabilitative awards are often based on
unrealistic assumptions about a long-term homemaker's ability to reenter the work force
successfully. See IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS
286 (2d ed. 1991); see also Belton v. Belton, 481 S.E.2d 174, 176 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997)
("Rehabilitative alimony should be approved only in exceptional circumstances ...
because it seldom suffices to maintain the level of support the dependent spouse enjoyed
as an incident to the marriage."); Katharine K. Baker, Contracting for Security: Paying
Married Women What They've Earned, 55 U. CI. L. REV. 1193, 1208-12 (1988) (noting
the unfairness in forcing women to get retrained or re-educated at an age when many men
are soon to enjoy pension plans and retirement, and the incentive for women to appear
helpless and dependent in order to receive a larger award, undermining the principle of
encouraging self-reliance); Joan M. Krauskopf, Rehabilitative Alimony: Uses and Abuses
of Limited Term Alimony, 21 FAM. L.Q. 573, 573-75 (1988) (citing several appellate court
cases demonstrating the trend away from rehabilitative alimony awards and toward
indefinite alimony awards); Linda Bailliff Marshall, Note, Rehabilitative Alimony: An
Old Wolf in New Clothes, 13 REV. LAW & SOC. CHANGE 667, 673 (1984-1985) (asserting
that the true purpose of rehabilitative alimony is to release the supporting spouse "from a
long term alimony obligation perceived as judicially imposed servitude," and that the
terms "dependent" and "rehabilitation" imply laziness, weakness, and helplessness).
184. In most circumstances, rehabilitative alimony leaves women undercompensated,
both in terms of the amount and duration of the award. See Baker, supra note 183, at
1208. Baker also criticizes the determination of rehabilitative alimony by courts that
regularly ignore factors such as a woman's contribution and time spent raising children,
and illustrates the difficulty in applying the rehabilitative maintenance standard. See id.
at 1209-12; see also Krauskopf, supra note 183, at 573-75 (discussing the notable trend
away from rehabilitative alimony awards in favor of indefinite awards); Marshall, supra
note 183, at 689 (noting the failure of rehabilitative alimony to increase the frequency of
support awards and the mislabeling of property or long overdue compensation for past
services as rehabilitative alimony, which may then be reduced).
185. Unanticipated diagnoses of serious illnesses, accidents causing permanent
disabilities, new responsibilities for aging parents, or the serious illness of a child are but a
few of the disruptive events that could undermine any rehabilitative efforts.
186. Some jurisdictions require, at least for an extension of rehabilitative alimony, that
the recipient spouse present a rehabilitative plan showing that good faith efforts have
been made toward financial independence. See Glazner v. Glazner, 693 So. 2d 650, 652
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) ("[I]n order to receive rehabilitative alimony, the former wife
must have requested it and must have presented a rehabilitative plan to the court showing
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the North Carolina statutes neither specifically authorize nor forbid
such extensions,"s there appears to be no reason whatsoever that our
courts do not have continuing jurisdicion'--a point made at length
earlier in this Article. 18 9 Even in the absence of a specific reservation
of jurisdiction in the initial order, it requires no great analytical leap
to imply the reservation of jurisdiction. The power to modify such an
award-a power clearly reserved to courts in the new statute 9 -
must surely be accompanied by a continuing power to extend the
award, if circumstances so dictate.
Indeed, the approach taken in many states-requiring that the
eligible spouse present a "rehabilitative plan" in the first instance and
an even more elaborate plan when seeking an extension beyond the
first award-would appear to be an eminently sensible and fair
procedure to require in many awards of alimony for a limited term.'9'
a plan to obtain a skill, education or rehabilitation in order to adjust to a new life." (citing
Brock v. Brock, 682 So. 2d 682 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996))); Allison v. Allison, 692 So. 2d
1013, 1013 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (per curiam) (reversing extension of rehabilitative
alimony award and remanding with instructions to make specific findings "addressing the
objective of rehabilitation, the costs of the plan, and the projected period necessary for
Former Wife to complete her rehabilitation"); see also Myers v. Myers, 927 P.2d 326, 328
(Alaska 1996) (explaining that a spouse's educational plan sufficiently supports a
rehabilitative alimony award if the spouse identifies a career goal, a degree program
aimed at achieving that goal, and a reasonable time frame for earning the degree); Miller
v. Miller, 739 P.2d 163, 165 (Alaska 1987) (allowing an award of rehabilitative alimony
only after a finding that the recipient spouse "intends to apply the alimony toward job
training"); Evans v. Evans, 559 N.W.2d 240,248 (S.D. 1997) ("An award of rehabilitative
alimony must be designed to meet an educational need or plan of action whose existence
finds some support in the record." (citing Radigan v. Radigan, 465 N.W.2d 483, 486 (S.D.
1991); Ryken v. Ryken, 440 N.W.2d 300,303 (S.D. 1989))).
187. Section 50-16.1A(4) provides that postseparation support is to be paid "until the
earlier of either the date specified in the order of postseparation support, or an order
awarding or denying alimony." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1A(4) (1995). Although it is
conceivable that an initial order might contain no specified termination date, such a
prospect is unlikely at best. Under § 50-16.9, either remarriage or cohabitation, see infra
Parts IV.C-D, will also terminate postseparation support. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9.
Finally, an award of equitable distribution under § 50-20(f) may constitute the basis for
termination of support awards, on the grounds that the dependent spouse is no longer
dependent. See id. § 50-20(f) (Supp. 1997); Capps v. Capps, 69 N.C. App. 755, 757, 318
S.E.2d 346, 348 (1984) ("This order of events is required, no doubt, because of the
obvious relationship that exists between the property that one has and his or her need for
support and the ability to furnish it.").
188. See supra text accompanying notes 94-96. Additionally, the median age for
women divorcing after their first marriage was 31.1 years in 1990. See Sally C. Clarke,
Advance Report of Final Divorce Statistics, 1989 and 1990, MONTHLY VITAL STAT. REP.,
Mar. 22, 1995, at 1, 4.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 94-114.
190. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9 (setting forth conditions for modification of
alimony and postseparation awards).
191. See supra note 186 (discussing rehabilitative plans).
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Moreover, such procedures, particularly with attempts to extend an
award, would be of great value in helping courts to avoid falling into
the "up or out" trap into which many other states had so perilously
and unjustly fallen.192 Reservation of jurisdiction does not, of course,
negate the dependency requirement. 93 Any specified term order for
spousal support should, at a minimum, require that judges and
lawyers fully bear in mind the statutory mandate that such spouse
should be able to maintain at least his previous standard of living
194
after the expiration of the specified term.9 Any specified term
192. See, e.g., Standage v. Standage, 711 P.2d 612, 617-18 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985)
(affirming the appropriateness of an indefinite rehabilitative award); In re Marriage of
Dillnam, 478 N.E.2d 86, 89 (Ind. Ct. App.) (1985) (reversing rehabilitative award for the
lower court's failure to appraise realistic employment opportunities in determining
earning capacity); Lepis v. Lepis, 416 A.2d 45, 55 (N.J. 1980) (affirming intermediate
appellate court that reversed decision failing to extend the time set for the original
rehabilitative award).
193. The recent and somewhat bewildering opinion in Cunningham v. Cunningham,
121 N.C. App. 771, 468 S.E.2d 466 (1996), rev'd on other grounds, 345 N.C. 430, 480
S.E.2d 403 (1997), discussed supra text accompanying notes 106-10, complicates the issue
of dependency. Although dealing with an alimony, and not a postseparation award, the
Cunningham decision might be of value to those seeking to extend a postseparation
support award. While the court's holding contradicts the entire body of case law on
alimony termination, the court nonetheless held that the issue of dependency is not
subject to reconsideration at a modification hearing. See Cunningham, 121 N.C. App. at
774, 468 S.E.2d at 468. The effect of this is to create a permanent "Cheshire cat"-
sometimes you see it, sometimes you don't, but it is always there-so long as the
dependent spouse does not die, reconcile before divorce, remarry, or "continuously and
habitually cohabit" with a person in a "marriage-like" relationship. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 50-16.9 (1995); see also supra note 99 (quoting statute); infra Parts IV.C-D (discussing
termination events and cohabitation).
194. It is critical to note the previous standard of living is but one of seven different
statutory factors to be considered in determining the amount of postseparation support.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.2A(b). Thus, it appears that North Carolina has at long last
abandoned the "previous standard of living" as the sole guideline for setting support. See
infra note 195.
195. Section 50-16.2A(b) states in full:
In ordering postseparation support, the court shall base its award on the
financial needs of the parties, considering the parties' accustomed standard of
living, the present employment income and other recurring earnings of each
party from any source, their income-earning abilities, the separate and marital
debt service obligations, those expenses reasonably necessary to support each of
the parties, and each party's respective legal obligations to support any other
persons.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.2A(b). Subsection (c) of the same statute states that a
dependent spouse may receive an award "if, based on consideration of the factors
specified in subsection (b) of this section, the court finds that the resources of the
dependent spouse are not adequate to meet his or her reasonable needs and the
supporting spouse has the ability to pay." Id. § 50-16.2A(c).
It should be noted, however, that the "accustomed standard of living" principle is
qualified by a good many other factors, and that dependent spouses who have acquiesced
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award predicated upon that assumption should be modifiable in favor
of a dependent spouse should circumstances beyond the control of
that spouse render such "rehabilitation" impossible. 9 6 The danger
that such temporary or rehabilitative awards, intended to meet the
needs of a newly separated or divorced dependent spouse, could be
transformed into a punitive measure against a dependent spouse is
very real indeed, as experience in other states has amply
demonstrated. 197 Ironically enough, it appears that once again North
Carolina's reluctance to revise its laws may have the advantage of
allowing the State to learn from and avoid the difficulties that other
states have experienced with similar laws.'98
III. THE TENACIOUS ROLE OF FAULT
A. Illicit Sexual Behavior
The remaining changes in and issues raised by the new alimony
statutes are considerably less complicated than those discussed thus
in marriages of extreme frugality should often be entitled to something more than that to
which they were "accustomed." This observation would appear to be all the more critical
in cases in which the supporting spouse's income or assets are already more than
sufficient to provide for a less parsimonious standard of living, or in instances in which the
supporting spouse's income or assets undergo an appreciable raise after the date of
separation. The "accustomed standard of living," in other words, should function as a
floor, and certainly not a ceiling for the amount of either an alimony or postseparation
support award.
196. In Mori v. Mori, 603 P.2d 85 (Ariz. 1979), for example, the Arizona Supreme
Court reversed the trial court's order awarding $1000 per month for one year after a 23
year marriage, extended the award for an additional two years, and directed the lower
court to reserve jurisdiction. See id. at 87-88. Also, in In re Marriage of Morrison, 573
P.2d 41 (Cal. 1978), the California Supreme Court cautioned against such awards,
especially in the case of a long-term marriage, and noted carefully that the lower court
should retain jurisdiction, indefinitely if necessary, "unless the record clearly indicates
that the supported spouse will be able to adequately meet his or her financial needs at the
time selected for termination of jurisdiction." Id. at 52.
197. See supra note 192 (citing cases).
198. An excellent example of learning from the mistakes of other states is North
Carolina's exclusion of professional degrees from categorization as marital property in
the initial enactment of the Equitable Distribution statutes. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-
20(b)(2) (1995) (amended 1997). The issue of whether a professional degree or license
should be considered marital property has been the subject of considerable litigation in
other states. See J. THOMAS OLDHAM, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND THE DISTRIBUTION
OF PROPERTY § 9.02, at 9-4 to -29 (1998) (devoting an entire section to this subject).
Oldham lists 35 states that have held either that a professional degree is not "property" or
that it is not property subject to division. See id. § 9.02[1], at 9-4 n.l. Our own statute,
however, completely obviates one of the difficulties faced in other states by clearly stating
that such a degree or license is "property," albeit separate. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-
20(b)(2) (Supp. 1997).
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far in this Article. In part, this difference is true because many of the
more significant points reserved for discussion partake of two
characteristics: (1) they are similar to, and often identical with,
previous statutory and case law, and (2) they are equally applicable
to alimony and to postseparation support. For the latter reason in
particular, several aspects of postseparation support and alimony
may best be treated together and understood by way of comparison
to one another. Alimony and its rather unique relationship with
marital fault, however, deserves separate treatment.
While "marital misconduct" includes nine separate forms of
fault,199 it is important to reemphasize that the statute requires that
any or all types of such marital misconduct must occur before or on
the date of separation.200 Because of its powerful effect on alimony,
however, by far the most significant of the variety of marital faults is
the category entitled "illicit sexual behavior."201 Such dire behavior is
specifically enumerated to include "illicit sexual behavior ...
[including] acts of sexual or deviate sexual intercourse, deviate sexual
acts, or sexual acts defined in G.S. 14-27.1(4), voluntarily engaged in
by a spouse with someone other than tle other spouse.
' '202
Assuming for now that illicit sexual behavior refers largely to
adultery (and whatever other forms of illicit sexual behavior that
199. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1A(3) (1995). Many such forms of marital
misconduct are already well-fleshed out in earlier case law. See infra Part III.B.2.
200. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1A(3). But see supra note 86 (noting that post
separation incidents can be considered as evidence of adultery before separation). As a
practical matter, the reach-back provisions in both § 50-16.2A(e) and § 50-16.3A(b)(1)
are probably limited to proving that adultery occurred before the date of separation.
201. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1A(3)(a).
202. Id. The good news, some would say, is that deviant sexual behavior between
spouses does not appear to fall within this definition. However, the alimony definition of
"illicit sexual" behavior is quite inconsistent with Section 14-27.1(4) of the General
Statutes, which reads as follows:
"Sexual act" means cunnilingus, fellatio, analingus, or anal intercourse, but does
not include vaginal intercourse. Sexual act also means the penetration, however
slight, by any object into the genital or anal opening of another person's body:
provided, that it shall be an affirmative defense that the penetration was for
accepted medical purposes.
Id. § 14-27.1(4) (1993). This North Carolina statute certainly may not be faulted for lack
of specificity. One observation of at least passing interest arises by way of comparison of
the above statute with North Carolina's somewhat infamous "crime against nature"
statute, which is not included within the definition of "illicit sexual behavior." Section 14-
177 states that "[i]f any person shall commit the crime against nature, with mankind or
beast, he shall be punished as a Class I felon." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177. Inclusion of
the latter statute might well have been deemed to be redundant, of course, but it is
noteworthy that only the "crime against nature" statute criminalizes the behavior.
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accompany it), proof that such act or acts203 occurred prior to the date
of the separation of the parties carries serious consequences indeed.
Section 50-16.3A(a) ("Entitlement") explains that either party may
move for alimony,2' and that upon finding that the one spouse is
dependent and the other is supporting and has committed adultery,
the "court shall award alimony to the dependent spouse ... after
considering all relevant factors" including, among fifteen other
specifically listed factors, "illicit sexual behavior."2 5
To deal with this important issue in more detail, it is critical to
note that the same statutory section continues to provide that proof
of illicit sexual behavior by the dependent spouse prior to the date of
separation shall bar any award of alimony.20 6 The harshness of this
bar is equally divided by the sentence immediately following: "If the
court finds that the supporting spouse participated in an act of illicit
sexual behavior ... during the marriage and prior to or on the date of
separation, then the court shall order that alimony be paid to a
dependent spouse. 2 7  This affirmative mandate that a proven
adulterous supporting spouse be ordered to make alimony payments
is completely new to North ,Carolina law. As a practical matter,
however, such spouses have always been virtually defenseless against
an alimony claim, and in any event, the court has fifteen other factors
to consider in determining the amount and duration of any alimony
award. 03
203. The statute refers to "acts." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1A(3)(b). It is extremely
unlikely, however, that our appellate courts would interpret this so literally as to allow a
party one "free" act.
204. This conceivably raises the question as to whether a supporting spouse already
paying postseparation support might be able to "move" for alimony in order to reduce or
terminate the existing support payments. This is obviously a strained, and probably
unsustainable, interpretation of this portion of the statute, the clear intent of which is that
a dependent spouse would file for alimony. It is suggested, therefore, that the
dependency requirement is likely to be read into this section.
205. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(a) (emphasis added); see infra Part III.C (discussing
the other fifteen factors).
206. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(a). The continuation of this bar to alimony,
regardless of need or any other circumstances, was in essence a trade-off within the
General Assembly of North Carolina to secure passage of the remainder of the alimony
statutes.
207. Id. (emphasis added).
208. See id. § 50-16.3A(b)(1)-(15).
2058 [Vol. 76
1998] DISTRIBUTIVE CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE 2059
B. Other Marital Misconduct
1. Condonation
Perhaps the oddest section of the new laws dealing with sexual
misconduct is the statutory admonition that if the court finds that
both spouses "participated in an act of illicit sexual behavior during
the marriage ... then alimony shall be denied or awarded in the
discretion of the court after consideration of all of the
circumstances." 20 9  This section appears to be self-explanatory,
although it has given rise to amused speculation by members of the
Family Law Section of the North Carolina Bar Association as to
whether one must now attempt to prove "aggravated adultery."21
Odd as this section may be, however, the statute continues with the
ominous and potentially quite destructive warning that "[a]ny act of
illicit sexual behavior by either party that has been condoned by the
other party shall not be considered by the court."21'
Condonation is, of course, one of the major common-law
defenses to the traditional fault grounds for divorce and/or
209. Id. § 50-16.3A(a). One of the most interesting implications of the new Act is the
issue of what effect the "on or after date of separation" might have on the much-used
torts of alienation of affections and criminal conversation. It would be anomalous, to say
the least, to "leave harmless" a technically adulterous relationship begun six months into
separation and yet to allow the other spouse to sue the third party for criminal
conversation. This blatant inconsistency between the common law and the new
legislation may in fact result in the implied elimination of this tort. Alienation of
affections well after the date of separation might receive the same treatment. Certainly a
marriage has "ended" for purposes of accumulation of marital fault and property between
the parties at the date of separation; it should be deemed to have "ended" with regard to
the behavior of any party.
210. Oddly enough, case law in alienation of affection actions does provide examples
of "aggravating" factors in adultery sufficient to support an award of punitive damages.
See, e.g., Jennings v. Jessen, 103 N.C. App. 739, 744, 407 S.E.2d 264, 267 (1991)
(upholding award of punitive damages based on a finding that the adulterous affair "was
replete with aggravating circumstances, specifically, that defendant had cohabited for
several weeks with plaintiff's husband and was audacious enough to call plaintiff's home
in an attempt to discover her husband's whereabouts"); Shaw v. Stringer, 101 N.C. App.
513, 517, 400 S.E.2d 101, 103 (1991) ("Aggravation, malice and willfulness were indicated
by evidence to the effect that after being asked not to do so defendant persisted in visiting
plaintiff's wife in the marital household and violating plaintiff's conjugal rights and even
laughed when plaintiff's wife told him that plaintiff had learned of their affair."); Gray v.
Hoover, 94 N.C. App. 724, 730-31, 381 S.E.2d 472, 475-76 (1989) (determining that
evidence of defendant's acts, which included telling plaintiff that he was having sex with
plaintiff's wife, driving up in front of plaintiff's business, blowing the horn, and kissing
plaintiff's wife in the presence of plaintiff, was sufficient to support the punitive damages
award).
211. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(a).
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alimony. 12 It is a conditional forgiveness, the condition being that
the offense not be repeated, and must be raised as an affirmative
defense.24 Beyond these elemental principles, the condonation
defense-almost surely to be the focus of renewed litigation in North
Carolina-is considerably more complicated. 5 Phrased differently,
the issue is not merely what condonation is, but how to prove that
condonation did in fact occur. The condonation defense, moreover,
has taken on renewed significance216 in the alimony context, because
it invites the kind of sordid behavior from parties wherein one spouse
in effect "sets up" the other to engage in behavior that might be
212. Condonation is usually said to be the forgiveness of a marital "sin" (that would
otherwise constitute grounds for divorce) by the injured party, with knowledge of the
offense. Homer Clark describes the confusion surrounding the condonation defense as
follows:
Condonation is ordinarily a question of fact. It has been variously defined in
English and American law. The early English rule was that when a resumption
of marital intercourse occurred with knowledge of the defendant's offense, the
offense was presumed remitted and the plaintiff could not have a divorce. This
definition includes the two elements of marital intercourse and forgiveness of
the offense, but it fails to say whether both are essential for condonation. Some
of the statutes indicate that either element is sufficient for condonation, some
limit condonation to cases in which there has been a resumption of cohabitation,
some require both elements to be present, and some are ambiguous. The case
law is in similar confusion.
CLARK, supra note 2, § 13.17, at 526 (footnotes omitted). Also, in Howell v. Tunstall, 64
N.C. App. 703, 308 S.E.2d 454 (1983), the court held that condonation may not be
presumed by the fact the parties reconciled then separated again. See id. at 706, 308
S.E.2d at 456. In Howell, the husband was attempting to set aside the divorce decree,
granted on the day of his ex-wife's death on the grounds of condonation of his prior
marital fault. See id. at 704, 308 S.E.2d at 455; see also 1 REYNOLDS, supra note 62,
§ 6.19(C), at 590-91 (explaining that cohabitation or reconciliation is treated "merely as
rebuttable evidence of condonation"). Although case law is somewhat contradictory on
the issue of whether sexual relations are also required for condonation, Professor
Reynolds concludes that it is so required. See 1 Id.
213. Thus, condonation is normally not a defense to patterns of behavior such as
cruelty or indignities. See Privette v. Privette, 30 N.C. App. 305, 308, 227 S.E.2d 137, 140
(1976). But see Cushing v. Cushing, 263 N.C. 181,187, 130 S.E.2d 217,222 (1964) (stating,
in dictum, that cruelty or indignities, like any marital fault, may be condoned).
Condonation has also been called "temporary probation" for the offending spouse. JOHN
DE WrT GREGORY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW 215 (1993).
214. Failure to do so is fatal to the defense. See 1 REYNOLDS, supra note 62,
§ 6.19(A), at 588.
215. See CLARK, supra note 2, § 13.11, at 525-26 (discussing the confusion in case law
about whether this common lav defense still exists).
216. Since the abolition of fault grounds for divorce in 1983, see Act of June 24, 1983,
ch. 613, § 1, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 548, 548, condonation has, until now, probably been
most significant as a defense to a divorce from bed and board under § 50-7, all of the fault
grounds of which are simultaneously grounds for marital misconduct under § 50-16.1A(3).
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-7 (1995). For further discussion of these grounds, see infra Part
III.B.2.
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regarded as condonation.217
It remains unclear in North Carolina just what type of behavior
will constitute the defense-i.e., what evidence is necessary to prove
that the offense was forgiven? In brief, (and assuming that the
wronged spouse has full knowledge of the offense), is condonation
proved by evidence that the parties merely slept together? That they
lived together without conjugal relation? Or that they continued, or
resumed, living together and had sexual intercourse? A clear answer
appears to exist only with reference to the second and third
questions: cohabitation, assuming that there is no evidence of sexual
intercourse, does not constitute condonation,218 and cohabitation plus
the renewal or continuance of conjugal relations will almost certainly
217. See Sally Burnett Sharp, Divorce and the Third Party: Spousal Support, Private
Agreements, and the State, 59 N.C. L. REV. 819, 841-42 (1981), for a critique of a similar
phenomena in North Carolina law involving reconciliation of separated spouses. As a
result of two cases, In re Estate of Adamee, 291 N.C. 386, 392-93, 230 S.E.2d 541, 546
(1976) (holding that wife's moving back into the marital home to care for her dying
husband constituted a reconciliation despite the fact that it was clear that the parties had
not engaged in sexual relations), and Murphy v. Murphy, 295 N.C. 390, 397, 245 S.E.2d
693, 698 (1978) (holding that even an isolated act of intercourse between estranged
spouses would constitute a reconciliation, and thus void their separation agreement),
North Carolina developed an utterly unique rule. Either the resumption of living
together or an isolated act of sex would constitute a reconciliation. The effect of the
Murphy rule, in particular, led many lawyers to warn their non-adulterous clients never to
attempt a reconciliation (especially if sexual intercourse were involved). As a corollary,
many other lawyers strongly advised their adulterous clients to move heaven and earth to
effect at least a sexual reconciliation, thus destroying any separation agreement into
which the parties might have entered. Separation agreements, it should be pointed out,
are the true "tarbabies" of North Carolina law: there is no judicial review of agreements,
and, once signed, they are fully binding almost without regard to procedural or
substantive unconscionability. See Sharp, supra note 30, at 1442-51.
The legislature finally disposed of this unwholesome practice by amending § 50-6 to
read: "Whether there has been a resumption of marital relations during the period of
separation shall be determined pursuant to G.S. 52-10.2. Isolated incidents of sexual
intercourse between the parties shall not toll the statutory period required for divorce
predicated on separation of one year." Act of July 24, 1987, ch. 664, § 2, 1987 N.C. Sess.
Laws 1228, 1229 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1995)). Section § 52-10.2 was also
amended to read that voluntary renewal of the husband and wife relation so as to
constitute reconciliation may be shown by "the totality of the circumstances," and it
continues and re-emphasizes that "[i]solated incidents of sexual intercourse between the
parties shall not constitute resumption of marital relations." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10.2
(1991).
218. See Privette v. Privette, 30 N.C. App. 305, 308, 227 S.E.2d 137, 140 (1976)
(holding that no condonation occurs when parties lived under same roof, if it
"'affirmatively appears that they do not have sexual intercourse'" (quoting 1 ROBERT E.
LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW § 87, at 333 (1963))); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 27 N.C.
App, 205,207,218 S.E.2d 518,519-20 (1975) (refusing to hold "that living under the same
roof, without any evidence of sexual relations" was condonation as a matter of law).
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indicate condonation, particularly with regard to adultery.219
As to the first query-whether sexual relations alone will
constitute condonation-no clear answer can be derived from North
Carolina cases. Certainly older cases have strongly indicated that
sexual relations alone will suffice.220 Such a holding, however, would
almost certainly revive the byzantine rule of Murphy v. Murphy,
2 21
placing it this time in the context of condonation rather than
reconciliation. Although reconciliation and condonation are of such
close analytical kin, there are several reasons why the occurrence of
one sexual act should not constitute condonation. Above all, the
North Carolina General Statutes have already removed "isolated
sex" incidents in determining when reconciliation occurs.m
Moreover, the same strong public policy supporting the continuation
of marriages applies equally to reconciliation and condonation.
Public policy, frustrated for years by the Murphy rulem strongly
suggests that a finding of condonation will turn upon the same
issue-whether, given the totality of the circumstances, true
forgiveness has occurred.224 The perils of doing otherwise are well
expressed in an older case involving condonation: "Whether the
benefits the courts derive from this exacting rule exceed the burdens
it imposes upon both court and pleader is debatable" because
frequently the rule "so distends pleadings that they strain both
patience and belief, yet it is a rule so very old that the years have
barnacled it in numberless cases upon our practice."'
2. Additional Factors
The remaining eight acts of "marital misconduct"-many of
219. As Professor Suzanne Reynolds points out, it is considerably more difficult to
prove condonation when there is a course of conduct involved. See 1 REYNOLDS, supra
note 62, § 6.19(C), at 592. The rationale supporting this position is basically one of public
policy-that a spouse who has attempted to preserve the marriage, by living with a course
of conduct such as cruelty, should not be punished by a condonation defense. See Adams
v. Adams, 262 N.C. 556,560, 138 S.E.2d 204,207 (1964).
220. See, e.g., Malloy v. Malloy, 33 N.C. App. 56,60,234 S.E.2d 199, 202 (1977). Clark
observes that true condonation should require a true recommitment to the marital
relationship, including sexual intercourse. See CLARK, supra note 2, § 14.11, at 62-63. He
concludes nonetheless that some states require either one of the two elements and that
this entire area is quite confusing. See id. § 14.11, at 61.
221. 295 N.C. 390, 397, 245 S.E.2d 693, 698 (1978); see also supra note 217 (discussing
Murphy). For an extended discussion and criticism of Murphy, see Sharp, supra note 217,
at 840-43.
222 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10.2 (1991); supra note 217 (discussing the statute).
223. See Sharp, supra note 217, at 840-43.
224. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10.2.
225. Cushing v. Cushing, 263 N.C. 181, 187, 139 S.E.2d 217,222 (1964).
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which are also rather "barnacled" upon our law-lend themselves to
a considerably less painstaking analysis. Indeed, the next five
enumerated acts are almost old friends, in that they are duplicates of
the grounds set forth for divorce from bed and board.226 These acts of
marital misconduct27 are as follows:
b. Involuntary separation of the spouses in consequence of
a criminal act committed prior to the proceeding in
which alimony is sought;
c. Abandonment of the other spouse;
d. Malicious turning out-of-doors of the other spouse;
e. Cruel or barbarous treatment endangering the life of the
other spouse;
f. Indignities rendering the condition of the other spouse
intolerable and life burdensome.2
These acts of marital misconduct should track quite naturally the
already existing case law on grounds for divorce from bed and board.
Similarly, "[e]xcessive use of alcohol or drugs so as to render the
condition of the other spouse intolerable and life burdensome" 9 and
"[w]illful failure to provide necessary subsistence according to one's
means and condition so as to render the condition of the other spouse
intolerable and life burdensome""3 are also familiar as grounds for
divorce from bed and board. One might well question the inclusion
of the "willful failure" to support, however, in view of the otherwise
strong legislative mandate that acts of marital misconduct mean any
of the aforementioned acts that "occur during the marriage and prior
to or on the date of separation."' "3 Brown v. Brown, 2 the only case
ever to deal with this ground for bed and board divorce, held that
failure to support gave rise (as did adultery then) to a bed and board
divorce action after the parties had separated. It would appear clear,
however, that securing support after separation lies within the control
226. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-7 (1995).
227. Our courts long have held that grounds (c) and (d) now mean precisely the same
thing. See Medlin v. Medlin, 175 N.C. 529, 531, 95 S.E. 857, 857-58 (1918) ("It is
understood with us that a suit for divorce because of being maliciously turned out of
doors, under subsection 2,... is but an instance of a wrongful abandonment provided for
in subsection 1 of the statute .. .
228. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1A(3)(b)-(f) (1995).
229. Id. § 50-16.1A(3)(h).
230. Id. § 50-16.1A(3)(i).
231. Id. § 50-16.1A. The very definition of marital misconduct limits its application to
"acts that occur during the marriage and prior to or on the date of separation." Id. § 50-
16.1A(3).
232. 104 N.C. App. 547,410 S.E.2d 223 (1991).
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of a dependent spouse, who may readily bring an action for
postseparation support. It is conceivable, however, that Brown might
retain some validity in the event that it could be used to persuade
courts to vary from the "accustomed standard of living" as a major
basis for determining the amount of postseparation support or
alimony.231
3. Concealment of Assets and the Duty to Disclose
The remaining ground of marital misconduct, however, is quite
new to North Carolina law, certainly in the alimony context.234
Subsection (g) lists "[r]eckless spending of the income of either party,
or the destruction, waste, diversion, or concealment of assets" 235 as
marital misconduct that may be considered in the determination of
whether or not alimony is equitable.236 This section raises several
233. See infra notes 364-68 and accompanying text. Excess frugality, which had kept a
couple's standard of living lower than what it should have been, would be difficult to
"condone," both because it is a course of conduct and because dependent spouses often
have little or no control over how marital funds are spent. This is especially true with
marriages in which physical or psychological battering occurs. See GAIL A.
GOOLKASIAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CONFRONTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE
ROLE OF CRIMINAL COURT JUDGES 2 (1986) (noting that economic dependence can
prevent a victim of domestic violence from leaving the abuser because "[a] woman
without financial resources or a job outside the home may have to rely on the abuser to
support herself and her children"); REPORT OF THE MISSOURI TASK FORCE ON GENDER
AND JUSTICE, reprinted in 58 MO. L. REv. 485, 497 (1993) [hereinafter MISSOURI TASK
FORCE] (" 'The most compelling reason for an abused woman to remain in the home
subject to more abuse is her financial dependency; this is particularly true for the women
with children.'" (quoting State ex rel. Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223, 229 (Mo. 1982)
(citations omitted))); LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 42-52 (1979)
(explaining the theory of "learned helplessness," according to which battered women
perceive things to be out of their control and thus become passive and submissive). See
generally Rhonda L. Kohler, Comment, The Battered Woman and Tort Law: A New
Approach to Fighting Domestic Violence, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1025 (1992) (discussing
Battered Woman's Syndrome and tort law). Not surprisingly, it has also been observed
that economic control significantly affects the course of litigation in domestic relations
cases. See MISSOURI TASK FORCE, supra, at 529-30 (noting that the party who controls
the finances "'literally has such a significant advantage in my opinion that they cannot
only control the litigation but also wind up with a great advantage on every issue and I
think if played right can succeed in almost every issue.' " (footnote omitted) (quoting a
Fellow of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers).
234. Section § 50-20(c) has a similar provision that is to be used as a "factor" in
determining whether an equal distribution of property would be equitable. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-20(c) (Supp. 1997).
235. Id. § 50-16.1A(3)(g) (1995).
236. Such acts are not listed as considerations with postseparation support. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 50-16.2A. For a condonation case, see Biggs v. Biggs, 253 N.C. 10, 17, 116
S.E.2d 178, 183 (1960) (allowing husband to introduce evidence to refute wife's attempted
condonation defense to her admitted acts of adultery), overruded in part by Hicks v. Hicks,
271 N.C. 204, 155 S.E.2d 799 (1967). The alleged condonation in Biggs, according to
1998] DISTRIBUTIVE CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE 2065
issues that have the potential to form the basis of radically new law.
First, "wasteful spending," much like cruelty or indignities, is
precisely the kind of "course of conduct" that could easily be deemed
to have been condoned by the non-wasting spouse.237 Moreover, it
must again be emphasized that this factor also lends support to the
proposition that the previous standard of living should now be
considered merely as one of fifteen factors in determining the
amount of alimony and certainly not the first among equals.238
Although the new statutes allow for a hearing on an alimony
claim "prior to the entry of a judgment for equitable distribution," 239
the equitable distribution statute prohibits consideration of such an
alimony award until after that procedure is completed. 20 The
combination of these two sections, one mandatory and one
permissive, clearly indicate a legislative contemplation of more than
one alimony hearing, the second of which would almost certainly be
wife's testimony, was that they had slept together in Homestead, Florida on Sunday night,
October 18, 1959. See id. at 11, 116 S.E.2d at 179.
237. See supra note 212 (discussing condonation). It should be clear that the specific
reference to condonation in § 50-16.3A(a) in no way restricts the use of this well-
established defense to acts of illicit sexual behavior.
238. See infra text accompanying notes 364-68 (discussing this proposition).
239. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(a) (1995). The statute also provides that "the issues
of amount and of whether a spouse is a dependent or supporting spouse may be reviewed
by the court after the conclusion of the equitable distribution claim." Id. Section 50-
20(f), however, still states that a court shall provide for an equitable distribution of
property "without regard to alimony." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(f) (Supp. 1997). Thus,
once again it appears that the "once-dependent-always-dependent" conclusion in
Cunningham v. Cunningham, 121 N.C. App. 771, 468 S.E.2d 466 (1996), rev'd on other
grounds, 345 N.C. 430,480 S.E.2d 403 (1997), is thoroughly discredited.
240. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(f) (Supp. 1997). In effect, § 50-20(f) authorizes
motions to modify or terminate alimony, after an equitable distribution is concluded.
Section 50-16.3A(a), however, goes further and specifically allows the issue of
dependency to be reexamined as well after an equitable distribution proceeding is
concluded. See id. § 50-16.3A (1995). At a minimum, this appears to put to rest the
conclusion of the court of appeals in Cunningham, 121 N.C. App. at 774, 468 S.E.2d at
468. More specifically, and supported only by the briefest of dicta from one earlier case,
the Cunningham court held that "[iut is not appropriate to reconsider, in a modification
hearing, the dependent spouse's entitlement to alimony, as the entitlement issue is
'permanently adjudicated by the original order.'" Id. (quoting Rowe v. Rowe, 305 N.C.
177, 187, 287 S.E.2d 840, 846 (1982), appeal on remand, 74 N.C. App. 54, 327 S.E.2d 624
(1985)). In fact, Rowe did state, virtually as dicta, that the dependency status could not be
relitigated. However, the real issue was whether or not the "partially integrated" consent
judgment was subject to modification in any event. See Rowe, 305 N.C. at 183-86, 287
S.E.2d at 844-46. The case was actually remanded to the trial court for a determination of
whether the "alimony" payments were integrated with the property division. See id. at
189, 287 S.E.2d at 847. The issue of dependency was mentioned only in passing and had
no relevance to the outcome of the appeal. In any event, it appears that the possibility of
two trials on the issues of dependency and amount and duration of alimony now exists.
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focused on dependency status.2 41  Moreover, the possibility of
discovery of substantial concealed assets242 sufficient to turn a
previously adjudicated non-dependent into a dependent is very real
indeed and could easily satisfy the changed circumstances standard
for an increase or decrease, or vacation of an alimony award.243
The real potential of this section on marital misconduct is that it
deals, for the first time in either the law of alimony or equitable
distribution, with the ubiquitous problem of concealment of assets.24
At one level, the questions, if not the answers, posed by concealment
of assets are simple. If, for example, an alimony trial occurred before
an equitable distribution settlement or trial, and concealed marital or
distributive assets were discovered or uncovered before a final
property division, it is virtually certain that such assets would be
included in the equitable distribution.245 Presumably, if the concealed
assets were of sufficient value, a motion to increase alimony might be
appropriate. But if the concealment were of a lesser magnitude,
could the discovery of such assets nonetheless reopen the alimony
case itself on the grounds that the additional marital misconduct
might itself be a sufficient change of circumstances? 246  Any
attempted answer to this question inevitably raises the issue of
whether this element of marital misconduct, particularly when
combined with the relatively new disclosure affidavits required under
§ 50-21,247 might well be interpreted to create an affirmative duty to
disclose assets-marital, divisible, and separate.24 8
241. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(a) (1995).
242. For further discussion on discovery of concealed assets, see infra Part III.B.3.
243. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9 (1995).
244. See Sharp, supra note 30, at 1424-28. Case law in other states is replete with
examples of concealment or outright misrepresentation of assets. See id. at 1424-27.
Public policy would seem to indicate strongly that encouragement of agreements between
parties should be balanced with penalties for such deceptive acts. Inability to remedy
concealment or misbehavior would leave spouses with virtually no alternative other than
to pursue discovery vigorously.
245. See infra notes 551-64 and accompanying text (discussing assets that are wasted
or that simply "disappear"). In the cases discussed there, such assets were simply poured
back into the marital "pot" and distributed to the spouse who had already disposed of
them.
246. The new statute certainly allows evidence after the date of separation to support
a claim that adultery had occurred before or on that date. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-
16.2A(e) (1995).
247. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-21 (Supp. 1997). Although the goal of the detailed
requirements for submitting affidavits at specific times was in fact to create mechanisms
by which the equitable distribution process might be somewhat streamlined, and the
affidavits are not binding at trial, the enactment of these sections would appear to
envision a duty on the part of both parties to make full disclosure.
248. Both the statutory law and well-established case law make it clear that separate
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Thus the issue becomes whether or not the concealment of
assets, or income which are specifically denominated as an act of
marital misconduct,249 may implicitly impose a duty not to conceal-
i.e., a duty to disclose. A powerful argument based upon both public
policy250 and the General Statutes can be made that such a duty does
and should, exist, especially as to marital property." Not only do the
alimony marital fault factors lead towards this conclusion, 2 but § 50-
21 also implicitly looks towards the creation of the same duty.Y
3
Additionally, § 50-20(k) states that spousal rights "to an equitable
distribution of marital property are a species of common ownership,
the rights of the respective parties vesting at the time of the parties'
separation."254  Although this section was designed to enable
divorcing couples in North Carolina to escape the burdens of the
capital gains tax, "common ownership" of property in other states has
often been held to give rise to common law fiduciary duties regarding
property must be taken into account in alimony and equitable distribution cases. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(b)(4), (11) (1995) (establishing as factors in determining the
amount and value of alimony: income from all sources of each spouse, and property
brought to the marriage).
249. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1A(3)(g) (describing "[r]eckless spending of the
income of either party, or the destruction, waste, diversion, or concealment of assets").
250. See infra notes 258-59 and accompanying text. Public policy strongly supports
separation agreements. These contracts are predicated on the existent of full disclosure
and some measure of fairness. See also infra note 273 and accompanying text (citing
cases).
251. See Talent v. Talent, 76 N.C. App. 545, 555, 334 S.E.2d 256, 263 (1985) ("In
determining an equitable division of the marital property, the court must consider the
separate property owned by each party at the time the property division is to become
effective.").
252. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1A(3)(g).
253. Section § 50-21 deals at length with the financial affidavits that the parties must
prepare, time limits on such affidavits and discovery procedures, and specifically
authorizes sanctions against the party who "has willfully obstructed or unreasonably
delayed, or has attempted to obstruct or unreasonably delay, discovery proceedings,
including failure to make discovery." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-21(e)(1) (Supp. 1997).
254. Id. § 50-20(k). This section of the Equitable Distribution Act has long been
almost dismissed by the judiciary on the ground that it was enacted before the current
I.R.C. § 1041, from the Tax Reform Act of 1984, to attempt to gain-as did Colorado in
Imel v. United States, 375 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1974), affd by 523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir.
1975)-community property treatment of nonrecognized capital gains as a part of
transfers pursuant to divorce. The logic of this argument is almost certainly deeply
flawed, however: Attempting to secure the tax treatment benefits always enjoyed by
community property states must surely entail imposition of the burdens as well-the
fiduciary duties that accompany "common ownership." For an extensive treatment of this
issue, see Sharp, supra note 30, at 1414-24. Fiduciary duties arise from common
ownership and are analytically quite different from confidential relationship duties. See
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the property so owned.255
The distinctions between fiduciary and confidential
relationships1 6 and the common-law duties (prominently including
full disclosure) that derive from each are often blurred or ignored,
especially in non-community property states. 7  Fiduciary duties,
however, arise not from any relationship of trust and confidence
between the parties, but from one spouse's control and management
of the assets of the marital community. As one California court
succinctly explained:
The confidential relationship and obligations arising out of
it are ... dependent upon the existence of confidence and
trust, but the husband's fiduciary duties in respect to his
wife's interest in the community property continue as long
as his control of that property continues, notwithstanding
the complete absence of confidence and trust .... The key
factor in the existence of a fiduciary relationship lies in
control by a person over the property of another. It is
evident that while these two relationships may exist
simultaneously, they do not necessarily do so.258
It is difficult to understand why a "species of common ownership" of
255. See, e.g., Vai v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 364 P.2d 247, 253 (Cal.
1961) for an excellent statement of this proposition. A divorce, of course, will
automatically terminate a tenancy by the entirety and create a tenancy in common in its
place. See Lanier v. Dawes, 255 N.C. 458, 462, 121 S.E.2d 857, 860 (1961). North
Carolina courts have held, however, that once an action for equitable distribution has
been filed, the usual rights of tenants in common-to an accounting or a partition, for
example-are within the jurisdiction of the district court distribution claim, so that none
of the remedies otherwise available to tenants in common are available. Although these
cases are (barely) defensible analytically, they lack any redeeming value as a matter of
equity and public policy. See Beam v. Beam, 92 N.C. App. 509, 512, 374 S.E.2d 636, 638
(1988) (Greene, J., dissenting) ("[Ojur Supreme Court has clearly held that the court's
equitable distribution of the parties' property under the Act terminates the parties'
previous common law right to divide their property based on those common law forms of
ownership."), rev'd per curiam, 325 N.C. 428, 383 S.E.2d 656 (1989) (reversing based on
Judge Greene's dissent below). In Hagler v. Hagler, 319 N.C. 287,354 S.E.2d 228 (1987),
the supreme court concluded that because the wife had not made an equitable distribution
claim she still had the common law remedies of tenants in common. See id. at 292, 354
S.E.2d at 233.
256. See Sharp, supra note 30, at 1414-24.
257. See id. at 1415-16.
258. Vai, 364 P.2d at 252; see also Compton v. Compton, 612 P.2d 1175, 1182 (Idaho
1980) (holding that a confidential relationship "continues until the moment of the
marriage's termination"). Of particular importance in this context is Link v. Link, 278
N.C. 181, 179 S.E.2d 697 (1971), in which the supreme court imposed an independent duty
of disclosure on a husband by virtue of his position as manager of a corporation, part of
the stock of which he had forced his wife to sign over to him. See id. at 193, 179 S.E.2d at
704.
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property that "vests" at the date of separation has failed thus far to
yield grounds for any fiduciary responsibilities in North Carolina.1 9
In addition, of course, such a duty of fairness and full disclosure
arises from the existence of a confidential relationship between
husband and wife.260 One North Carolina case contains what may be
the strongest possible language regarding a confidential relationship:
speaking in the context of an attempt to void a separation agreement,
the supreme court held that any such agreement between husband
and wife must be "'untainted by fraud, must be in all respects fair,
reasonable and just, and must have been entered into without
coercion or the exercise of undue influence, and with full knowledge
of all the circumstances, conditions, and rights of the contracting
parties.' "261 Such a laudable statement of purpose, however, has
been severely undermined by later cases.
262
The real issue regarding confidential relationships in North
Carolina is not how strong they are when they exist, but rather when
such a relationship ceases to exist. In common with a growing
number of states,2 63 North Carolina at long last has discarded its
adherence to the principle that an occurrence of a particular event
259. Indeed, just the opposite occurred under the previously applicable section of the
Equitable Distribution Act. See Chandler v. Chandler, 108 N.C. App. 66, 69-70, 422
S.E.2d 587, 590 (1992). There the wife was unaware of large rental incomes (over
$140,000) from properties held in tenancy by the entirety. See id. She had no right to
share in that income, or even to an accounting, whereas her husband in effect "kept" all
the income, under the Truesdale rule, that because the money was received after the date
of separation, it was therefore neither marital nor separate property. See id. at 70, 422
S.E.2d at 590; see also supra notes 512-20 and accompanying text (discussing Truesdale).
260. See generally Sharp, supra note 217, at 832-38. On the other hand, the renowned
scholar Homer Clark takes the strong position that the duty of disclosure should not rest
on a finding of a confidential relationship which often in fact does not exist, but upon the
public interest in having the wife and children provided for in a manner bearing some
relation to the husband's true means. See CLARK, supra note 2, § 19.2, at 415.
261. Eubanks v. Eubanks, 273 N.C. 189, 196, 159 S.E.2d 562, 567 (1968) (quoting
Taylor v. Taylor, 197 N.C. 197,201,148 S.E. 171,173 (1929)).
262. See infra note 264.
263. See Sharp, supra note 217, at 837 (discussing North Carolina cases); see also Bates
v. Bates, 400 P.2d 593, 596 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965) ("Extrinsic fraud may also consist of
deception practiced by the successful party in purposely keeping his opponent in
ignorance."); Dendrinos v. Dendrinos, 374 N.E.2d 1016, 1018 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) ("Fraud
may consist in the concealment of what is true as in the assertion of what is false.");
Daffin v. Daffin, 567 S.W.2d 672, 677 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) ("Concealment of a material
fact ... which a party has the duty to disclose, constitutes fraud as actual as by affirmative
misrepresentation."); Abbate v. Abbate, 441 N.Y.S.2d 506, 514 (App. Div. 1979)
(" 'Concealment with intent to defraud of facts which one is duty-bound in honesty to
disclose is of the same legal effect and significance as affirmative misrepresentations of
fact.'" (quoting Nasaba Corp. v. Harfred Realty Corp., 39 N.E.2d 243, 245 (N.Y. 1942)))
(emphasis in original).
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terminates the confidential relationship between spouses.76  Instead,
as the court of appeals has aptly stated the matter: "[T]he
involvement of an attorney does not automatically end the
confidential relationship of husband and wife" because when a
''spouse alleges and offers evidence that the confidential relationship
still existed and that the attorney's role was merely to record the
agreement the spouses negotiated, it is a question of fact as to
whether the confidential relationship has been terminated."2 65
Even more significantly, the supreme court recently held in
Bromhal v. Stott2" that separation agreements-often entered into
without extensive discovery and so more likely to create
opportunities for nondisclosure or misrepresentation-are indeed
quite different from any other kind of contract.2 67 The supreme court
observed that in general, a separation agreement "cannot be
analyzed in terms of the marketplace. ' '21 This statement alone
contradicts, and presumably overrules, considerable case law to the
contrary.2 69 The court continued to explain its rationale at length:
Standard contract principles are designed to operate within
the context of a rational, competitive market that assumes a
relative parity of bargaining strength between the parties.
To equate the "market" of settlement agreements, marriage
dissolution-a situation virtually always accompanied by
extraordinary stress and rarely accompanied by mutual
desires to achieve fair results-with the paradigmatic
264. Previous cases had treated the husband-wife relationship quite harshly. See
Avriett v. Avriett, 88 N.C. App. 506, 508, 363 S.E.2d 875, 877 (determining no
confidential relationship merely because husband had obtained a lawyer), affd per
curiam, 322 N.C. 468,368 S.E.2d 377 (1988); Knight v. Knight, 76 N.C. App. 395, 398, 333
S.E.2d 331, 333 (1985) ("[A] separation agreement should be viewed today like any other
bargained-for exchange between parties who are presumably on equal footing.").
265. Harroff v. Harroff, 100 N.C. App. 686, 691,398 S.E.2d 340, 343-44 (1990); see also
Eubanks, 273 N.C. at 195-96, 159 S.E.2d at 567 (recognizing a confidential relationship
despite involvement of an attorney). When, however, both parties have engaged
attorneys, the confidential relationship is almost always deemed to have been terminated.
See 3 LINDSEY ON SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACrS 3-22
(1985).
266. 341 N.C. 702,462 S.E.2d 219 (1995).
267. See Bromhal, 341 N.C. at 706-07,462 S.E.2d at 222. Although the case held that a
liquidated damages clause in a separation agreement was enforceable, Justice Orr's
rationale for the holding was that separation agreements are indeed different from other
types of contracts. See id. This emphatic ruling effectively negates the logic of cases such
as Avriett. See supra note 264 (discussing cases).
268. Bromhal, 341 N.C. at 706,462 S.E.2d at 222.
269. See, e.g., Pope v. Pope, 38 N.C. App. 328, 330, 248 S.E.2d 260, 261 (1978)
(explaining that a separation agreement is "just like any other contract under North
Carolina law"); supra note 264 (discussing cases).
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"marketplace" in which strangers bargain at arms' length, is
simply to ignore the realities of human nature, the
adversarial process, and the realities of most divorce
bargaining.27
Given these refreshingly flexible (and realistic) principles that
the appellate courts of North Carolina are beginning to develop, 71
and because the issue of deliberate concealment in this context has
never been addressed by statute and only barely by case law,72 an
even more basic issue involves the meaning of concealment itself. In
many states, a misrepresentation that virtually amounts to fraud is
required. 3 If and when there is a duty to disclose, however, many
states hold that a simple failure to disclose violates that duty.274
When nondisclosure amounts to misrepresentation, most states will
270. Bromhal, 341 N.C. at 706-07, 462 S.E.2d at 222 (citing Sharp, supra note 136, at
350).
271. It must be emphasized that the language in Bromhal, 341 N.C. at 704-06, 462
S.E.2d at 220-21, is extremely broad and holds significant potential for the development
of some of the analyses and conclusions set forth in this Article.
272. See Sharp, supra note 213, at 832-40.
273. See In re Marriage of Broday, 628 N.E.2d 790, 795 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (requiring
"clear and convincing evidence that [husband] intentionally misstated or concealed a
material fact which he had a duty to disclose and that [wife] detrimentally relied upon his
statement or conduct" as proof of fraud); Hewlett v. Hewlett, 845 S.W.2d 717, 719 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1993) (noting that "a single finding of misrepresentation or concealment rising
to the level of fraud is a sufficient basis upon which to set aside the judgment"); Shelton v.
Shelton, 885 P.2d 807, 808 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (explaining that material
misrepresentation or concealment of assets or financial condition which affected an
alimony or property award is proper ground for relief, provided that "'the alleged
misrepresentation or concealment constitutes conduct, such as fraud, as would basically
afford the complaining party relief from the judgment' " (quoting Clissold v. Clissold, 519
P.2d 241, 242 (Utah 1974), overruled on other grounds by St. Pierre v. Edmunds, 645 P.2d
615 (Utah 1982))). In some jurisdictions, proof of fraud suffices to invalidate settlements,
but other evidence may also suffice. See, e.g., Casto v. Casto, 508 So. 2d 330, 334 (Fla.
1987) ("The critical test in determining the validity of marital agreements is whether
there was fraud or overreaching on one side, or, assuming unreasonableness, whether the
challenging spouse did not have adequate knowledge of the marital property and income
of the parties at the time the agreement was reached.").
274. Apparently, however, unless actual misrepresentation of the value of property is
involved, see infra note 278, there is no duty to disclose the value of marital property. As
one court noted, "each spouse is free to adopt a position favorable to himself or herself
regarding the property's valuation, its inclusion in the community, or other such issues."
Compton v. Compton, 612 P.2d 1175, 1183 (Idaho 1980); see also In re Marriage of
Connolly, 591 P.2d 911, 915 (Cal. 1979) (en banc) (holding that failure of husband to
reveal that stock was about to go public was not a breach of fiduciary duty when even a
"cursory examination" by wife's attorney would have revealed the pending sale); Boeseke
v. Boeseke, 519 P.2d 161, 164-65 (Cal. 1974) (imposing no duty to value property);
Garmisa v. Garmisa, 280 N.E.2d 444, 454 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972) (holding that failure of
husband to reveal negotiations for sale of stock was insufficient to warrant setting aside
decree).
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grant a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside the judgment.275 As noted
earlier, the same treatment is often afforded a "mere"276 failure to
disclose when there is a duty to make full disclosure, derived either
from a confidential relationship, fiduciary obligations, or contract,277
at least as to the existence of an asset if not always as to its value. 78
275. Rule 60(b) states, in part: "On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court
may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding
for the following reasons: ... Fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party." N.C. R. Civ. P.
60(b)(3). Virtually all states have adopted this version of the federal rule. See Sharp,
supra note 30, at 1411 & n.48.
276. See, e.g., Ronnkvist v. Ronnkvist, 331 N.W.2d 764, 765-66 (Minn. 1983) (setting
aside decree when husband failed to disclose assets he had purchased after an agreement
was signed but prior to the divorce decree); Verschell v. Pike, 445 N.Y.S.2d 489, 491-92
(App. Div. 1981) (rescinding an agreement, although no actual duress or fraud was found,
on grounds that wife had failed to reveal her knowledge of a zoning problem, which would
have adversely affected the value of the settlement to which the husband had agreed).
277. Duties derived from a contract, usually a settlement agreement, are discussed
infra notes 282-85 and accompanying text. In Lee v. Lee, 93 N.C. App. 584, 378 S.E.2d
554 (1989), however, a separation agreement was set aside on the grounds that husband
had failed to disclose a $102,000 loan he had made to a third party, because the separation
agreement itself warranted full disclosure and stated that failure to disclose would
constitute a material breach of the agreement. See id. at 587-88, 378 S.E.2d at 556. For
other examples of jurisdictions in which the duty to disclose is not governed solely by
fraud principles, see In re Marriage of Grissom, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 530 (Ct. App. 1994) and
In re Marriage of Baltins, 260 Cal. Rptr. 403 (Ct. App. 1989). In Grissom, the court noted
that the spouse controlling a community asset "'has a duty to disclose the existence of
that asset. This fiduciary relationship does not terminate with the separation of the
spouses or the commencement of a dissolution proceeding. The duty of disclosure
continues until the marriage has been dissolved and the community property divided by
the court.'" Grissom, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 536 (quoting In re Marriage of Modnick, 663 P.2d
187, 191 (Cal. 1983) (citations omitted)). In Baltins, the court explained the legislative
mandate imposing a good faith duty in the confidential relationship between spouses in
the management and control of community property until the property is divided by the
court, which includes the obligation to make full disclosure to the other spouse of assets
and debts of the community, upon request. See Baltins, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
278. In cases involving the valuation of assets, as opposed to the concealment of assets,
property settlement agreements have been set aside based on the misrepresentation of
asset value. See, for example, Shafmaster v. Shafmaster, 642 A.2d 1361 (N.H. 1994), in
which the court countered the defendant's contention that his estimates of value in his
financial statements were opinions rather than facts, with the holding that "opinions" of
value, if made to mislead, were indeed fraudulent misrepresentations. See id. at 1365.
Similarly, in Hager v. Hager, 378 N.E.2d 459 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978), the court held that
husband's representation that stock he owned was virtually without value, when in fact
the value was over one million dollars, was sufficient to set aside the settlement
agreement. See id. at 460; see also Adams v. Adams, 376 So. 2d 1204, 1204-05 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1979) (vacating decree of a case in which the husband assigned value of $290,000
to Kentucky Fried Chicken holdings worth well over eight million dollars); Bellow v.
Bellow, 352 N.E.2d 427, 430-31 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (determining that husband's actual
income was five times greater than he represented); Alexander v. Sagehorn, 600 S.W.2d
198, 200-02 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (recognizing the gross undervaluation of farm acreage as
sufficient fraud to warrant setting aside property division portion of decree).
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Absent such a meaningful disclosure requirement, the burden
may well shift to the other spouse to undertake extensive and
expensive discovery-a result that can only create yet more
animosity and distrust of the judicial system.279 Thus, absent a duty to
disclose, and to update disclosure as necessary,20 (coupled with
remedies and penalties for such behavior), spouses enter into
"friendly" settlements at their peril-a result that blatantly
contradicts public policy in favor of settlement agreements. 28 The
only law or policy that can further this strong public interest in
settlements is imposition of disclosure duties sufficient to reassure
spouses that it is in fact safe to enter into such agreements.
A third basis upon which a duty to disclose may be supported is
through the simple act of voluntarily undertaking the duty, as with a
contract or settlement agreement-a strategy that in fact has led to
success in at least one case in North Carolina.m Parties also often
deal with these issues by what amounts to an in terrorem clause in a
separation agreement,283 that warrants full disclosure and provides for
penalties if nondisclosure is later discovered. Often, however, there
is no provision affirming the existence of any disclosure. In the
absence of a statutory, confidential, fiduciary, or contract foundation
279. This was, in fact, the effect of North Carolina cases that so narrowly defined the
confidential relationship. See supra note 264 (discussing cases).
280. Ironically, this duty already exists in North Carolina under § 50-21(a). See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 50-21(a) (Supp. 1997). Thus far, however, neither the bar nor the bench
have taken this mandate seriously.
281. In Bromhal, the court observed that "it is obvious that the General Assembly of
North Carolina views the utilization of separation agreements as instruments of sound
public policy in North Carolina in dealing with the growing number of divorces taking
place in our society." Bromhal v. Stott, 341 N.C. 702,704, 462 S.E.2d 219,220-21 (1995).
Alternatively, honest spouses might well be forced into unnecessary discovery.
282. See Lee v. Lee, 93 N.C. App. 584, 378 S.E.2d 554 (1989). The agreement in that
case contained a provision that "the failure to disclose property shall constitute a material
breach of this Agreement and give rise to whatever remedies at law or in equity may be
available to either." Id. at 587, 378 S.E.2d at 556. On proof that husband had failed to
disclose a $102,000 debt owed to his corporation, the court of appeals rescinded the
agreement. See id. at 588, 378 S.E.2d at 556.
For excellent examples of other types of disclosure and penalty clauses commonly
used in settlement agreements, see Carlyn G. Poole, Deception, Disclosure and
Confidentiality, FAMILY LAW INTENSIVE SEMINAR (North Carolina Bar Foundation
Continuing Legal Education, Cary, N.C.), Feb. 1998, at V-B-15 to -18.
283. Common provisions include an agreement that 75%-or even 100%-of such
nondisclosed property discovered after a final equitable distribution will become the
property of the aggrieved spouse. Another solution, eminently feasible in North Carolina
given its year-plus waiting period for a divorce, is simply to set aside any agreement for a
material failure to disclose. A material failure to disclose often amounts to fraud, of
course, and many courts have set aside decrees on this basis. See infra note 273 (citing
cases).
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for the duty to disclose, there can be no "free-floating" obligations,
and thus the burden "to find out" may rest entirely upon the other
spouse-a result that has no discernible merit whatsoever.
Imposition of a duty to discover not only exposes the financially
weaker spouse to what may be immense discovery expenses, but it
also creates additional acrimony towards the other spouse and to the
ever-growing frustration with, or enmity towards, the judicial system
itself. Whatever the parameters of this duty might be,2 4 the clear
opportunity, if not mandate, for the imposition of such duties at long
last has presented itself to the courts of this state.2 5
In particular, the strong public policy of encouraging settlement
agreements between spouses, including both alimony and division of
property, can only be undermined by the continuation of "every man
for himself,"-a policy, thus far largely allowed by our courts in the
absence of a settlement agreement to the contrary.286 It is of
immense significance that North Carolina courts are presented at last
with the opportunity, or perhaps with the necessity, to begin to
undertake the task of defining true disclosure duties between the
parties themselves.' Our domestic law, particularly in this context,
is light years behind the law of other states' and even lags far behind
284. Any duty to disclose must, of course, include some duty to value in North
Carolina, because § 50-21(b) of the North Carolina General Statutes requires that our
courts determine the net value of a marital asset at the date of separation, although the
same statutory section requires that divisible property be valued as of the date of
distribution. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-21(b) (Supp. 1997).
285. Two points regarding disclosure in other contexts do appear to be well-
established. The first is that if a party chooses to make a representation, she must do so
fully-half truths may give rise to fraud almost as easily as outright misrepresentations.
See Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 286 N.C. 130, 134, 209 S.E.2d 494, 497 (1974) (involving the
sale of a business). The second is that failure to speak fully when there is a duty to do so
may also be fraud. As the Middle District of North Carolina has explained:
"Silence, in order to be an actionable fraud, must relate to a material matter
known to the party and which it is his legal duty to communicate to the other...
party, whether the duty arises from a relation of trust, from confidence,
inequality of condition and knowledge, or other attendant circumstances....
[t]he silence must, under the conditions existing, amount to fraud, because it
amounts to an affirmation that a state of things exists which does not ......
Breeden v. Richmond Community College, 171 F.R.D. 189, 194 (M.D.N.C. 1997)
(omissions in original) (quoting Setzer v. Old Republic Life Ins. Co., 257 N.C. 396, 399,
126 S.E.135, 137 (1962)).
286. See Sharp, supra note 217, at 832-33.
287. See supra note 282 (discussing Lee)
288. See GREGORY ET AL., supra note 213, § 4.04[A], at 86-90. For example, New
York, which has always maintained a firm adherence to its presumption of equal division
of marital property, recently justified a 35%/65% division in favor of the wife, on proof
that the husband had attempted to hide assets in a foreign bank, and had also squandered
large sums of money on luxuries for himself and various mistresses. See Maharam v.
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disclosure requirements in business or commercial contexts. 289 The
absence of such duties and effective judicial measures to provide
remedies (particularly after an agreement is signed but before the
divorce decree) can operate only to encourage the
dominant/supporting spouse to fail to disclose, to misrepresent, and
to commit fraud.290 As Justice Benjamin Cardozo once observed (in
a joint venture case, not a matrimonial one), the morals of the
marketplace are completely inappropriate for any enterprise that
requires the "duty of finest loyalty."2 91 Surely no less should be said
of simple duties of honesty and disclosure owed to a spouse, to the
institution of marriage, and to the more efficient operation of the
judicial system of this state.
C. Alimony Factors
1. Introduction: Factors 1-3
Finally, this discussion of the new alimony laws is clearly
incomplete without a rather extended discussion of the factors that a
court, in its discretion, but with a strict mandate for findings of fact,2'
"shall consider"'29 in determining the "amount, duration, and manner
of payment of alimony." 94 A cursory glance at the list of factors can
Maharam, 666 N.Y.2d 129, 129-30 (App. Div. 1997).
289. See supra note 291 (citing cases). Imposition of higher standards with commercial
sales than with marriage dissolutions has long been an anomaly in North Carolina. This
probably derives from the repeal of the Privy Examination Statute in 1978. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 52-6 (1966) (repealed 1977). The magistrate's exam, in effect, substituted
for judicial review. The preferred solution, as suggested by Judge Greene in his dissent in
Avriett v. Avriett, 88 N.C. App. 506, 363 S.E.2d 875 (1988) (Greene, J., dissenting), would
have been to ensure that both parties were guaranteed the protection against
overreaching, nondisclosure, and unconscionability that the older statute provided for the
wife. See id. at 510-11, 363 S.E.2d at 878-79 (Greene, J., dissenting).
290. The line between fraud and failure to disclose is often a thin one indeed. See
generally Sharp, supra note 218 (discussing these issues).
291. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). It is sadly, but not
infrequently, true that spouses often receive less protection than do business partners, for
whom good faith and disclosure duties not only continue beyond formal dissolution, but
throughout the "winding up" or liquidation phase as well. See Lavin v. Erlich, 363
N.Y.S.2d 50 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Johnson v. Peckham, 120 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. 1938); Karle v.
Seder, 214 P.2d 684 (Wash. 1950).
292. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(c) (1995).
293. Id. § 50-16.3A(b).
294. Id. Pennsylvania, which lists 17 factors to be considered in alimony
determination, 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3701(b) (1991), is apparently the only state
which enumerates more factors than North Carolina. Other states also have a lengthy list
of factors in their alimony statutes. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 4320 (West Supp. 1998) (12
factors); HAW. REV. STAT. § 580-47 (Supp. 1995) (13 factors); IOWA CODE ANN.
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easily leave the impression that they are self-evident. But a more
thorough analysis of the factors reveals that they may be the most
exciting, innovative, and potentially most significant part of the new
statutes. These factors are:
(1) The marital misconduct of either of the spouses.
Nothing herein shall prevent a court from considering
incidents of post date-of-separation marital
misconduct as corroborating evidence supporting
other evidence that marital misconduct occurred
during the marriage and prior to date of separation;
(2) The relative earnings and earning capacities of the
spouses;
(3) The ages and the physical, mental, and emotional
conditions of the spouses;
(4) The amount and sources of earned and unearned
income of both spouses, including, but not limited to,
earnings, dividends, and benefits such as medical,
retirement, insurance, social security, or others;
(5) The duration of the marriage;
(6) The contribution by one spouse to the education,
training, or increased earning power of the other
spouse;
(7) The extent to which the earning power, expenses, or
financial obligations of a spouse will be affected by
reason of serving as the custodian of a minor child;
(8) The standard of living of the spouses established
during the marriage;
(9) The relative education of the spouses and the time
necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to
enable the spouse seeking alimony to find employment
to meet his or her reasonable economic needs;
§ 598.21(3) (West Supp. 1997) (10 factors); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 951(1)
(West 1998) (15 factors); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 11-106(b) (Supp. 1997) (12
factors); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.335(2) (West 1997) (10 factors); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:34-23(b) (West Supp. 1997) (10 factors); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-7(E) (Michie
Supp. 1996) (10 factors); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(6)(a) (McKinney 1986) (11 factors);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.18(c)(1) (Anderson Supp. 1997) (14 factors); OR. REV.
STAT. § 107.105(d) (1997) (13 factors); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-130(C) (West Supp. 1997)
(13 factors); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-5-101(d)(1) (Supp. 1997) (12 factors); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 767.26 (West 1993) (10 factors); see also UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT
§ 308(b), 9A-II U.L.A. 446 (1998) (listing six factors to be considered in determining
maintenance, four of which, § 308(b)(2)-(5), are virtually identical to § 50-16.3A(b)(3),
(5), (8), (9) of the North Carolina General Statutes).
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(10) The relative assets and liabilities of the spouses and
the relative debt service requirements of the spouses,
including legal obligations of support;
(11) The property brought to the marriage by either
spouse;
(12) The contribution of a spouse as homemaker;
(13) The relative needs of the spouses;
(14) The federal, State, and local tax ramifications of the
alimony award;
(15) Any other factor relating to the economic
circumstances of the parties that the court finds to be
just and proper. 95
The first factor, marital misconduct, including "illicit sexual
behavior," has already been discussed in considerable detail 96 The
remaining fourteen factors are in part familiar, either through prior
case law under the predecessor alimony statute2' 9 or because of their
similarity to the thirteen statutory factors, many of which have
received considerable appellate attention,2 9 in the equitable
distribution statute. 99 Some of these factors, however, introduce
295. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(b)(1)-(15) (1995). The most obvious "any other
factor" that comes to mind is a history of domestic violence inflicted upon a dependent
spouse. It may well take years before a battered spouse, even with extensive
psychological help, may be able even to begin to attempt to function in a self-sufficient
manner. Limited term alimony awards would appear to be especially inappropriate in
such situations. At a minimum, the court should retain jurisdiction to extend the award if
necessary.
296. See discussion supra Part III.A.
297. The predecessor statute stated only that "[a]limony shall be in such amount as the
circumstances render necessary, having due regard to the estates, earnings, earning
capacity, condition, accustomed standard of living of the parties, and other facts of the
particular case." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.5 (1987), repealed by Act of June 21, 1995, ch.
319, § 1, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 641, 641.
298. This is particularly true with factor 12--"[a]ny other factor." N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 50-20(c)(12) (Supp. 1997).
299. The factors that a court considered in dividing marital property equitably, as
listed in the old § 50-20(c), were:
(1) The income, property, and liabilities of each party at the time the division
of property is to become effective;
(2) Any obligation for support arising out of a prior marriage;
(3) The duration of the marriage and the age and physical and mental health of
both parties;
(4) The need of a parent with custody of a child or children of the marriage to
occupy or own the marital residence and to use or own its household
effects;
(5) The expectation of nonvested pension, retirement, or other deferred
compensation rights, which is separate property;
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
considerations that are quite new and potentially of great
significance, particularly with regard to North Carolina domestic law,
which has been underdeveloped in many areas for so long. 0 In
general, however, the expansion of alimony factors-always bearing
in mind the dependency hurdle 0l and the possibility of adultery as an
absolute bar for the dependent spouse 3 -- appears to signal a
considerably more generous approach to alimony awards than did its
predecessor, particularly with regard to amounts.303 In addition, the
alimony factors evidence growing familiarity, increased sophistication
with, and appreciation of the many facets of a marriage and the often
gender specific roles undertaken therein-roles that now require
prominent consideration. °4
Factors number 2 and 3-"[t]he relative earnings and earning
capacities of the spouses" and "[t]he ages and the physical, mental,
and emotional conditions of the spouses "305-- are basically quite
familiar. Earnings and earning capacities track the old statute, and
(6) Any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution made
to the acquisition of such marital property by the party not having title,
including joint efforts or expenditures and contributions and services, or
lack thereof, as a spouse, parent, wage earner or homemaker;
(7) Any direct or indirect contribution made by one spouse to help educate or
develop the career potential of the other spouse;
(8) Any direct contribution to an increase in value of separate property which
occurs during the course of the marriage;
(9) The liquid or nonliquid character of all marital property;
(10) The difficulty of evaluating any component asset or any interest in a
business, corporation or profession, and the economic desirability of
retaining such asset or interest, intact and free from any claim or
interference by the other party;
(11) The tax consequences to each party;
(Ila) Acts of either party to maintain, preserve, develop, or expand; or to
waste, neglect, devalue or convert such marital property, during the period
after separation of the parties and before the time of distribution; and
(12) Any other factor which the court finds to be just and proper.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c) (1995) (amended 1997). It should be noted here that the
equitable distribution factors include "Ila," so that there are effectively thirteen factors.
300. See supra Part III.B.3 (discussing disclosure duties).
301. See supra note 1.
302. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(a) (1995).
303. See infra Part III.C.2 and accompanying text (analyzing medical benefits in
particular); see also supra note 180 (discussing the pitfalls in the underlying assumptions
regarding alimony for a specified term).
304. Nothing in the now repealed statutes forbade consideration of many of these new
factors, of course, but the statutory mandate now raises these factors to an entirely
different plane. See supra note 297 (setting forth the previous standards). Although
many gender-based roles reflect social mores and choice of the parties, others, such as
child-bearing, are biologically imposed.
305. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(b)(2), (3).
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nothing in that statute indicates that one might expect any change
from prior case law,30 6 with the exception of "earnings. '30 7 It should
be noted that a supporting spouse's earnings and earning capacity
should, as with dependency, be measured initially as of the date of
separation, absent extraordinary involuntary declines in earnings or
earning capacity.30 8 Many factors, especially those related to the
health of a supporting spouse, may affect earning capacity. Probably
the best initial guides to determining income (particularly if one is
self-employed) and the nature of under-employment may be found in
the introductory text to the child support guidelines.0 9
2. Medical Insurance and Other Factors
Factor number 4-directing consideration of earned and
unearned income, "including, but not limited to, earnings, dividends,
and benefits such as medical, retirement, insurance, social security, or
others" 310 -appears to reinforce strongly the usage of the child
support guidelines in calculating income.311 Much more importantly,
however, this factor not only specifically opens the door to include
306. See, e.g., Bowes v. Bowes, 287 N.C. 163, 171-72, 214 S.E.2d 40, 45 (1975)
(explaining that only when a court finds that a supporting spouse has deliberately reduced
his earnings in order to avoid support obligations should his earning capacity be the basis
for an award of alimony); Harris v. Harris, 258 N.C. 121, 128 S.E.2d 123 (1962) (same);
Conrad v. Conrad, 252 N.C. 412, 113 S.E.2d 912 (1960) (same). A decrease in actual
earnings between the date of separation and the date of an alimony hearing, however,
should be viewed with more than mere suspicion.
307. See infra notes 310-36 (discussing employer-provided medical insurance).
308. See supra note 306; see also Laura W. Morgan, Beyond the 1040: Finding Hidden
Sources of Income for Support, 10 DIVORCE LrrIG. 83-87(discussing often overlooked
sources of income, such as employer contributions to tax-deferred savings plans,
reinvested dividends, retained earnings from a close corporation that could be distributed,
and pre-payment of debts).
309. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.4(cl) (Supp. 1997) (authorizing the Conference of
Chief District Judges to set uniform presumptive guidelines for computing child support
obligations). The actual Guidelines state that computation for self-employed persons
"should be carefully reviewed to determine an appropriate level of gross income .... In
most cases, this amount will differ from a determination of business income for tax
purposes." N.C. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, N.C. CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES
AOC-A-162, at 3 (1994) [hereinafter CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES].
310. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(b)(4) (1995). See 42 U.S.C. § 1482(a)(2)(B) (1994)
(defining unearned income, in part, as "any payments received as an annuity, pension,
retirement, or disability benefit, including veterans' compensation and pensions,
workmen's compensation payments, old-age, survivors, and disability insurance benefits,
railroad retirement annuities and pensions, and unemployment insurance benefits"); see
also I.R.C. § 32(c)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1998) (discussing income that the IRS has thus far
chosen to disregard).
311. See supra note 309 (discussing guidelines).
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more broadly defined sources of income,312 but it also places medical
benefits in that category.313 Although it sounds almost clich6d today
to repeat that health insurance is of almost inestimable value to all
persons, it is particularly so for housewives who are divorced after a
number of years of marriage31 4 and who previously had medical
coverage through their husbands' employers.
The significance of factoring in health insurance coverage in
determining income, both for purposes of establishing dependency
and for determining the duration and amount of alimony,315 both
during employment and after retirement, simply cannot be
underestimated, particularly in marriages in which one spouse
(usually the wife) has been out of the work force for a number of
years.316 Although continuation of medical insurance (at the expense
of the non-employee spouse) is available for a maximum of thirty-six
months317 under COBRA provisions,318 the value of which is certainly
312. The Child Support Guidelines, for example, offer a much more expansive
definition of income:
Gross income includes income from any source, except as excluded below, and
includes but is not limited to income from salaries, wages, commissions, bonuses,
dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, trust income, annuities, capital
gains, social security benefits, workers compensation benefits, unemployment
insurance benefits, disability pay and insurance benefits, gifts, prizes and
alimony or maintenance received from persons other than the parties to the
instant action. While includable as income, non-recurring, one-time payments
should be distinguished from ongoing income.
CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES, supra note 309, at 2.
313. It has been suggested, quite appropriately, that the existence of health insurance
should be considered as marital property for the spouse who is insured. See, e.g., William
R. Horbatt & Alan M. Grosman, Division of Retiree Health Benefits on Divorce: The
New Equitable Distribution Frontier, 28 FAM. L.Q. 327, 328 (1994). Several states,
moreover, require increased coverage beyond that which is mandated by COBRA to
insure that coverage remain available until the non-participant reaches the age of 62. See
supra note 316 (citing examples).
314. See supra note 4 (discussing George v. George, 115 N.C. App. 387, 444 S.E.2d 449
(1994)).
315. See supra notes 333-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of the possibility
of the inclusion of medical benefits, particularly after one reaches the age of eligibility for
Medicare, as property.
316. The question of how long is "long enough" is clearly a difficult one. Several
states, however, have established alimony or maintenance guidelines. Section 60-
1610(b)(2) of the Kansas Statutes, for example, creates rules for presumptive terms for
alimony, with a presumed duration of 121 months, but allowing successive orders of 21
months. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(b)(2) (Supp. 1997). Delaware's formula sets a
maximum duration of one-half of the years of the marriage, for marriages of under 20
years, but has no limit for marriages of over 20 years. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§ 1512(d) (1993).
317. This limit is probably reflective of the early years of experience with
rehabilitative alimony, when three-year awards were common. See supra note 182 and
accompanying text.
2080 [Vol. 76
1998] DISTRIBUTIVE CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE 2081
better than nothing, COBRA is nonetheless of limited worth. First,
unlike its most recent counterpart, a federal law requiring health
insurance for children when it is available to a parent' 19 and
mandated under state law,320 the three-year maximum continuation of
insurance321 is woefully inadequate for virtually all "homemaking"
spouses over forty years of age (and often younger spouses as well),
who are unlikely, regardless of any retraining, to obtain any job
which provides health benefits.
3 22
Second, only forty-four percent of the United States
population 323 is employed by firms that are covered by the Employee
Retirement and Income Security Act ("ERISA") group health
plans324 that provide medical care321 and that therefore must also
provide continuation coverage under COBRA.326 Third, no state,
federal, local government, certain charitable organizations, or
businesses with fewer than twenty employees32 7 are subject to
COBRA provisions regarding insurance continuation in the first
instance.3  Lamentably and needlessly, North Carolina grants
absolutely no right to continuation of health insurance in the case of
318. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 ("COBRA"), Pub. L.
No. 99-272, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat.) 82, 228-29, codified at I.R.C. § 4980B (1994)).
This act is codified in the Internal Revenue Code, I.R.C. § 4980B (1994), and the Public
Health Service Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-68 (1994).
319. COBRA has been amended to require and provide for Qualified Medical Child
Support Orders ("QMCSOs"). For example, it requires employer-provided heath
insurance plans to continue health insurance for dependent children, regardless of
whether the child lives with the employee, resides in the group coverage geographical
area, etc. See Consolidated Omnibus Budget Resolution Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66,
§ 1908, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 312, 633-36 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396-gl(1994)).
320. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.11 (1995).
321. See I.R.C. § 4980B(d)(1)-(3).
322. According to the United States Census Bureau, nearly 75% of the elderly four
million poor in the United States are women. See LEATHA LAMISON-WHITE, U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P60-198, POvERTY
IN THE U.S.: 1996, tbl.2, at 2 (1997).
323. See GAO OFFIcE LETrER REP., 07/25/95, EMPLOYER-BASED HEALTH PLANS:
ISSUES, TRENDS, AND CHALLENGES POSED BY ERISA (1995).
324. Section 58-53-3 provides only for twelve months of continued coverage under the
group policy for an employee and his "eligible" dependents. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-
53-3 (1984).
325. Group health plans are defined in I.R.C. § 5000(b)(1) (1994).
326. For the definition of medical care, see I.R.C. § 213(d).
327. COBRA actually provides that businesses with 20 or fewer employees are
excluded if that number is employed for less than one-half of the year. See id. § 4980B(d).
328. Employees and their dependents may be, and usually are, provided health
insurance from such employers, but there is likely to be no continuation insurance for ex-
spouses beyond the three-year limit imposed by COBRA. See id.
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an ex-spouse 29 Many states not only provide for the availability of
such coverage, but have greatly expanded the continuation coverage
beyond that required by COBRA.330 Massachusetts has gone even so
far as to require an employee (in. conjunction with his or her health
care plan) to provide continued insurance for a former spouse as if
such spouse were still a dependent.3 Other states have extended
continuation coverage for older spouses until they reach the age of
Medicare eligibility.
3
Especially in view of both the absence of any such provision in
North Carolina and the explicit statutory reference in the fourth
factor to "medical" benefits,333 statutory analysis, logic, and common
sense suggest that medical benefits, both current and post-retirement,
should be treated as either (1) earned or unearned income and
therefore a critical component in determining income with a
determination of dependency in the first instance, or (2) an asset or a
form of deferred compensation under the equitable distribution
factors.334 At an absolute minimum, the cost of procuring post-
COBRA medical coverage for a dependent former spouse should be
one of the most significant factors in determining the amount and
duration of any alimony award. 35 Equity, among the other concerns
listed above, should surely require no less.
336
329. Section 58-53-3 provides for an employee and his or her dependents--clearly not
including an ex-spouse-to maintain coverage under his or her group plan (and at his or
her expense) for up to one year. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-53-3.
330. Illinois, for example, mandates that all former spouses under the age of 55 must
have the option of continuation of insurance for two years, but that a former spouse 55 or
older may continue coverage until that spouse otherwise obtains health insurance or
becomes eligible for Medicare. See 215 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/367.2 (West 1994).
Missouri has a similar provision for ex-spouses 55 years old or older. See Mo. ANN.
STAT. §§ 376.892-.894 (West Supp. 1998). California provides for a five-year COBRA
extension of benefits. See CAL. INS. CODE § 10116.5 (West Supp. 1998).
331. See MASS. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 175, § 1101 (West 1987).
332. See, e.g., 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/367.2.
333. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(b)(4) (1995).
334. It is almost impossible to distinguish between retirement benefits and medical
retirement benefits. If the former can be reduced to a discounted current value, the latter
may clearly be as well. See Elizabeth L. Bennett & John W. Goldsborough, Guaranteeing
Medical Insurance Coverage After Separation or Divorce, 28 FAM. L.Q. 305,331-32 (1994)
(demonstrating such valuations). Similarly, medical benefits until retirement may clearly
be, in whole or in part, a "marital asset" and should thus be subject to the same rules
governing valuation as are pension benefits. See Horbatt & Grosman, supra note 313, at
328.
335. Were the former spouse to procure employment that provided such benefits,
modification of the alimony award might be appropriate.
336. Nearly $16,000,000 is paid by North Carolina counties each year in Medicaid
benefits. See N.C. DEP'T OF HUMAN RESOURCES: STATISTICS FISCAL YEAR 1996,
STAT. J. 3-4 (1996). The statistics are not broken down into age or gender categories.
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Consideration of the ages and the physical, mental, and
emotional states of the parties, of course, is virtually identical to the
third factor of the equitable distribution statute,337 as is the fifth
factor, the duration of the marriage. 338  Indeed, duration of a
marriage correlates not only with age and the need for continued
medical coverage, but with earning capacity as well. It is likely to
be-along with a dependent spouse's income-the most critical
factor in determining the amount and duration of alimony in North
Carolina and in the majority of states.3 39 It is also likely to be closely
related to the sixth factor-"[tihe contribution by one spouse to the
education, training, or increased earning power of the other
spouse,' 340 a factor that is similar to, but still significantly different
from, its counterpart in equitable distribution. 41 Clearly, the alimony
statutory directive to consider the "relative earnings and earning
capacities" 2 is much more forceful and specific than the equitable
distribution factor to consider "the career potential" of the other
spouse.3" Thus, assuming that one can "pass" the dependency test,
the opportunity to maximize the effect of this alimony factor should
never be overlooked. Employer-paid medical insurance, both before
and after retirement, is no less income, or an asset, than pension
benefits. The cost to a dependent spouse in obtaining similar
coverage after three years should similarly be taken into account in
determining whether an alimony award is appropriate in the first
instance.3"
The seventh factor, the "extent to which the earning power,
expenses, or financial obligations of a spouse will be affected by
337. See supra note 299 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c) (1995) (amended 1997)).
338. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-16.3.A(b)(5), -20(c)(3) (1995 & Supp. 1997). This
should, in fact, be the paramount consideration in determining when a periodic alimony
award is appropriate. See supra notes 127-35 and accompanying text.
339. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 5.02, at 268.
340. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(b)(6) (1995).
341. See id. § 50-20(c)(7) (Supp. 1997) (referring to "[a]ny direct or indirect
contribution made by one spouse to help educate or develop the career potential of the
other spouse").
342. Id. § 50-16.3A(b)(2) (1995). It is also the second time the alimony factors
specifically refer to earning capacity. See supra text accompanying 295 (quoting N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(b)).
343. Id. § 50-20(c)(7) (Supp. 1997).
344. Even a modest alimony award leaves the door open for an increase once an ex-
spouse's COBRA coverage expires. Alternatively, an order that a supporting spouse
continue health insurance for the dependent spouse after COBRA coverage-assuming
that the dependent spouse is unable to secure employment which provides coverage-
could also be appropriate.
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reason of serving as the custodian of a minor child,' 3 45 is the statutory
embodiment of the eminently common-sense holding in Fink v.
Fink,!'46 a relatively new decision from the court of appeals. The
relationship between caring for a minor child, or children, and
earning capacity (or even the ability to secure a job in many
instances) is almost too obvious to warrant discussion. A recent and
quite extensive study found, however, that the custodial spouse was
awarded alimony in only thirty percent of cases involving divorcing
parents who had at least one child under the age of sixteen.347 The
significance of this custodial factor, moreover, correlates to a
considerable degree with the twelfth factor, the "contribution of a
spouse as homemaker,"s as well as to the "duration of the
marriage."' ' 9 In virtually all instances, homemaking and child care
responsibilities will result not only in a significant decline of earnings,
but in a decline in residual earnings and earning capacity as well.
350
The custodial and/or homemaking responsibilities of a
dependent spouse must play a large role in the ninth factor-the
"relative education of the spouses and the time necessary to acquire
sufficient education or training to enable the spouse seeking alimony
to find employment to meet his or her reasonable economic
needs. '351  This factor rather clearly refers to situations in which
alimony for a specified term is contemplated, and it has been
discussed at length already.3 2  Again, however, it must be
345. Id. § 50-16.3A(b)(7) (1995).
346. 120 N.C. App. 412,462 S.E.2d 844 (1995).
347. See ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD
123-24 & n.4 (1992). This percentage is considerably higher than the average number of
divorces that include alimony awards. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 5.05, at 302.
348. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(b)(12).
349. Id. § 50-16.3A(b)(5).
350. The significance of these declines has been the subject of many studies, with
findings that an interruption in work for a single year may result in an income decline
ranging from somewhere between 3.3% and 7.6% to 1.4%. This decline, moreover, is
cumulative and lifetime. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 507, at 346; see also Ann
Laquer Estin, Maintenance, Alimony, and the Rehabilitation of Family Care, 71 N.C. L.
REV. 721 (1993). Virtually the entirety of this excellent article is devoted to the inability,
or unwillingness, of the domestic laws of the several states to truly take seriously, value,
or recompense, the economic value of marriage to a caregiver-and the equally dismal
failure to recognize the losses incurred by such a caregiver. At one point, Professor Estin
asks what should be, but unfortunately is not, a rhetorical question: "We know
empirically, however, that women continue to be responsible for most caregiving work in
our society, and in the context of divorce, that difference generates substantial,
unrecognized economic consequences. Can we not agree that this is an unfair approach
to family life, or, at least, to divorce?" Id. at 781.
351. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(b)(9).
352. See supra Part II.C.2.
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emphasized that such awards are often totally inappropriate, may
often underestimate greatly the actual opportunities available to a
spouse, or may ignore eventualities that were completely outside the
contemplation of either party at the time of the decree 353-all of
which point to the critical opportunity for a court to revisit the issue
of any time limit imposed upon alimony. 4
3. Standard of Living and Remaining Factors
The tenth and eleventh factors are somewhat unusual in that
they contemplate a decision as to the amount and duration of
alimony after an equitable distribution of property, whereas § 50-
16.3A(a) allows for an alimony claim to be heard on the merits
before property is actually divided.355  The tenth factor directs
consideration of the "relative assets and liabilities of the spouses and
the relative debt service requirements ... including legal obligations
of support. '356 Clearly such assets and liabilities should be measured
after the completion of an equitable distribution. Indeed, any well-
advised supporting spouse, unless she has evidence, unavailable at
the time of separation, of pre-date of separation adultery on the part
of the dependent spouse, should attempt to avoid an alimony hearing
in which these two factors are, almost by definition, unknown.
Added expenses for both parties and a waste of judicial resources are
likely to be the only results of an alimony hearing before a final
equitable distribution. The eleventh factor, "property brought to the
marriage by either spouse, '357  may or may not be known or agreed
to by the spouses before equitable distribution is resolved, but the
rationales for delaying any alimony hearing until after property
division is complete still retain validity. Moreover, in the event of a
settlement agreement prior to divorce, it strains credulity to postulate
that parties could agree on a property division without also agreeing
upon alimony. The two are in virtually every instance inextricably
intertwined. 358 If there is no settlement, however, hearing the
alimony claim first is likely to be a waste of judicial and other
resources and will certainly bring added expenses to the parties. The
353. Countless examples illustrate this point: diagnosis of a serious health problem in
the dependent spouse or in a child of the parties; disabling accidents to either; a job that
did not materialize; loss of employment; diagnosis of a serious learning disorder in a child,
etc.
354. See supra Part II.B.2.
355. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(a).
356. Id. § 50-16.3A(b)(10).
357. Id. § 50-16.3A(b)(11).
358. See supra notes 109, 187.
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caveat to this statement would involve the unlikely event that the
results of equitable distribution would not change the alimony
duration or amount, or the dependency status-an eventuality that,
given the potential of the expanded factors that can be used to
increase the assets and income of the supporting spouse, 59 is so
unlikely as to stretch the imagination.
Of the four remaining factors, the fourteenth factor-the
"federal, State, and local tax ramifications of the alimony award" 360-
is similar to the same factor in equitable distribution,361 albeit the
alimony factor is more specific. The major point to recall regarding
the fourteenth factor is that the court of appeals has held that
consideration of the tax ramifications of any equitable distribution
award is limited only to those that actually will ensue as a direct
result of any court order. As the court made clear in the property
context, "speculative" or hypothetical considerations of what tax
consequences might ensue at a future point are impermissible.3 6 2 It
seems clear, however, that this thoroughly common-sense rule should
359. See supra notes 310-36 and accompanying text (discussing the value of medical
insurance).
360. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(b)(14).
361. See id. § 50-20(c)(11) (Supp. 1997) (stating only that the "tax consequences to
each party" should be considered in determining if equal is equitable).
362. See Harvey v. Harvey, 112 N.C. App. 788,793,437 S.E.2d 397,400 (1993) ("[I]t is
improper to consider possible tax consequences as a distributive factor under G.S. § 50-
20(c)(11) in the absence of evidence that some taxable event has already occurred or that
the distribution ordered by the court will itself create some immediate tax consequence to
either of the parties." (citing Smith v. Smith, 104 N.C. App. 788, 411 S.E.2d 197 (1991)));
Wilkins v. Wilkins, 111 N.C. App. 541, 553, 432 S.E.2d 891, 897 (1993) (rejecting
consideration of hypothetical tax consequences on retirement plan value as a distributive
factor because "predict[ing] variables (including, inter alia, the government's tax
structure, plaintiff's financial condition, the date of plaintiff's early withdrawals, if any,
and the date of plaintiff's eventual retirement) that far in the future requires the trial
court to engage in impermissible speculation"); Smith, 104 N.C. App. at 790,411 S.E.2d at
198 (rejecting plaintiff's argument that tax consequences of withdrawal from his
retirement plan funds should be considered in equitable distribution, when plaintiff did
not present evidence, nor even argue, that he would be forced to withdraw any part of
these funds to comply with the distribution order, indicating that the fact of withdrawal
and possible tax consequences were "purely speculative"). Several other states-as
common sense would indicate-also have found no error in trial court failure to consider
merely speculative tax considerations as a factor in property distribution. See In re
Marriage of Bayer, 687 P.2d 537, 539 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984); In re Marriage of Kapusta,
491 N.E.2d 48, 53 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); In re Marriage of Hayne, 334 N.W.2d 347, 353
(Iowa Ct. App. 1983); Catania v. Catania, 385 N.W.2d 28, 30-31 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986);
Hardwick v. Hardwick, 399 S.E.2d 791, 793 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990). See generally Tracy A.
Bateman, Annotation, Divorce and Separation: Consideration of Tax Consequences in
Distribution of Marital Property, 9 A.L.R.5TH 568 (1993) (listing both jurisdictions which
have not found trial court error in failure to consider hypothetical tax consequences, and
jurisdictions which have found such error).
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not be applicable in instances in which, for example, one spouse
receives the marital home or other real estate, the taxes on which
become a necessary and legitimate living expense.
363
The eighth factor--"[t]he standard of living of the spouses
established during the marriage"-and the thirteenth factor-
"[r]elative needs of the spouses' 3 4 -are of singular importance.
Despite the paramount emphasis under the predecessor statute365 and
prior case law on the previous standard of living as both the sine qua
non and a virtual "ceiling" on support amounts,366 an almost
irresistible argument can be made that under the new alimony and
postseparation statutes, both of which merely list the previous
standard of living as one of many factors,367 the previous standard of
363. Although the last revision of the tax code eliminated capital gains taxes on
transfers incident to divorce, either spouse will be responsible for such taxes if the
property is sold. See I.R.C. § 1041 (1994). Therefore, it would appear that the relative
bases in different pieces of property should at least warrant some consideration,
particularly if the divorce itself will force one party to sell the marital home.
364. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(8), (13) (1995).
365. Repealed § 50-16.5(a) stated only that alimony should be determined "having due
regard to the estates, earnings, earning capacity, condition, accustomed standard of living
of the parties." Id. § 50-16.5(a) (1987) (repealed 1995). Earning capacity had specific
restrictions, however, see supra note 306, and the previous standard of living was
unquestionably the most critical factor in determining the amount of alimony, see infra
note 366.
366. See Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 181, 261 S.E.2d 849, 855 (1980) (holding
that legislative usage, in determination of spousal dependency, of the term "accustomed
standard of living of the parties" in connection with "maintenance and support" means
that "alimony, to the extent it can possibly do so, shall sustain that standard of living for
the dependent spouse to which the parties together became accustomed" (emphasis
added)), quoted in Quick v. Quick, 305 N.C. 446, 456, 290 S.E.2d 653, 660 (1982)
(stressing the critical importance of this factor in determining not only dependency but
also the amount of alimony)); Spillers v. Spillers, 25 N.C. App. 261, 264, 212 S.E.2d 676,
678 (1975) (upholding the trial court's consideration of plaintiff's earning capacity in
determining that she could "'substantially continue to maintain the standard of living
previously enjoyed during her marriage' " (quoting trial court) (emphasis added)).
367. Section 50-16.2A governs the determination of the amount of a postseparation
support award. That section lists the following nine factors:
In ordering postseparation support, the court shall base its award on the
financial needs of the parties, considering the parties' accustomed standard of
living, the present employment income and other recurring earnings of each
party from any source, their income-earning abilities, the separate and marital
debt service obligations, those expenses reasonably necessary to support each of
the parties, and each party's respective legal obligations to support any other
persons.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.2A(b) (1995). The alimony statute lists 14 specific factors, and
factor 15 mandates consideration of "[a]ny other factor relating to the economic
circumstances of the parties that the court finds to be just and proper." Id. § 50-
16.3A(b)(15). Thus the previous standard of living surely must be deemed to have lost its
preeminent status under the old statute and case law.
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living does no longer, and should no longer, create such a ceiling. It is
emphatically not a "first among equals," and indeed may bear little
relationship to the needs of a newly separated or divorced spouse.
Use of this single factor in such an overwhelming manner as virtually
to render the fourteen other factors nugatory would contradict the
purposes of the new statutes, would be egregiously inconsistent not
only with the respective needs of the parties but with many other
factors as well and would drastically reduce if not eliminate one of
the more critical goals of the new statutes-flexibility.3 6 And in an
area of law in which fairness and equity are inevitably defined on an
almost case-by-case basis, flexibility is essential to the just
interpretation and effective application of the new statutes.
Last, but hardly least, the final factor that a court "shall"
consider in its determination of the amount, duration, and manner of
payment of alimony is "[a]ny other factor relating to the economic
circumstances of the parties. 3 69  If experience with equitable
distribution furnishes any guide, this might well prove to be the most
significant of all the factors.370  This factor's application is limited
only by circumstances, imagination, and more than a scintilla of
common sense. The following examples, however, come to mind:
the fact that one spouse has cared for the children from the other
spouse's previous marriage; the fact that one spouse has an
employment contract, beginning on a date certain to increase his
income and benefits, or has received notice that he will be
"downsized" at a date certain; the fact that one spouse has a
preexisting medical condition;371 and the fact that the parents or
children of a spouse need regular and intensive attention. The
possibilities would appear to be endless.
Finally-and probably most significantly-in view of the
economic ramifications of the extensively broadened scope and list of
factors-it is suggested that just as the definitions of assets and
368. See supra text accompanying note 15.
369. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(b)(15).
370. Certainly the "any other factor" in the equitable distribution context has proven
to be of greater significance than any of the listed factors in § 50-20(c). Collins v. Collins,
125 N.C. App. 113, 479 S.E.2d 240, disc. review denied, 346 N.C. 277, 487 S.E.2d 542
(1997), furnishes the most recent example of the use of "any other factor" to serve the
ends of justice. In that case, involving a short-term marriage and a home the husband had
placed in tenancy by the entireties, the wife was awarded considerably less than 50% of
the marital property. See id. at 115, 479 S.E.2d at 242.
371. Federal law now mandates that coverage be extended to such a spouse after, for
example, COBRA coverage has terminated. But it places no limit on the additional cost
that a group plan may-and certainly will-charge for such individual coverage. See 29
U.S.C.S. § 1181 (Law Co-op. 1997).
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income have changed and the "previous standard of living" of the
parties is now only one of fifteen factors, the manner of determining
dependency status surely should follow suit. To limit a determination
of dependency to the "incomes and expenses based upon the
previous standard of living," 372 as did previous law, and yet to
determine the amount and duration of alimony under the new
factors, is surely short-sighted. Factors determining the latter surely
should be read in pari materia with any determination of dependency
in the first instance.373  Application of two different standards to
accomplish the same statutory goal-expanding the manner in which
both the eligibility for and the amount of support are determined-
would undermine that very goal. If unearned income, increased
income capacity, medical benefits, and the duration of the marriage
(and all the disabilities that may well accompany one spouse in such a
marriage) are critical factors in determining the amount of alimony,
such factors should be just as critical in determining dependency in
the first, or any other, instance. 74 It seems that the essence of judicial
interpretation and common sense would dictate that these different
sections of the same revision of the alimony statutes must inform,
rather than do battle with, one another.
IV. POSTSEPARATION SUPPORT
A. Introductory Issues
Postseparation support awards, as one would expect, share much
in common with the new alimony statutes,- and many of the issues
already discussed regarding alimony are quite relevant to, or identical
with, issues that arise with postseparation support awards. Issues
372. See Talent v. Talent, 76 N.C. App. 545, 548, 334 S.E.2d 256, 258 (1985) ("To
determine whether such actual dependence exists, the trial court must evaluate the
parties' incomes and expenses measured by the standard of living of the family as a unit."
(citing Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 261 S.E.2d 849 (1980))); see also Patterson v.
Patterson, 81 N.C. App. 255, 257-58, 343 S.E.2d 595, 598 (1986) (explaining that "actually
substantially dependent" has been interpreted "to mean that the spouse seeking alimony
must be actually dependent upon the other 'in order to maintain the standard of living in
the manner to which that spouse became accustomed during the last several years prior to
separation'" (quoting Williams, 299 N.C. at 180, 261 S.E.2d at 854)).
373. See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
374. An almost precise parallel may be drawn between this conclusion and the
treatment of the tax considerations that will ensue as a direct result of an alimony or
equitable distribution award. See supra text accompanying notes 360-63. So long as the
precipitating event of tax consequences that will flow directly from a maintenance or
property order may be considered, so should the economic circumstances inevitably
incident to a separation or divorce.
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involving the latter awards are, on the other hand, quite different in
many significant respects. Although reminiscent of alimony
pendente lite awards, 75 postseparation support is by no means the
same-in purpose, entitlement, prerequisites, or operation-and is to
some degree an entirely new creature in what may aptly be called the
thicket of North Carolina family law.
The first significant point, however, is that postseparation
support is, much as was alimony pendente lite,376 primarily designed
to function as a means of securing temporary support for a dependent
spouse in an expedited manner.377  The new statute defines
postseparation support as "spousal support to be paid until the
earlier" of the date specified 378 in the "order of postseparation
support, or an order awarding or denying alimony. ' 379  Previous
warnings with regard to the significance of a specified date in any
postseparation order (which, as noted previously, ought to be the
date of final distribution) are not inconsistent when paired with the
admonition that such orders ought to remain subject to continuing
jurisdiction of the entering court. Even without undue delay by
either party, the discovery process often may be a long and tortured
one. Moreover, in the event of any intentional delay on the part of
the spouse already receiving postseparation support,310 the payor
375. Thus some, but by no means all, alimony pendente lite principles (often called
temporary alimony) developed by case law may prove relevant in the interpretation and
operation of the new statute.
376. See infra note 378 (discussing limitations on alimony pendente lite awards).
377. Section 50-16.2A(a) reads that the action for postseparation support may be
brought by "verified pleading, verified motion, or affidavit of the moving party" which
shall set forth the factual bases for the relief requested. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.2A(a)
(1995). While several judges make use of the affidavit procedure, apparently most do not
as yet.
378. As noted earlier, failure to obtain a date specified for a supporting spouse could
well result in an almost limitless award. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
The alimony pendente lite section limited the award to "the pendency of the suit in which
the application is made." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3(b) (1987), repealed by Act of June
21, 1995, ch. 319, § 1, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 641, 641.
379. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1A(4) (1995). The statutory section goes on to read that
it "may be ordered in an action for divorce, whether absolute or from bed and board, for
annulment, or for alimony without divorce." Id. For a discussion of the possible
procedural inconsistencies between this and § 50-16.2A(a) (authorizing the action to be
brought in "an action brought pursuant to Chapter 50"), see supra notes 122-26 and
accompanying text.
380. A defense to resist extending such an award could also be made on a myriad of
other bases as well, including the termination events included within the new act, see N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9, as well as any other change of circumstances. On the other hand, a
motion to set alimony hearing before there has been reasonable time and opportunity for
completion of discovery, should surely be subject to dismissal.
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spouse is always free to resist continuation of the original award
beyond its initial term. This adds even more support to the previous
conclusion that a court must exercise its continuing jurisdiction and
flexibility to deal with attempts by either spouse to delay or to move
to set a permanent alimony hearing before the discovery process is
complete. Again, following strict statutory definition,38'
postseparation support is designed to provide the necessary funds to
a dependent spouse to bridge the period from separation until a final
alimony hearing, which may not occur until after equitable
distribution.3u While the statute defines the award as one that
terminates on the earlier of the date specified in the order or the
award or denial of alimony,3 3 there appears to be no non-punitive
rationale that would justify terminating such an award merely
because the "date certain" had occurred. In any event, judicial power
to extend the date of a postseparation award certainly does not limit
a court's willingness to refuse to do so.3
4
Although marital fault has not been banished from consideration
in postseparation support awards,385 in those instances in which
marital fault is irrelevant the statute goes on to mandate that such an
award be made, if "the resources of the dependent spouse are not
adequate to meet his or her reasonable needs and the supporting
spouse has the ability to pay. '386  The latter findings, in turn, are
based upon the consideration of several factors enumerated in § 50-
16.2A(b)-to the effect that the court "shall base its award on the
financial needs of the parties, considering the parties' accustomed
standard of living, the present employment income and other
recurring earnings of each party from any source, their income-
earning abilities," plus debt services, other legal obligations, and
"those expenses reasonably necessary to support each of the
parties."38
381. In fact, neither the definition of "alimony" nor postseparation support contains
any reference to the dependency status. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1A(1), (4).
Nonetheless, it is clear that one must be adjudicated dependent before either type of
support may be granted.
382. Such hearings, in view of the complexity of the 15 factors discussed supra Part
III.C, are likely to include much greater trial preparation time, in addition to longer trials.
383. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1A(4).
384. The most likely scenario when a court probably should refuse to extend an award
is that in which the dependent spouse, for reasons of marital misconduct, might be
ineligible for alimony. In such a situation, a delaying strategy might not be the better, but
possibly the only, "course of valor" for such a spouse. See supra Part II.A.2.
385. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.2A(e).
386. Id. § 50-16.2A(c).
387. Id. § 50-16.2A(b).
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A more critical examination of these factors leads to several
conclusions. The first is that given the relative brevity of these
factors compared with those for alimony,388 postseparation support
contemplates a rather truncated examination of the parties' needs
and assets. 389 Second, given the fact that this section clearly looks at
short-term, rather easily calculable, economic characteristics of the
individuals to a marriage, the statutory factors390 coincide very neatly
with the purposes of postseparation support-to function almost as a
stop-gap measure to provide some support to a dependent spouse
prior to the discovery of the data necessary for an alimony or
equitable distribution hearing. Although it is significant that
postseparation support factors do not include "any other factor, 3 91
the "accustomed standard of living" of the parties is, as noted earlier,
but one of nine factors that a court must consider in determining the
amount of an award of postseparation support.3 9
Finally, it appears that the dependency gatekeeper with
postseparation support is not so fully susceptible to the type of
expansion already discussed with alimony.393 Even this more limited
eligibility for dependency status will be quite sufficient for those
spouses who are "actually substantially dependent upon the other
spouse for his or her maintenance and support, '39 4 even if the amount
of support is somewhat limited-again, as alimony is not, and
postseparation support should not be 395-- by the parties' accustomed
standard of living. A more meticulously calculated computation of
income-which even at this early stage of the proceedings-should
include unearned income, plus a realistic limit on the reasonable
living expenses396 of the supporting spouse-should create a less
formidable dependency hurdle even with postseparation support
388. See supra text accompanying note 295 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(b)).
389. Indeed, § 50-16.8, setting forth the procedures in an action for postseparation
support, specifically states that a court may base its award "on a verified pleading,
affidavit, or other competent evidence." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.8.
390. See supra note 367 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.2A(b)).
391. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(b)(15); see supra note 307 (comparing
postseparation support to alimony).
392. See supra text accompanying notes 364-68 (discussing the diminution in
importance of the previous standard of living and other factors that should ease the
burden of proof of dependency).
393. See supra notes 109-14, 381 accompanying text (discussing dependency
determinations).
394. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1A(2); see also supra note 67 (discussing the difference
between the two definitions of dependency).
395. See supra notes 372-74 and accompanying text.
396. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.2A(b) (1995).
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This observation leads to two conclusions that, certainly at first
blush, may seem odd: (1) there may be different standards for
dependency with postseparation support and alimony; and the
correlative proposition that (2) the accustomed standard of living
probably furnishes somewhat more of a ceiling with postseparation
support than with alimony397 In light of the different functions of the
two means of spousal support and the detailed discovery process
necessary for alimony, however, these conclusions in fact should not
occasion great surprise. Considering the often times urgent need for
postseparation support, moreover, time is of the essence.
Given the greater limits on postseparation support, however, the
question arises as to why a nonadulterous spouse would not skip this
interim step altogether and proceed to an alimony hearing.39 8 The
start of the answer to this question is easy indeed: assuming proof of
dependency, postseparation support should be a more expedited and
less complicated process. Moreover, as noted previously, a pre-
equitable distribution alimony hearing would probably result in the
waste of the parties' and the courts' resources, and, at a minimum,
will likely require extensive discovery in many cases. The remainder
of the answer, however, takes us not only back into marital fault
issues but adds a new twist as well.
B. Fault and the Fault Flaw
Subsection (d) of the postseparation support statute is designed
solely to deal with fault issues and also clearly contemplates, if not
mandates, a hearing on the issues. It states in full:
At a hearing on postseparation support, the judge shall
consider marital misconduct by the dependent spouse
occurring prior to or on the date of separation in deciding
whether to award postseparation support and in deciding
the amount of postseparation support. When the judge
considers these acts by the dependent spouse, the judge
shall also consider any marital misconduct by the supporting
spouse in deciding whether to award postseparation support
397. As previously discussed in Part III.C, the list of alimony factors is greatly
expanded under the new statute and clearly contemplates much more elaborate discovery
than do the factors determining postseparation support.
398. This may always be a viable option to some degree, unless the dependent spouse
had committed adultery before or on the date of separation, in which case such adultery
would prove to be a bar to alimony. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(a) (1995). In
comparison with postseparation support, the illicit marital misconduct would be a factor a
judge would consider. See id. § 50-16.2A(d), (e) (1995).
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and in deciding the amount of postseparation support.399
To point out the obvious, marital misconduct (including, of
course, illicit marital sexual behavior) 40 may well be relevant in the
determination of whether or how much postseparation support will
be awarded. The statute at least limits such misconduct to that which
occurred before or at the date of separation, however, and it does not
create a statutory bar to or mandate for an award of such support.0 1
It is in this narrow sense only that the statute creates at least the
possibility of a "no-fault" support award.402 But this is indeed likely
to be the most narrow of possibilities, due largely to the fact that the
supporting spouse alone appears to have the option of whether or not
to introduce fault issues.4 °3 The manifestly unjust reading of the
statute would relegate the dependent spouse to a purely reactive
position. If, for example, a supporting spouse somehow had managed
to commit all nine acts of marital misconduct,404 and thus wisely
decided not to present any evidence of the other spouse's marital
misconduct, would the dependent spouse in effect be muzzled?
Granted that our legislature unfortunately has decided that fault
may be a consideration even in a postseparation support hearing, it
nonetheless strains the imagination to understand why the discretion
to play the fault cards is left in the hands of the supporting spouse
only. Not only does this policy contradict the "what's good for the
goose is good for the gander" rationale for the treatment of
postseparation adultery with alimony,405 but if this portion of the
399. Id. § 50-16.2A(d).
400. See supra Part III.A (discussing illicit sexual behavior).
401. The alimony statutes, as discussed previously, do create statutory bars to or
mandates for awards of alimony if there is proof of illicit marital behavior. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-16.3A(b).
402. Compare supra text accompanying notes 67-74 (discussing alimony and the role
of fault, with supra note 396 (discussing the greater ease with which dependency may now
be proven).
403. See supra text accompanying note 399 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.2A(d));
see also infra notes 405-10 and accompanying text (discussing Equal Protection concerns).
404. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1A(3) (stating the nine factors).
405. Section 50-16.3A states in part:
If the court finds that the dependent spouse participated in an act of illicit sexual
behavior, as defined in G.S. 50-16.1A(3)(a), during the marriage and prior to or
on the date of separation, the court shall not award alimony. If the court finds
that the supporting spouse participated in an act of illicit sexual behavior, as
defined in G.S. 50-16.1A(3)(a), during the marriage and prior to or on the date
of separation, then the court shall order that alimony be paid to a dependent
spouse. If the court finds that the dependent and the supporting spouse each
participated in an act of illicit sexual behavior during the marriage and prior to
or on the date of separation, then alimony shall be denied or awarded in the
discretion of the court after consideration of all of the circumstances.
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statute is interpreted to mean what it says, then one might well raise
the question of whether it would pass constitutional muster even
under a rational basis test.406 Certainly such an anomalous, disparate
treatment of spouses, whether labeled dependent or supporting,
husband or wife, appears nowhere else in Chapter 50.407 An award or
denial of postseparation support based on marital misconduct, the
introduction of evidence as to which lies within the control of only
one spouse, not only magnifies the effect of such fault of the
dependent spouse in a manner totally inconsistent with the intent of
the statute, it also deals with a substantial right from which appeal
may lie as a matter of right.
40 8
Given the substantial nature of the right involved and the
drastically unequal allotment of the privilege to introduce evidence
that could be the determinative factor in denying or awarding that
right, it appears that this issue is ripe for constitutional challenge.4 9
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(a).
406. The modern equal protection rational basis test requires that a statute be based
on "a rational means to serve a legitimate end." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985). The Court in Cleburne held that the "legislation
... must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose." Id. at 446. The
legitimate governmental purpose for this statute is virtually impossible to discern, unless,
of course, its purpose is to protect supporting spouses' marital misbehavior from coming
before the court, which would seem ludicrous.
407. The father of a child is, for example, no longer presumed to be "primarily liable"
for the support of a child and the mother only secondarily liable. See Act of June 18,
1981, ch. 613, § 1, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 892, 892 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-
13.4(b) (Supp. 1997)). And in 1994 our legislature was so acutely attuned to such unequal
treatment that it even amended § 50-12(al) to allow a husband, incident to a divorce, to
change his surname to his "premarital surname." Act of June 15, 1994, ch. 565, § 1, 1993
N.C. Sess. Laws 565,565 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-12(al) (1995)).
408. See N.C. GEN. STAT § 50-16.3. Although the alimony pendente lite statute has
been repealed, the statutory annotations remain and provide the only guidance available
for analysis of postseparation support. The right to appeal from such an order has long
been recognized. See, e.g., Rickert v. Rickert, 282 N.C. 373, 379, 193 S.E.2d 79, 82 (1972).
409. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Indeed, an argument can be made for
subjecting this statute to a heightened level of constitutional scrutiny: the procedural
advantage given to the supporting spouse-who happens to be male in almost all of the
divorce actions in North Carolina-presents a possible violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by discriminating on the basis of sex.
The United States Supreme Court has created a two part test to determine if a
statute is gender based:
When a statute gender-neutral on its face is challenged on the ground that its
effects upon women are disproportionably adverse, a twofold inquiry is thus
appropriate. The first question is whether the statutory classification is indeed
neutral in the sense that is not gender based. If the classification itself, covert or
overt, is not based upon gender, the second question is whether the adverse
effect reflects invidious gender-based discrimination. In this second inquiry,
impact provides an "important starting point," but purposeful discrimination is
"the condition that offends the Constitution."
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Under any equal protection analysis, it is, to say the least, difficult to
conceive of any legitimate state purpose that could be served by such
a rule. Any provision in our laws serving, first and foremost, as a
powerful evidentiary weapon placed only in the hands of supporting
spouses hardly serves a legitimate state purpose.
410
It appears that the only other option in interpreting this statute
would be to postulate that it merely sets the order in which a judge
"shall ' '411 hear evidence of marital misconduct-first that committed
by the dependent spouse, (presumably an offensive tactic by the
other spouse)412 and only then that committed by the supporting
spouse. Moreover, it is worth noting that the statute is silent as to
who may present such evidence. Following by analogy to the new
alimony act, which allows either party to move for a hearing,411 one
could at least argue that the dependent spouse might move to
introduce evidence of marital fault, but that evidence of his or her
fault must not be heard first.414 Absent such an admittedly rather
strained interpretation, it would appear difficult to free the statute
from the conclusion that it is otherwise constitutionally frail. This
attempt to avoid a constitutional challenge to the statute carries with
Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979) (citations omitted) (quoting Village
of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) and
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971)). While
disproportionate impact alone is typically insufficient to hold a statute unconstitutional,
see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976), an exception exists where the "statute
could not be plausibly explained on a neutral ground." Feeney, 442 U.S. at 275. Absent
this exception, "[p]roof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose ... may be used to
show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause." Village of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S.
at 265. However, note that discriminatory purpose does not have to be the primary
purpose, merely a "motivating factor in the decision." Id. at 266. Multiple factors should
be considered when searching for discriminatory intent, including the impact of the
statute (especially, a "clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race"),
historical background of the decision, and legislative history. Id. at 266-68.
Any classification that is determined to be based on gender "must bear a close and
substantial relationship to important governmental objectives." Feeney, 442 U.S. at 273.
For example, in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), the goals of expediting the judicial
process and avoiding additional conflict within families did not meet the test of important
governmental objectives in the gender-based appointment of administrators for intestate
decedents' estates. See id. at 76-77.
410. See supra note 406.
411. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.2A(d) (1995).
412. Presentation to the court of marital misconduct on the part of a dependent spouse
might also be characterized as "defensive." In any event, the purpose of such evidence
would clearly be to attempt to defeat or diminish any postseparation support award.
413. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(a) (1995) (stating that either party "may move
for alimony").
414. The dependent spouse might also introduce his or her own fault, in order to open
the door to presentation of fault of the supporting spouse.
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it the danger that consideration of fault might be interjected into
almost every postseparation support hearing-a result clearly not
intended by the framers of this act or the legislature.415 One might
speculate, therefore, that this issue may well be one of the first to
reach the Supreme Court of North Carolina.416
C. Termination Events
The termination events portion of the statute, extensively
amended in 1995,'4 1 brings something old, and some things quite new,
to the discussion of alimony and postseparation support.418 As a
general proposition, either type of support may be "modified or
vacated ' 419 by proof of "changed circumstances""42 on the part of
"either party."4"1 An "alimony" award, it should be noted, clearly
applies only to "true" alimony, so that awards labeled "alimony" that
are actually part of a property division will not be subject to this
modification provision in the first instance.4  "True" alimony,
however, whether in a lump sum (or for a specified period) or
periodic and so long as it is part of an order or judgment.4 3 will be
afforded the protection of the changed circumstances standard, as
will an award of postseparation support.42 4
415. It is true, of course, that "[w]here one of two reasonable constructions of a statute
will raise a serious constitutional question, it is well settled that our courts should adopt
the construction that avoids the constitutional question." State v. T.D.R., 347 N.C. 489,
498, 495 S.E.2d 700, 705 (1998). On the other hand, the holding of the Supreme Court of
the United States in Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), declaring unconstitutional an
Alabama statute that allowed alimony only for wives, creates a parallel that is analytically
hard to resist.
416. Apparently, no other state has imposed an almost wholly gender-based
evidentiary standard. See CLARK, supra note 2, at §§ 16.2-.4, at 622-55; OLDHAM, supra
note 198, § 13.04, at 13-39 to -46.
417. See Act of June 21, 1995, ch. 319, § 7, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 641, 647 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9 (1995)).
418. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9. The section clearly applies equally to both types
of awards.
419. Id. § 50-16.9(a).
420. Id. The standard has not been effected by other changes in the new alimony laws,
but application of the standard must necessarily be modified by the repeal of § 50-16.5,
see Act of June 21, 1995, ch. 319, § 1, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 641, 641 (repealing alimony
pendente lite and accompanying factors), and by the recently adopted factors to be
considered in awarding or denying alimony under § 50-16.9(a). See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 50-16.9.
421. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A (1995).
422. See supra text accompanying notes 173-78 (discussing integration),
423. See Marks v. Marks, 316 N.C. 447, 451, 342 S.E.2d 859, 862 (1986); see also supra
Part II.C.1 (discussing integration and "true" alimony principles).
424. Section 50-16.9(a) states that "[a]n order of a court of this State for alimony or
postseparation support, whether contested or entered by consent, may be modified or
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Because this standard of proof is already so well-established in
the case law,4zs the types of changes in circumstances that will suffice
are beyond the scope of this Article. It should be carefully noted,
however, that use of the same standard does not imply that
application of the changed circumstances standard will continue to be
applied in the same manner. Indeed, quite the contrary is true, in
view of the fact that both the amount and duration of alimony and
postseparation support awards are now controlled by significantly
different statutory factors.426 Notably, the consideration of so many
non-economic factors,427 in addition to many more economic
factors, 428 is likely to result in awards considerably less vulnerable to
modification or termination under this changed circumstances
standard.
In addition to the familiar changed circumstances standard, there
are five other instances in which alimony or postseparation support
may be terminated. The first two of these termination events, death
of either the payor or the payee, are unchanged from previous law.429
The third event, resumption of marital relations prior to a divorce,430
is defined under § 52-10.2 as the "voluntary renewal of the husband
and wife relationship, as shown by the totality of the
circumstances. ' '431  The scant case law established under this still
relatively new statute thus far indicates that courts are interpreting
the totality of the circumstances standard, very sensibly, on a case-by-
vacated at any time, upon motion in the cause and a showing of changed circumstances by
either party.... " N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9(a).
425. But see supra text accompanying note 402 (raising the caveat that the recent
amendments have altered the standard).
426. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(b) (1995) (alimony), with id. § 50-16.2A(b)
(postseparation support).
427. See id. § 50-16.3A(b). Prominent among the new factors are the duration of the
marriage, the contribution of one spouse as a homemaker, and the existence of
retirement, insurance, and medical benefits. See supra Part III.C.
428. For examples of the courts' previously rather narrow focus on largely economic
factors, see Beaman v. Beaman, 77 N.C. App. 717, 336 S.E.2d 129 (1985), and Roberts v.
Roberts, 38 N.C. App. 295, 302-03, 248 S.E.2d 85, 89 (1978), determining changed
circumstances existed when wife was no longer able to provide adequate standard of
living for herself and child.
429. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9(b). Indeed, payment must cease upon the death of
the payor in order for the amounts paid as alimony to qualify for the tax deduction from
the payor's income. And payments that continue beyond the death of the payee are a
classic indicator of an integrated agreement. See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying
text.
430. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9(a).
431. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10.2 (1991). The statute continues that "[i]solated
incidents of sexual intercourse between the parties shall not constitute resumption of
marital relations." Id.
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case basis.432 Remarriage of the dependent spouse is the fourth
terminating event. Normally there are few disputes as to what
constitutes a remarriage,433  but cohabitation, the remaining
termination event, warrants further consideration.
D. Cohabitation
The fifth terminating event introduces an entirely new concept
and is likely to bring such complexity into North Carolina
jurisprudence that it deserves separate treatment from the other
termination events. Under the new statutes, spousal support will now
terminate in the event that the receiving spouse "engages in
cohabitation." 434  To suggest that the legislature has opened a
Pandora's box of remarkable and unfortunate proportions is to state
the matter mildly.435 Even more unfortunately, the statute further
432. In Fletcher v. Fletcher, 123 N.C. App. 744, 474 S.E.2d 802 (1996), disc. review
denied, 345 N.C. 640, 483 S.E.2d 706 (1997), the court applied the "totality of
circumstances" standard and explained that the standard "'focuses on all the
circumstances of a particular case, rather than any one factor.'" Id. at 750, 474 S.E.2d at
806 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1490 (6th ed. 1990)). The court held that no
resumption of marital relations existed when plaintiff maintained her separate residence
and never "moved" back into the home, the time period claimed by defendant to have
established cohabitation was less than a week, there was no evidence that they resumed
sharing of household responsibilities or that they held themselves out as husband and
wife, both parties continued to abide by the separation agreement terms, and defendant
stated that he wished plaintiff to leave because "he wanted to be with his girlfriend." Id.
at 750-51, 474 S.E.2d at 806-07 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Schultz v.
Schultz, 107 N.C. App. 366, 373, 420 S.E.2d 186, 190 (1992) (holding marital relations
were resumed, based on evidence that, among other things, defendant lived continuously
at marital residence, moved his belongings, car, and animals there, paid joint bills, and
mowed the lawn, while plaintiff did defendant's laundry, dined at restaurants and shopped
with him, filed joint tax return with him, and engaged in sexual relations with him weekly
for at least two to three months).
433. But see Taylor v. Taylor, 321 N.C. 244, 362 S.E.2d 542 (1987) (holding that a
bigamous "marriage," subsequently annulled, did amount to a remarriage for purposes of
this statute and that the wife's previous alimony award should be terminated); Fungaroli
v. Fungaroli, 53 N.C. App. 270, 280 S.E.2d 787 (1981) (same). Again, an "alimony"
agreement that states that payment of alimony to the wife will continue even in the event
of her remarriage is a hallmark of an integrated agreement.
434. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9(b) (1995).
435. At least 12 other states deal with the cohabitation issue by statute. See ALA.
CODE § 30-2-55 (1989); CAL. FAM. CODE § 4323(a)(1) (West 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 46b-86(b) (West Supp. 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1512(g) (1993); GA.
CODE ANN. § 19-6-19(b) (Supp. 1994); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/510(c) (Supp.
1998); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. Art. 115 (West 1998); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 248
(McKinney 1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 134(C) (West Supp. 1998); PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 3706 (West Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-5-101 (a)(3) (Supp. 1997);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(a) (Supp. 1997). These statutes vary greatly in their content,
standard of proof, and definition of cohabitation. North Carolina's statute, however,
would appear to be the most complex, and confusing, of all.
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provides that cohabitation, in the termination of support context,
means "the act of two adults dwelling together continuously and
habitually in a private heterosexual relationship even if this
relationship is not solemnized by marriage, or a private homosexual
relationship," and evidence of cohabitation includes "the voluntary
mutual assumption of those marital rights, duties, and obligations
which are usually manifested by married people, and which include,
but are not necessarily dependent on, sexual relations." '436
Although legislative intent with regard to this cohabitation
provision is clear, and certainly not to be regarded lightly,4 7 one
cannot help but wish that the rulemakers had not defined
cohabitation with such pains, or indeed, had not defined it at all.
Under previous case law, a dependent spouse's cohabitation with
another was deemed simply to constitute a changed circumstance that
might, or might not, be sufficient to modify or terminate alimony.43
This position, adopted by a large majority of states, looks to any
actual change of circumstances stemming from the cohabitation,439
436. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9(b).
437. Indeed, this section might be a reflection of the more generous standards for
awarding alimony, in terms of both duration and amount, of the new acts and the
concomitant intent that it be more easily terminable. It is more likely, however, that the
new section partakes of a punitive quality, in view of how broadly it defines cohabitation.
438. See Britt v. Britt, 49 N.C. App. 463, 474, 271 S.E.2d 921, 928 (1980); Stallings v.
Stallings, 36 N.C. App. 643,644,244 S.E.2d 494,495 (1978). Because such "cohabitation"
clauses have long been a part of many settlements, or the subject of statutes in many
states, courts in other states have frequently dealt with this issue, whether or not those
states had a statutory termination, or definitional, section. Needless to say, the results in
the majority of those cases are extremely fact-specific. See CLARK, supra note 2, § 16.5,
at 666 n.9.
439. See CLARK, supra note 2, § 16.5, at 666 n.9. For an example of a state statute
which specifies the necessity of a change in circumstances before living together can
justify a modification of alimony, see § 46b-86(b) of the Connecticut Code, which allows
the court to
suspend, reduce or terminate the payment of periodic alimony upon a showing
that the party receiving the periodic alimony is living with another person under
circumstances which the court finds should result in the modification,
suspension, reduction or termination of alimony because the living arrangements
cause such a change of circumstances as to alter the financial needs of that party.
CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-86(b) (1995) (emphasis added). The case law in several
other states supports this position. See Van Dyke v. Steinle, 902 P.2d 1372, 1378 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1995) (explaining that cohabitation is not, in itself, a sufficient basis for
terminating or reducing maintenance, and that "only evidence relating to the economic
nature of the cohabitation would be relevant to show that wife's support needs have
changed since the decree"); In re Marriage of Dwyer, 825 P.2d 1018, 1019-20 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1991) (stating that because unmarried cohabitants do not assume the reciprocal
obligations of marriage, cohabitation in and of itself is not a sufficient ground to suspend,
reduce, or terminate maintenance); Dibartolomeo v. Dibartolomeo, 679 So. 2d 72, 73
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) ("Because it does not entail the same benefits, duties and rights
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and thus largely avoids the issue of what does or does not constitute
"cohabitation."" Under the new North Carolina statutes, the
number of issues that are raised, simply by virtue of the definition of
cohabitation, defy a truly thorough analysis."
Other states have experienced less than satisfactory outcomes
when dealing with this issue, whether or not the
cohabitation/termination issue arose via statute or through a
separation agreement between the parties."2 Several states whose
statutes failed 4 '-as does ours-to exclude close blood relatives from
the class of persons who may trigger cohabitation have found
themselves in something of a quandary. If, for example, a dependent
ex-spouse moved in with her brother and assumed the "normal"
duties of a housekeeper, and he likewise assumed traditional "men's
work," the lifestyle arrangement appears technically to be a true fit
with the statute-a result that it is difficult to believe the legislature
either intended or contemplated.444
as a traditional marriage, cohabitation alone cannot precipitate a termination of alimony
without the factual finding of a change in circumstances concerning the former spouse's
needs and finances.").
440. See supra text accompanying notes 425-28.
441. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9(b) (1995) (defining cohabitation); supra text
accompanying notes 434-35.
442. See Gordon v. Gordon, 675 A.2d 540 (Md. 1966), for a well-reasoned opinion in
which the court dealt with a termination clause in a separation agreement, which was
triggered in the event that the wife lived with an unrelated man for more than 60 days.
See id. at 541. The court determined that the husband had failed to prove that
cohabitation as intended by the parties did exist, but it enumerated certain factors that
should be considered-among them, joint contribution to household expenses and
community recognition of the relationship. See id. at 547-48. Such factors-unlike those
that "evidence" cohabitation under § 50-16.9(b) of the North Carolina General Statutes-
would have been immensely useful had they been included in this state's statute.
Applying New York's statute, which requires a "holding out" as husband and wife in
order to establish cohabitation, in Bliss v. Bliss, 487 N.Y.S.2d 26 (App. Div.), rev'd, 488
N.E.2d 90 (N.Y. 1985), the appellate division held that a husband was entitled to
termination of his alimony payments when his former wife and her lover, each of whom
kept separate homes, otherwise took on all the accouterments of marriage, and the wife
lived with him the majority of the time and shared a family life with him, although she did
not take on his last name. See id. at 28-29. But the New York Court of Appeals reversed,
stating that there was no "holding out," and thus ruled that the support obligation could
not be modified. See Bliss, 488 N.E.2d at 93; see also CLARK, supra note 2, § 17.6, at 287
n.4 (citing several Illinois cases for the statement that "cohabitation was held to have
occurred 'on a conjugal basis' when the ex-wife lived with an impotent man, the court
saying that the term 'conjugal' does not necessarily require evidence of sexual conduct").
443. Pennsylvania's cohabitation statute applies to persons of the opposite sex but
excludes family members. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3706 (West 1991).
444. Most of the statutory provisions in other states refer to living with a party "of the
opposite sex" in a "marriage-like" relationship-a redundancy of sorts, in view of the fact
that homosexuals may not validly marry. See CLARK, supra note 2, § 16.5, at 667; see also
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Nor is it facetious to question whether the statute might also give
rise to a finding of cohabitation with mere roommates, a situation not
at all uncommon for older dependent spouses and for those whose
alimony awards were insufficient in the first instance. In particular,
because our statute clearly is designed to include homosexual
couples 5 via its reference to "two adults,"' 6 it appears that it may be
entirely overinclusive, not to mention punitive in intent.447 Moreover,
if alimony is intended to compensate a dependent spouse, after
taking into consideration all fifteen of the listed factors, it is difficult
to understand why such an award should be terminable without any
proof of changed circumstances, which may or may not exist in a
cohabitation context. Furthermore, to presuppose that two people of
either sex live together without marriage, and possibly without sexual
relations as well," solely to avoid termination of alimony is patently
ridiculous.
Similarly, one might ask if the termination provision is
applicable only in situations in which there are only two roommates.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 248 (McKinney 1986) ("proof that the wife is habitually living
with another man and holding herself out as his wife"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 1289D
(West 1988) ("voluntary cohabitation of a former spouse with a member of the opposite
sex").
445. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9(b) (1995) (referring to a "private homosexual
relationship").
446. Id. Whether or not these two adults might include siblings or a parent and an
adult child depends on whether the statute is interpreted to require that the parties have
sex.
447. Indeed, the entire termination provision, because it looks to post-divorce events
without regard to whether or not any change in economic circumstances has occurred,
appears to be quite punitive in intent and quite at odds with the more generous nature of
the remainder of the new statutes. Tennessee has perhaps the best of both worlds, in that
cohabitation raises a rebuttable presumption that cohabitation has affected the economic
needs of a party. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-5-101(a)(3) (Supp. 1997).
448. Two people who live together in a "marriage-like" relationship are clearly
included within the statute. Because cohabitation is "evidenced by" entry into a
marriage-like relationship that "include[s] but [is] not necessarily dependent upon, sexual
relations," it is somewhat difficult to determine if sexual relations are a necessary element
in cohabitation. It would appear that the use of the word "include" would require an
affirmative answer to this question. If this proves to be the case, then it is difficult to
determine legislative intent with regard to the "not necessarily dependent upon"
language. Indeed, unlike the quite specific definition of "illegal sexual conduct" in § 50-
16.2A, what constitutes "sexual relations" is itself rather vague. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 50-16.9(b). By far, the majority of states require that the recipient spouse cohabit with a
person of the opposite sex. See, e.g., supra note 444 (citing examples); see also ALA.
CODE § 30-2-55 (1984) (requiring the recipient spouse to be "living openly or cohabiting
with a member of the opposite sex"). Alabama also requires proof of some permanency
in the relationship, certainly an improvement over North Carolina's more vague
"habitually and continually" standard. See Kennedy v. Kennedy, 598 So. 2d 985, 986
(Ala. Civ. App. 1992).
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If two adults who are sexually involved with one another share a
home with a third adult and are thereby excluded from the scope of
the statute, then legislative intent is clearly being undermined. 449 To
extend further this analysis from the sublime to the ridiculous: would
a dependent spouse receiving alimony be forced to deny the request
of an adult child to move back into the home, on peril of loss of
spousal support?
There are, in addition, several other difficulties with this section
of the statute, at both an analytical and often a practical level. One
might well ponder, for example, how two adults living together, and
falling within the other statutory requirements, could have a "private
homosexual relationship" or a "private heterosexual relationship"
and yet not have sexual relations with one another.45 To characterize
a relationship as either homosexual or heterosexual without regard to
the existence of sexual relations rather strains the imagination and
drastically limits the scope of the statutes.
Three other portions of this lamentable statute also deserve
attention. How courts will define "dwelling together continuously
and habitually"451 is analogous to the question, "how long is a
rope?" 452  A number of states that have statutory provisions on
cohabitation at least include some kind of temporal requirement. 453
449. There are numerous reasons to avoid remarriage-paramount among them being
the desire to protect one's estate for her children, loss of social security benefits, desire
for companionship, etc.
450. Georgia requires the cohabitation of a "former spouse with a third party in a
meretricious relationship," GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-19(b) (Supp. 1997), as a ground for
modification of alimony but does not require automatic termination of a spousal support
award. Oklahoma makes cohabitation a grounds for a showing of changed circumstances
and defines it as "the dwelling together continuously and habitually of a man and a
woman who are in a private conjugal relationship." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1289D
(West 1988). Clearly, large portions of this definition were incorporated into the North
Carolina statute. See supra text accompanying note 436 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-
16.9(b) (1995)).
451. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9(b).
452. The expression is indeed colloquial, but refers in general to issues that are not
susceptible to a precise definition. By analogy, the "best interest of the child" is standard
easy to state, but impossible to define in a manner that provides an "answer."
453. Virginia states its temporal requirement as follows:
Upon order of the court based upon clear and convincing evidence that the
spouse receiving support has been habitually cohabiting with another person in a
relationship analogous to a marriage for one year or more commencing on or
after July 1, 1997, the court may decrease or terminate spousal support and
maintenance unless (i) otherwise provided by stipulation or contract or (ii) the
spouse receiving support proves by a preponderance of the evidence that
termination of such support would constitute a manifest injustice.
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-109(A) (Michie 1997). California formerly allowed revocation of a
support order if the recipient spouse was "living with a person of the opposite sex and
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In the absence of such a guideline, it possibly would behoove the
courts of the state to proceed with great caution on this issue. Some
type of common-sense requirement as to the length of cohabitation
would also aid greatly in determining what is "continuously and
habitually."4 4 The use of these two terms conjunctively is otherwise
the only statutory guide to what "dwelling together" may mean.
455
The often overlooked distinction between "continuously" and
"continually" must be borne in mind as well. 5 6 The use of the former
term would appear to strengthen greatly the proposition that a
considerable period of time should be required before a finding that
cohabitation has occurred.
Ambiguity follows upon ambiguity, moreover, when one turns
from the definition of cohabitation to the evidence that is indicative
of, and apparently required by the statute,4 57 to show cohabitation-
"the voluntary mutual assumption of those marital rights, duties, and
obligations which are usually manifested by married people."458 The
holding himself or herself out as the spouse of the person for a total of 30 days or more,
either consecutive or nonconsecutive, although not married to the person," CAL. CIV.
CODE § 4801.5 (1974) (repealed 1992); see also In re Marriage of Ludwig, 130 Cal. Rptr.
234 (Ct. App. 1976) (applying 1974 version of the statute). It has been asserted that in
order for the payor to rely on cases in which cohabitation was found to decrease or end
the recipient's need for financial support, usually on the ground that the third-party
cohabitant contributed to the recipient's support, "the payer should be required to show
that the recipient occupied living quarters with the cohabitant over a substantial period of
time up to the date of the petition for modification." CLARK, supra note 2, § 17.6, at 288
(emphasis added) (citing Brister v. Brister, 594 P.2d 1167, 1171 (N.M. 1979); In re
Marriage of Vann, 544 P.2d 175, 176-77 (Or. Ct. App. 1976)).
454. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9(b). A parallel might well be drawn from the cases
dealing with reconciliation, see supra note 432, at least insofar as the behavior of the
parties is concerned. Reconciliation, however, is a return to a former condition with
which both parties are presumably quite familiar. Cohabitation, on the other hand, is
entry into a new relationship with which both parties are relatively unfamiliar. It appears
sensible, therefore, to find that a reconciliation has occurred after a considerably lesser
period of time than should be required to find that cohabiting partners have in fact
established the type of relationship usually manifested by married people.
455. Many states have terminated alimony even when the parties maintain separate
residences. See supra note 442 (discussing cases).
456. One dictionary defines "continuous" as "la: characterized by uninterrupted
extension in space: stretching on without break or interruption ... b: characterized by
uninterrupted extension in time or sequence: continuing without intermission or
recurring regularly after minute interruptions." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY 493-94 (1993). "Continually," on the other hand, may be
"in regular or repeated succession: very often." Id. at 493. "Habitually" is even more
loosely defined as "1: by habit: customarily: unthinkingly. 2: consistently, persistently,
repeatedly, usually." Id. at 1017.
457. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9(b).
458. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9(b). The language here is, in some respects, quite
similar to that in Pennsylvania, 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3706 (1995), which has been
[Vol. 762104
1998] DISTRIBUTIVE CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE
statutes of other states are replete with references to more definitive
indicia of such a relationship.4 59
The first, and by any measure foremost, flaw in this portion of
the statute is that there are no rights or duties whatsoever that flow
between cohabitants. The parties may, by contract, attempt to settle
their rights between themselves, but only so long as such a contract is
not founded upon "illegal consideration.""46 Thus, cohabitants who
are involved in a sexual relationship may be denied even the relief
that contract law might afford. Parties may, of course, share a bank
account, obtain credit cards in their joint names, sign or co-sign a
lease, take out or guarantee loans together-but they certainly need
not be cohabitants to do so. In short, any two persons may
voluntarily undertake responsibilities vis-a-vis the other, but the law
imposes utterly no other rights or duties between them, or between
cohabitants. Equitable relief, such as a constructive or resulting trust,
is equally available between two parties, regardless of their status as
cohabitants. 461 The same is true with "obligations," whatever they
may be. In brief, because cohabitants may easily refrain from
creating any responsibilities or rights between themselves, and
because neither statutory nor common law imposes any rights, duties,
or obligations between them, this portion of the statute may, as a
practical matter, be of little or no value in "evidencing" cohabitation
sufficient to terminate support awards.
Finally, the last part of § 50-16.9-albeit unchanged from
previous law46 2-warrants attention. In essence, it grants courts of
this state, so long as personal jurisdiction over both parties exists, the
power to modify a support decree from another state to the extent
the issuing state could have done So.463 In fact, this portion of the
interpreted as follows: Cohabitation serves to bar alimony if "two persons of the opposite
sex reside together in the manner of husband and wife, mutually assuming those rights
and duties usually attendant upon the marriage relationship," and a party may prove
cohabitation by "evidence of financial, social, and sexual interdependence, by a sharing of
the same residence, and by other means. An occasional sexual liaison does not constitute
cohabitation." Miller v. Miller, 508 A.2d 550, 554 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
459. See CLARK, supra note 2, § 16.5, at 665-67.
460. See, e.g., Suggs v. Norris, 88 N.C. App. 539,364 S.E.2d 159 (1988). The parties in
this case were non-married cohabitants, but the court of appeals determined that the
female partner who had been the sole worker in the business the two had shared, was
entitled to a quantum meruit recovery, so long as none of her services could be
characterized as "sexual" in nature. See id. at 542-42, 364 S.E.2d at 162. Otherwise, the
implied-in-law contract would have been invalidated by "illegal consideration." Id. at
541,364 S.E.2d at 161.
461. See id. at 543, 364 S.E.2d at 162.
462. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9 (1987) (amended 1995).463. Section § 50-16.9 states:
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statute is in direct conflict with the federally mandated Uniform
Interstate Family Support Act,4" effective in North Carolina since
January 1, 1995.465 Under that Act, the only state that may modify a
spousal support award, regardless of where either or both parties live,
is the rendering state.466 Thus, any attempt by any court in North
Carolina to modify a spousal support award from another state would
thus be unenforceable in this, or any other, state.
In conclusion, the "termination upon cohabitation" provisions of
§ 50-16.9(b) are virtually without redeeming function. In an attempt
to ensure that dependent ex-spouses, including homosexual ex-
spouses, do not try to "have their cake and eat it too," the legislature
has created a Hydra-like statute that is misguided, ambiguous,
overinclusive, punitive, possibly void for vagueness, and that has
effectively thrown out the baby-proof of changed economic
circumstances-with the bathwater. The change of circumstances
standard, focusing on the economic contributions of one cohabitant
and the ensuing decreased need of the other, is a considerably more
sensible and easy to follow standard.
V. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION AMENDMENTS
A. Introduction
The 1997 amendments to the Equitable Distribution Act are
indisputably the most significant changes to that Act since it was first
passed in 1981.467 Despite this fact, the discussion of these changes in
property division will be considerably more truncated than the above
alimony and postseparation analyses. There are several factors that
account for this difference, but above all the property division
amendments are the direct and extremely well-analyzed product of
almost two decades of extensive and often very frustrating experience
When an order for alimony has been entered by a court of another jurisdiction, a
court of this State may, upon gaining jurisdiction over the person of both parties
in a civil action instituted for that purpose, and upon a showing of changed
circumstances, enter a new order for alimony which modifies or supersedes such
order for alimony to the extent that it could have been so modified in the
jurisdiction where granted.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9(c).
464. 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(f) (1997) ("on or after January 1, 1998, each State must have in
effect the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act").
465. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52C (1995).
466. See id. § 52C-2-205.
467. See Act for Equitable Distribution of Marital Property, ch. 815, 1981 N.C. Sess.
Laws 1184, 1184-86 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-20, -21 (Supp. 1997)).
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with the Equitable Distribution Act.468 The experiences, at both the
trial and appellate levels, over this period of time made the more
serious defects-of omission and commission-blatantly obvious.
Knowledge of the flaws in the legislation carried with it, at least in
this instance, considerable knowledge not only of how to "fix" the
law, but many of the consequences of doing so as well. Thus, these
amendments are more directed, corrective of well-known flaws,469
and less experimental than most of the new alimony laws. They
nonetheless pose analytical, practical, and mechanical new issues, and
exciting new possibilities for the state.
In addition, the equitable distribution amendments were only
signed into law in the summer of 1997 and did not become effective
until October 1, 1997.470 Given the novelty of the new amendments,
and the slow pace at which cases move through the court system1 71 it
has been both more difficult, and less pressing, to attempt to explore
the full ramifications of the property division changes in the manner
in which the new alimony statutes were analyzed. Moreover, as
previously noted, knowledge of what the problems were goes far
towards analysis of the corrections.41 7 Finally, of course, the issues
and implications of portions of the new alimony statutes on equitable
distribution have already been discussed at length.473
B. The Amendments
1. Pension Benefits
One of the more obvious deficiencies in the previous equitable
distribution law-and one that no degree of judicial or scholarly
legerdemain could obviate or alleviate474-was the statutory mandate
that only vested pensions were subject to distribution as marital
property.4 75 The rationale for this almost defiantly unfair exclusion of
468. See supra notes 3-4; see also Sharp, supra note 2 (providing an initial analysis of
the act).
469. But see infra Part V.B.2 (discussing several lingering problems under the date of
separation rule).
470. See Act of July 16, 1997, ch. 212, § 3, 1997 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 206, 207-08
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (Supp. 1997)); Act of June 19, 1997, ch. 212, § 6,
1997 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 206, 210 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-20, -20.1 (Supp.
1997)).
471. See supra note 53 (citing examples).
472. A forthcoming article will attempt to provide such close analysis.
473. See supra Part III.B.3.
474. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994), limits vesting in most instances to ten
years or less. See id. § 1053; see supra note 4 (discussing vesting).
475. Section 50-20(b)(1) of the North Carolina General Statutes could not be clearer:
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nonvested pensions rights accumulated during the marriage was
never clear.476 Employee contributions to any type of pension plan,477
as virtually all commentators478 and all states479 have recognized, are
no less a divisible product of the marital community than a savings
account-or than vested pensions. In particular, however, the vesting
requirement had a much greater potential for harm in North Carolina
than in most other states, owing to the large number of members of
the armed forces stationed in this state4 ° and to the fact that military
pensions were interpreted in North Carolina to mean that a
serviceperson must complete twenty years of service for vesting to
occur.
481
In the summer of 1997, however, the legislature at long last took
the necessary steps to correct the meaningless distinction (at least in
this context) between vested and nonvested pensions as marital
property-a position apparently already taken by all but three
"The expectation of nonvested pension, retirement, or other deferred compensation
rights shall be considered separate property." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(1) (Supp.
1997). Under § 50-20(c)(5), such expectations of nonvested deferred compensation rights
are merely one of 12 factors that a court could consider, after determining that an equal
distribution would not be equitable, in determining what would constitute an "equitable"
distribution. See id. § 50-20(c).
476. The original version of the statute, however, excluded all pension and other forms
of deferred compensation benefits as well. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(1) (1981)
(amended 1997). The inclusion of vested pensions and other such benefits was the first
amendment to the statute-an indication of a recognition of the same kind of inequity
that inclusion of unvested pensions only repeats. See Act of July 14, 1983, ch. 758, §§ 1, 2,
1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 787, 787 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(1)
(Supp. 1997)).
477. This includes both defined benefit and defined contribution plans.
478. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 2, § 15.6, at 613-14 (explaining that both contributory
and non-contributory pensions "realistically represent deferred compensation to the
earning spouse and therefore should be available for division on divorce," and that "the
non-vested pension is an intangible asset of value, in some cases the only valuable asset of
the marriage, which properly should be divisible on divorce"); Grace Ganz Blumberg,
Marital Property Treatment of Pensions, Disability Pay, Workers' Compensation, and
Other Wage Substitutes: An Insurance, or Replacement Analysis, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1250,
1290-94 (1986) (making the point that pension benefits are sui generis wage
replacements); Sarah G. Ramsay, 1994-95 Survey of New York Law, Family Law, 46
SYRACUSE L. REv. 661, 667 (1995) (noting that nonvested pensions are a form of
deferred compensation, and uncertainties in value or vesting need not deter division as
marital property).
479. See infra note 482 (citing examples).
480. All military personnel stationed in North Carolina for the requisite six month
period are deemed to have met the residency requirement. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-18
(1995); see also George v. George, 115 N.C. App. 387, 389, 444 S.E.2d 449, 450 (1994)
(holding that 17-year armed forces veteran had no "vested" pension benefits).
481. See 3 WILLIAM M. TROYAN ET AL., VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF
MARITAL PROPERTY § 46.32 (1985).
2108 [Vol. 76
1998] DISTRIBUTIVE CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE 2109
states.48 Not only have the definitions of separate
483 and marita 84
property been amended to deal with nonvested pensions, but the
expectation of nonvested pension benefits has been eliminated as a
factor in determining what is an "equitable" distribution.485
Additionally, an entirely new section, § 50-20.1, has been added to the
equitable distribution statute describing the manner in which
payments reflecting the division of nonvested pensions may be
made.486 Section 50-20.1(b) reads:
The award of nonvested pension, retirement, or other
deferred compensation benefits may be made payable:
(1) As a lump sum by agreement;
482. Only Arkansas, Indiana, and Ohio still differentiate between vested and
nonvested pensions in the division of marital property. See Burns v. Bums, 847 S.W.2d
23, 25-26 (Ark. 1993) (holding that nonvested military retirement benefits are not
property to be divided at dissolution, and explaining that such benefits "lack the following
characteristics of property: cash surrender value, loan value, redemption value, lump sum
value, and a value realizable after death"); Kirkman v. Kirkman, 555 N.E.2d 1293, 1294
(Ind. 1990) (holding that because husband's "right to pension benefits was neither vested
nor had it become 'not forfeited upon termination' prior to the entry of the dissolution
decree," the pension was properly excluded from property division (quoting In re
Marriage of Adams, 535 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. 1989))); Skinner v. Skinner, 644 N.E.2d
141, 146 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that when husband's pension was only 20% vested
at the time of dissolution, and when, under § 31-1-11.5-2 of the Indiana Code, he had no
present right to withdraw the unvested portion, no right to receive the unvested portion
which was not forfeited upon employment termination, no present right to receive the
unvested portion payable after dissolution, and the unvested portion was not disposable
retired or retainer income, the unvested portion was not "property" to be included in the
marital estate); King v. King, 605 N.E.2d 970, 974-75 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (classifying
vested pension plans accumulated during marriage as marital assets that must be
considered with other factors in dividing marital assets and liabilities, but concluding that
it was trial court error to reserve jurisdiction to divide unvested pension benefits that may
or may not be available in nine years). For a contrary classification of the status of
nonvested pension rights, in accordance with the vast majority of states, see Kendrick v.
Kendrick, 902 S.W.2d 918 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994). In Kendrick, the court of appeals
acknowledged the supreme court's recognition of "the trend in other jurisdictions toward
treating nonvested pension rights as marital property," and concluded that although § 36-
4-121(b)(1)(B) of the Tennessee Code specifically includes vested, but not nonvested,
pension rights in the definition of marital property, the legislative intent was not to
exclude nonvested pension rights. Id. at 923-24. The court thus held that nonvested
pension rights accruing during marriage are marital property subject to equitable
distribution. See id. at 924.
483. Section 50-20(b)(2) has been amended to omit any reference to nonvested
pensions as separate property. See Act of June 19, 1997, ch. 212, § 3, 1997 N.C. Adv.
Legis. Serv. 206,207-08 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (Supp. 1997)).
484. Similarly, § 50-20(b)(1) has been amended to include "vested and nonvested"
pensions as part of marital property. See Act of June 19, 1997, ch. 212, § 2, 1997 N.C.
Adv. Legis. Serv. 206,207 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (Supp. 1997)).
485. See supra note 295.
486. Section § 50-20.1 is now devoted solely to division of pension benefits. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 50-20.1 (Supp. 1997).
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(2) Over a period of time in fixed amounts by
agreement; or
(3) By appropriate domestic relations order as a
prorated portion of the benefits made to the
designated recipient at the time the party against
whom the award is made actually begins to receive
the benefits.'
With one exception, the treatment of nonvested pensions is now
identical to that of vested pensions. Vested pension benefits may be
divided by a fourth option not available (except, presumably by
agreement of the parties4 8) with nonvested pensions. Regarding only
vested benefits, § 50-20.1(a)(4) provides, for the award of "a larger
portion of other assets to the party not receiving the benefits and a
smaller share of assets to the party entitled to receive the benefits. '4s9
The exclusion of this option with nonvested pension and other
deferred benefits may reflect an assumption that parties who have
been married for a time period insufficient for such benefits to vest
may not have sufficient assets to offset a current payout-and the
even more important contingency that vesting might not occur at all.
Such a contingency, however, should have already been factored into
the valuation process in the first instance.49 ° It should be emphasized
that it is the rendering court that loses this payout option, not the
parties, who are at liberty to agree otherwise.49 1 The remainder of
§ 50-20.1 is almost identical to the now-repealed provisions of § 50-
20(b)(3),492 which has been removed from the old statute and placed
487. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20.1(b). Subsection (3) is an excellent example of the
"share the risk" approach that may also be used with other deferred compensation
benefits, see infra Part V.C.3 of this Article. The significance of the further applicability
of this statutory authorization should not be overlooked.
488. It has long been recognized that parties may by settlement agreement bind
themselves to obligations that a court could not order but could enforce. Provisions to
provide for the college education of children are probably the classic example. See, e.g.,
Sharpe v. Nobles, 127 N.C. App. 705, 710, 493 S.E.2d 288, 291 (1997) (upholding trial
court's enforcement of provision in separation agreement, incorporated into divorce
decree, requiring father to invest $50 per month for child's college education).
489. N.C. GEN. STAT. 50-20.1(a)(4).
490. See Seifert v. Seifert, 319 N.C. 367,369-70, 354 S.E.2d 506, 508-09 (1987).
491. See supra note 488 and accompanying text. The two options specifically made
available to the parties by agreement-payout as a lump sum or over a period of time in
fixed amounts-do not appear to foreclose any other agreement between the parties.
492. The opening sentence in § 50-20(b)(3) has not been repealed. It reads:
"'Distributive award' means payments that are payable either in a lump sum or over a
period of time in fixed amounts, but shall not include alimony payments or other similar
payments for support and maintenance which are treated as ordinary income to the
recipient under the Internal Revenue Code." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(3) (Supp.
1997). The inclusion of this definition of distributive awards as the opening paragraph of
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in the new one.
In conclusion, the categorization of unvested pension rights is a
much welcomed, albeit somewhat overdue, development in the law of
equitable distribution in North Carolina. It is a development,
moreover, that should occasion few to no difficulties in analysis,
implementation, or interpretation. Valuation problems should be, if
anything, even less complicated than those which are already present
with vested pensions, for which an abundance of case law guidance is
already available.4 93 In particular, the "share the risk" (of never
vesting) coupled with the new presumption of in-kind awards, is a
relatively small risk, and may prove to be the easiest and most
attractive option for many couples.494 The same, most emphatically,
cannot be said with regard to the other, equally corrective, revisions
to the law of equitable distribution.
2. Date of Separation and Its Progeny
The term "divisible property" may leave most experts in this
field rather understandably bewildered, insofar as the concept
appears to exist as a third category of property in no other state.495
For years, moreover, it was clear that only property defined as
"separate" or "marital" need be identified and thus valued by courts
and parties, although only the latter was divisible.496 Introduction or
the long remainder of that section (dealing only with pension distribution laws), now
repealed but also incorporated into the new § 50-20.1, had long seemed inappropriately
placed. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20.1 (Supp. 1997).
493. See Sharp, supra note 2, at 210-17.
494. See infra notes 525-33 (discussing this option).
495. Equitable distribution states may occasionally invade separate property at the
time of divorce, but only in extraordinary circumstances. See Sharp, supra note 10, at 249
nn.8-10. It should be pointed out, however, that the term "divisible property" is used in
several states as synonymous with what North Carolina calls marital property. See, e.g.,
Grigsby v. Grigsby, 620 So. 2d 35, 36 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993) (rejecting wife's claim that a
retirement plan "should be divisible as marital property" by concluding that the trial
court's failure to treat the plan "as divisible property" was not error); In re Marriage of
Conger, 492 N.W.2d 715, 716 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992) (explaining that "pension benefits are
treated as marital property in Iowa" and holding that the benefits at issue "are like a
private pension plan and, as such, are divisible property"); In re Marriage of Murphy, 862
P.2d 1143, 1145 (Mont. 1993) (explaining that specific military disability and retirement
pay "may be considered by state courts as community property, i.e. divisible property");
Spindler v. Spindler, 558 N.W.2d 645, 651 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (addressing the question
of whether a spouse had shown that the character of certain property "had changed to
marital property," and explaining that "[c]hanging the property's title, for example, can
transmute it to divisible property") (emphasis added). The term "divisible" property,
however, is virtually unknown in other states.
496. Because § 50-20(c)(1) requires that the "income, property, and liabilities of each
party" be considered as a factor in determining if an equal division is equitable, see N.C.
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recognition of the three new kinds of property now deemed to be
distributable property is a step of immense significance.4w In essence,
§ 50-20(4) recaptures from the black hole of established case law498
passive increases or decreases in value of marital and divisible
property from the date of separation to the date of distribution,
499
increases in marital debt,510 and-most significantly-"[p]roperty,
property rights, or any portion thereof received after the date of
separation but before the date of distribution that was acquired as a
result of the efforts of either spouse during the marriage." 50
These changes, however, were almost without doubt the only
feasible options to correct the scores of "analytically challenged"
GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(1) (Supp. 1997), separate property must be identified and valued,
see McLeod v. McLeod, 74 N.C. App. 144, 154,327 S.E.2d 910, 916-17 (1985).
497. The North Carolina General Assembly defined "divisible property" to mean all
real and personal property as set forth below:
(a) All appreciation and diminution in value of marital property and divisible
property of the parties occurring after the date of separation and prior to
the date of distribution, except that appreciation or diminution in value
which is the result of postseparation actions or activities of a spouse shall
not be treated as divisible property.
(b) All property, property rights, or any portion thereof received after the date
of separation but before the date of distribution that was acquired as a
result of the efforts of either spouse during the marriage and before the
date of separation, including, but not limited to, commissions, bonuses,
and contractual rights.
(c) Passive income from marital property received after the date of separation,
including, but not limited to, interest and dividends.
(d) Increases in marital debt and financing charges and interest related to
marital debt.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(4) (Supp. 1997).
498. See supra notes 512-20 and accompanying text (discussing the previous rule that
required courts to ignore increases or decreases in value of, or income, or profits from
marital property after the date of separation).
499. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(4)(c) (Supp. 1997); see also infra notes 517-20
(discussing the Truesdale case). It is well worth noting, however, that this section of the
new amendments could potentially pose problems, in that it may conflict with § 50-21(b)
regarding valuation of marital property on the date of separation. To paraphrase § 50-
21(b), if marital property is diminished in value by one spouse after the date of
separation, such diminution is clearly not to be treated as diminished value marital
property. And if it is to be treated as depreciated marital property, could both spouses
bear the cost of such decrease in value or would a court simply revert to value as of the
date of separation? At a minimum, the issue further clouds the continued clarity of the
rigid rule equating date of separation with valuation of marital property.
500. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(4)(d).
501. Id. § 50-20(4)(b). The statute also excludes from divisible property increases or
decreases in value of marital or divisible property that are the result of the activities of
either spouse after separation. See id. § 50-20(b)(4)(a). This provision in the new
amendments is especially likely to cause difficulties for practitioners and the courts. It is
closely akin to the already familiar concept of "mixed" property, discussed infra note 511
and accompanying text.
1998] DISTRIBUTIVE CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE
results and the irreconcilable conflicts within our own
jurisprudence-all of which were set in motion by a seemingly
innocuous amendment to the Equitable Distribution Act in 1983.1°
Because the original version of the Act had contained no clear
indication as to when marital property was to be valued, the Act was
amended in 1983 to include the now infamous requirement that
marital property "shall be valued as of the date of the separation of
the parties.""5 3 The fact that numerous types of assets or property
that were clearly earned by a spouse during the marriage but that
were technically, and often just barely,5° acquired after the date of
separation, was almost entirely unappreciated initially.505  Very
quickly, however, spouses realized how this "all or nothing" rule
could be used to manipulate the receipt of income or property until
after the date of separation and so exclude it from division by the
court. Thus the simple and unilateral act of separation before the
receipt of income or assets could markedly decrease the value of the
marital estate.50 6
Nonetheless, it first appeared that the 1983 amendment, albeit
somewhat miserly in its effect in further decreasing the marital
proportion of property, would be susceptible to a sensible and
flexible interpretation, as indeed it initially was by the court of
appeals,5 7 and by the supreme court as well. 8 In particular, the
502. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-21(b) (1984) (amended 1997) (affecting all cases
pending as of August 1, 1983). One might only have wished that the somewhat
retroactive reach of this amendment had been duplicated by its predecessor.
503. Act of July 1, 1983, ch. 671, § 1, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 640, 640 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-21(b) (Supp. 1997)).
504. See infra note 521 (discussing cases). Remarkably, this oversight contradicted
both the substance and the analysis underlying the source of funds theory, a position
firmly embraced in existing case law, the function of which was to recognize and reward
marital contributions to separate property and vice-versa. See, e.g., McLeod v. McLeod,
74 N.C. App. 144, 377 S.E.2d 910 (1985); Wade v. Wade, 72 N.C. App. 372, 325 S.E.2d
260 (1985). For a more painstaking, and possibly painful, discussion of the source of
funds theory and examples of formulas other states have used, see Sharp, supra note 2, at
217-19. For an example of a trial court formulating its own formula to separate out
marital and separate portions of mixed property, see Mishler v. Mishler, 90 N.C. App. 72,
75, 367 S.E.2d 385, 387-88 (1988). See also infra note 511 and accompanying text
(discussing the dual classification of property).
505. See Sharp, supra note 2, at 236-37, for a critique, including comments from other
state courts, on the use of such a unilaterally determined date of valuation. See also
David L. Baumer & J.C. Poindexter, Women and Divorce: The Perils of Pension
Division, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 203,208 (1996) (collecting data showing that North Carolina is
the only state that unequivocally mandates the use of the date of separation for valuation
and distribution of marital property).
506. See, e.g., infra notes 507-20 (discussing cases).
507. See, e.g., Dewey v. Dewey, 77 N.C. App. 787, 790-91, 336 S.E.2d 451, 453 (1985)
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supreme court decision in Johnson v. Johnson09 suggested that the
1983 amendment as to valuation might be interpreted quite sensibly.
The "analytical approach"51 adopted in that case was used to
separate out what in other contexts is known as "dual" or "mixed"
property.
5 1'
That benign assessment of the probable and initial effect of the
amendment,1 2 however, was virtually eradicated by the court's
opinion in Truesdale v. Truesdale,513 which inexplicably ignored both
the logic and analysis of Johnson,14 rejected the rationale of Dewey
and its kindred cases,515 and ignored the source of funds rule as
well.516 Instead, the court of appeals held in contravention to § 50-
(holding lower court's error in valuing the marital home sometime after the date of
separation harmless because it had also ordered an equal division of the proceeds of the
sale); Appelbe v. Appelbe, 76 N.C. App. 391, 392-93, 333 S.E.2d 312, 312-13 (1985)
(allowing the proceeds from the sale of a marital home to be divided in kind, in order to
assure that each spouse received his and her distributional shares). After Truesdale's
insistence on fixing the value on the date of separation was established, such in-kind
divisions were no longer available to ameliorate the disparities in value that might occur
after the date of separation and before equitable distribution.
508. Indeed, in Johnson v. Johnson, 317 N.C. 437, 346 S.E.2d 430 (1986), the supreme
court sensibly held that proceeds received after the date of separation from a personal
injury lawsuit for an injury received during the marriage would be divisible to the extent
that such proceeds represented losses to the marriage. See id. at 450-53, 346 S.E.2d at
438-40. As the concurrence carefully explained, "The proceeds merely represent the
value of the cause of action, which cause was acquired during the marriage and before
separation." Id. at 456, 346 S.E.2d at 441 (Martin, J., concurring). This ruling, however,
was utterly and inexplicably overlooked by the court of appeals with a series of cases that
created one of the major problems the new legislation was intended to correct. See infra
notes 512-20 and accompanying text.
509. 317 N.C. 437,346 S.E.2d 430 (1986).
510. See id. at 446-51, 346 S.E.2d at 435-38 (discussing the "analytic" method).
511. See Wade v. Wade, 72 N.C. App. 372, 325 S.E.2d 260 (1985). The court of
appeals recognized that property might sometimes have a "dual classification ... as part
marital and part separate," but concluded that this was consistent with the partnership
principle in that it ensured "that both the separate and marital estates receive a
proportionate and fair return on its [sic] investment." Id. at 381-82, 325 S.E.2d at 269.
512. See Sharp, supra note 2, at 226-37, for one of this author's more notably incorrect
prognostications.
513. 89 N.C. App. 445,366 S.E.2d 512 (1988).
514. See supra note 508 (discussing Johnson).
515. See supra note 507 (citing cases). Truesdale basically overruled both Dewey and
Appelbe without analysis, without appreciation of the practical effect, and in
contravention of the supreme court's holding in Johnson.
516. The source of funds rule had its origin in the partnership theory of marriage,
called the "very raison d'tre of the Act" in Mauser v. Mauser, 75 N.C. App. 115, 119, 330
S.E.2d 63, 65 (1985). The North Carolina Supreme Court, in its first decision interpreting
the Equitable Distribution Act, agreed: the Act "reflects the idea that marriage is a
partnership enterprise to which both spouses make vital contributions." White v. White,
312 N.C. 770,775,324 S.E.2d 829,832 (1985).
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21(b) that it was not mere "harmless error to distribute such
appreciation [of marital property received after the date of
separation] so long as it is distributed in the same ratio deemed
equitable under Section 50-20(c). 517 To compound its error and to
confound rational analysis, the court went on to hold that any such
appreciation of "marital property is itself neither marital nor separate
property. '518  This rather incomprehensible and internally
inconsistent519 conclusion ignored the results it would inevitably
produce: that even passive appreciation in the value of what was
clearly marital property would inure solely to the benefit of the
spouse in control of, or who was awarded, that property. It also flew
directly in the face of what was then, and is now, one of the guiding
principles of interpretation of the act-the source of funds doctrine,
readily adopted by the supreme court in its early interpretations of
the Act to ensure that both marital and separate estates would be
justly recognized and rewarded commensurably with their
contributions to the marriage, regardless of when such fruits of their
contributions were actually received.2
As this interpretation of the valuation as of the date of
separation rigidly progressed, moreover, it quickly became a
remarkably voracious worm in the apple of equitable distribution. It
invited extensive pre-divorce planning-manipulation of the receipt
of income or assets, clearly earned during the marriage, until after
date of separation -21-and forced courts virtually to put on blinders
517. Truesdale, 89 N.C. App. at 448,366 S.E.2d at 515.
518. Id. at 448, 366 S.E.2d at 514. This statement has long struck this author as
tantamount to saying that one is "neither pregnant nor non-pregnant." The court held
that any such change in value should instead be considered as a distributional factor in
determining if equal were equitable. See id. Truesdale nonetheless is the start of a long
line of cases adopting this logic, thus creating a kind of "black hole" sucking into itself
virtually all economic events after the date of separation. But see Nye v. Nye, 100 N.C.
App. 326, 327, 346 S.E.2d 91, 91-92 (1990) ("awarding" over $500,000 in post date of
separation increase in the value of the husband's corporation).
519. See supra notes 515,518.
520. See Sharp, supra note 10, at 254-59; see also Smith v. Smith, 314 N.C. 80, 331
S.E.2d 682 (1985) (creating the partnership concept); McLeod v. McLeod, 74 N.C. App.
144, 327 S.E.2d 910 (1985) (formulating the active-passive distinction with increases in
separate property); Wade v. Wade, 72 N.C. App. 372, 325 S.E.2d 260 (same). It should
also be recalled that even the most simple divorce requires a year's separation under § 50-
6, plus an additional couple of months for serving the complaint, filing the answer, and
obtaining a court date. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1995).
521. Sonek v. Sonek, 105 N.C. App. 247,412 S.E.2d 917 (1992), discussed in a different
context, see supra note 20, is again an excellent example of this. The husband there
closed down his private gynecological practice shortly before separation and joined a
professional clinic as a salaried employee-thereby nicely shedding himself of any
goodwill he would otherwise have had. See id. at 248-49, 412 S.E.2d at 918. Not
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with regard to increases or decreases in the value of assets after the
date of separation and before the often long-delayed distribution of
assets.52  Although the new amendments to the Equitable
Distribution Act do not deal directly with the valuation as of date of
separation rule (except as to "divisible property" which is to be
valued as of the date of distribution5 23), they nonetheless must create
the critically needed flexibility in this heretofore unyielding rule in
order to carry out the mandates of the new portions of the statute
24
3. In-Kind Awards and Valuation
Probably more critically, although perhaps less obviously, the
dogmatic adherence to identification of value with the date of
separation had also led to at least two other, equally misbegotten
derivative rules. The first was that each and every asset must be
assigned a value by the court in order for it to be distributed in the
first instance 5 - a rule which unfolded, for example, as a total bar on
a court's power to order that an asset be divided in kind,5 26 regardless
of the fact that there are indeed assets whose values, although not
ascertainable, are nonetheless quite real, 527 and regardless of the fact
that the ultimate division of an asset in kind would resolve many of
the problems with post-separation increases in value.528
surprisingly, he re-opened his private practice shortly after the divorce. See id.; see also
Godley v. Godley, 110 N.C. App. 99, 429 S.E.2d 382 (1993) (providing an example of the
kind of manipulation of the receipt of income, clearly earned during the marriage, that
could and should have been avoided altogether simply by following the guidelines laid
down by the supreme court in Johnson v. Johnson, 317 N.C. 437, 346 S.E.2d 430 (1986));
infra notes 602-04 and accompanying text (discussing Godley v. Godley).
522. See supra note 53 (citing examples).
523. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-21(b) (Supp. 1997). But see supra note 499 (discussing
a potential problem with diminution in value).
524. Again, the inclusion of unvested pension rights, which almost by definition cannot
be valued as of the date of separation, is an excellent example of this statement.
525. See Seifert v. Seifert, 319 N.C. 367, 354 S.E.2d 506 (1987); Grasty v. Grasty, 125
N.C. App. 736, 482 S.E.2d 752 (1997). The analytical foundation for this rule is not
altogether lacking: it derived from the premise that a court cannot determine if equal
actually is equitable, as required by § 50-20(c), unless it first has all the valuation evidence
before it. The rule is nonetheless shortsighted, for reasons discussed above in part, and
also has the ironic effect of transgressing the very principle and presumption that equal is
equitable. See also supra note 511 and accompanying text (discussing valuation dual-
nature property and the source of funds doctrine).
526. See supra notes 512-20 (discussing Truesdale and the sensible line of cases it
disavowed).
527. Frequent flyer miles are an excellent example of this. Surely no one would assert
that they are without value, but what that value is rests solely with how the individual
owner of the miles decides to use them. See supra note 646 and accompanying text
(discussing frequent flyer miles cases).
528. Ironically, the line of cases begotten by Truesdale became so deeply entrenched
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One of the new amendments to the Equitable Distribution Act
has at long last corrected the above rule, which had virtually nothing
to recommend it in any event. Section 50-20(e) now states that
"[s]ubject to the presumption.., that an equal division is equitable, it
shall be presumed in every action that an in-kind distribution of
marital or divisible property is equitable."5 29 The benefits likely to be
derived from this amendment are difficult to overestimate. This is by
no means to suggest that under the new amendment valuation is not
still of great importance, because the statute still dictates that at least
the "approximate" ' net value of both marital and divisible property
must be found by the court.53' At a practical level, however, many
asset valuations depend more on the skill of an expert witness than
on actual net value, and case law has already created strong
precedent for division of assets whose value is so difficult to
determine that valuation need only "reasonably approximate" the
that even the supreme court has cited Truesdale for support. See Smith v. Smith, 336 N.C.
575, 578, 444 S.E.2d 420, 422 (1994) (stating that the receipt of dividend income of over
$240,000 after the date of separation must be considered as a distributional factor only).
529. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(e) (Supp. 1997). Section 50-20(e) continues as follows:
This presumption may be rebutted by the greater weight of the evidence, or by
evidence that the property is a closely held business entity or is otherwise not
susceptible of division in-kind. In any action in which the presumption is
rebutted, the court in lieu of in-kind distribution shall provide for a distributive
award in order to achieve equity between the parties. The court may provide for
a distributive award to facilitate, effectuate or supplement a distribution of
marital or divisible property.
Id.
530. See infra note 532 (giving examples of approximations of value).
531. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c). Logically, and in order to conform to the new
amendments, this section should be amended to read, "where feasible." Indeed, our
courts already stray widely from the set "date of separation value" any time they allow a
deferred distribution of a pension. Because the value of the pension once the employee
begins to receive it is almost by definition unknown, our courts make full use of the
"coverture fraction" which essentially does what our courts are now urged to do: divide
property in-kind. The values of a book, invention, screenplay, patent, etc., are similarly
unknown at the date of separation or distribution. Again, an in-kind distribution is
particularly appropriate in such cases. Furthermore, as the Supreme Court of Minnesota
has noted, with regard to assets that are susceptible to some form of valuation:
Furthermore, valuation is necessarily an approximation in many cases,
and it is only necessary that the value arrived at lies within a reasonable range of
figures. Thus, the market valuation determined by the trier of fact should be
sustained if it falls within the limits of credible estimates made by competent
witnesses ....
Hertz v. Hertz, 229 N.W.2d 42, 44 (Minn. 1975). A Missouri court, moreover, held that
the trial judge was not required to value a husband's military retirement pension before
awarding the wife a coverture fraction of such retirement. See In re Marriage of Ward,
955 S.W.2d 17,21-22 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
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net value of an asset.532 Furthermore, insistence on a precise value of
every asset already contravenes most pension valuations because of
contingencies necessarily involved but unknown at the time of
valuation. 33
The point is not a recommendation that courts ignore what our
statutes dictate, but that increased flexibility, including toleration of
some imprecision where necessary, should be accorded valuations of
some types of assets that will or must be divided in-kind. Indeed,
fluctuations in the value of assets after the date of separation, along
with many other fact scenarios are particularly well suited to an
in-kind division, and also justify a very disproportionate division as
"any other factor."5' Furthermore, our supreme court had already
mandated that increases or decreases in marital property after the
date of separation be classified as either active or passive. 35 Divisible
property, which includes passive increases in value to the date of
distribution,536 is also an appropriate candidate for what is already a
presumption in favor of such distributions. 37
Secondly, the separation/valuation date also had led to the rule
that an asset must either be in existence, or must be the subject of a
near absolute right of ownership by the marital community, by or on
the date of separation. 3 Otherwise, it could be excluded from
consideration as marital property-regardless of whether or not the
marital community had contributed all or ninety-nine percent of the
effort that went into securing its acquisition.5 In addition, the same
532 See Fox v. Fox, 103 N.C. App. 13, 18,404 S.E.2d 354,356 (1991); see also Carlson
v. Carlson, 127 N.C. App. 87,92,487 S.E.2d 784,788 (1997) (ruling that the trial court had
"reasonably approximated" the goodwill value of husband's medical practice); Lawing v.
Lawing, 81 N.C. App. 159, 169, 344 S.E.2d 100, 108 (1986) (allowing an offer to buy to
serve as competent evidence of value); Poore v. Poore, 75 N.C. App. 414, 421, 331 S.E.2d
266, 271 (1985) ("There is no set rule for determining the value of the goodwill of a
professional practice.").
533. See Seifert v. Seifert, 319 N.C. 367, 354 S.E.2d 506 (1987), which held that that
employment contingencies may result in a non-matured pension and must be factored
into the valuation process. See id. at 369-70, 354 S.E.2d at 508-09. The existence of
contingencies with nonvested pensions gives even greater weight to this observation.
534. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(b)(15) (1995); see also supra note 370 (discussing
Collins v. Collins, 125 N.C. App. 113,479 S.E.2d 240 (1997)).
535. See Smith v. Smith, 336 N.C. 575,579,444 S.E.2d 420,423 (1994).
536. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-21(b) (Supp. 1997).
537. See id. § 50-20(e).
538. This rule rather blatantly contradicted the large group of cases in the 1980s,
beginning with Wade v. Wade, 72 N.C. App. 372, 325 S.E.2d 260 (1985), which held that
"acquisition must be recognized as an on-going process of making payment for property
or contributing to the marital estate rather than being fixed on the date that legal title to
property is obtained." Id. at 380, 325 S.E.2d at 268-69.
539. In Smith v. Smith, 111 N.C. App. 460, 433 S.E.2d 196 (1993), rev'd on other
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valuation rule had been extended, not only to the draconian
situations discussed above, but also to the passive earnings of or
income from any marital property received after the date of
separation, including rental income from marital property.540 Never
was a rule as illogical and unfair as the date-of-separation
accumulation and valuation rule. When paired with the prohibition
against in-kind distributions of property without absolute values or
ownership at the date of separation, the result for many parties was
an incarceration in rigid rules from which neither equity nor existing




Considerable public outrage542 accompanied such decisions as
those previously discussed. Additionally, such decisions violated
both the spirit and the law543 of equitable and partnership principles.
The more indefensible argument that treatment of post-separation
appreciation of, income from, or literal acquisition of property
earned during the marriage but not received until after the date of
grounds, 336 N.C. 575,444 S.E.2d 420 (1994), for example, the court of appeals held, inter
alia, that a stock redemption of $900,000, of which $300,000 was still owed at the date of
separation, and was paid to the marital corporation after that date, was nonetheless
marital property, because even though it was not actually received until after the date of
separation, the right to the funds was "vested" before the date of separation. See id. at
481-84, 433 S.E.2d at 209-11. Compare this holding with Edwards v. Edwards, 110 N.C.
App. 1, 428 S.E.2d 834 (1993), in which a marital corporation increased in value by more
than one million dollars within three months after separation. It was not disputed that
this increase resulted from husband's completion of a contract-on which he had been
working for two years-with Saudi Arabia, but none of the increase in value was held to
be marital property. See id. at 1, 6-7, 428 S.E.2d 834, 836 (1993).
540. See, e.g., Chandler v. Chandler, 108 N.C. App. 66, 422 S.E.2d 587 (1992). In
Chandler, the rent collected after separation by the husband (who presumably was the
rental manager of the property) was held to be "neither marital nor separate property."
Id. at 69, 422 S.E.2d at 590. In another case, a wife's attempts to demand an accounting
for, or partition of, the property during the long process of equitable distribution were
denied. See Beam v. Beam, 92 N.C. App. 509, 512, 374 S.E.2d 636, 638 (1988) (Greene,
J., dissenting) (arguing that equitable distribution claim in district court deprived the
superior court of jurisdiction and extinguished wife's common law right to the alternative
accounting and division of property), affd, 325 N.C. 428, 383 S.E.2d 656 (1989); see also
Hagler v. Hagler, 319 N.C. 287,292,354 S.E.2d 228,233 (1987) (same).
541. See infra notes 504-05 and accompanying text (discussing ownership at separation
requirement).
542. See supra note 31 (discussing the publicity garnered by such cases).
543. The major principles, which should infuse the law with their spirit are the
marriage as partnership, source of funds, dual or mixed property, and the analytical
approach, discussed in more detail supra notes 508-11.
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separation was "neither marital nor separate property"5 constituted
a total derogation of the source of funds rule545 and other cardinal
rules of interpretation under the Act.546 All these forces combined-
at long last-to form the legislative creation of the most unique but
creative concept: "divisible property.
54 7
As noted above,54 divisible property essentially pours back into
the marital "pot" passive increases in the value of marital property,
including any fruits of marital efforts, or portions thereof, that are
received up until the time of distribution.5 49  But this greatly
simplified explanation grossly underestimates the complexities that
await both the bench and the bar. Beyond the rather simple situation
involving post date-of-separation rental income from marital
property, such as that posed in Chandler v. Chandler,550 extremely
complex issues will arise at both practical and procedural levels.
Fortunately, there is an abundance of case law from other states
which offers considerable guidance as our courts wade into these
often very muddy new waters.
Initially, however, there are two general issues that will
undoubtedly be the subject of new or expanded litigation. The first
of these issues is the much expanded opportunity for dissipation of
assets that accompanies the introduction of divisible property.
5 51
544. Truesdale v. Truesdale, 89 N.C. App. 445, 448, 366 S.E.2d 512, 514 (1988); supra
notes 512-20 (discussing Truesdale).
545. Wade v. Wade, 72 N.C. App. 372, 325 S.E.2d 260 (1985), was the first case to
address the source of funds principle, under which the separate and marital (and now
divisible) portions of dual-natured property must be identified and proportionally
recompensed. See also Sharp, supra note 2, at 210-20 (discussing the source of funds
principle).
546. See supra notes 531, 535, 537 and accompanying text.
547. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(4) (Supp. 1997); supra note 497 (setting forth
text of statute).
548. See supra note 497.
549. At a minimum these changes alone should operate to help deter the strategy of
unduly prolonging an equitable distribution trial or settlement. Although active increases
in value will not be treated as divisible property under § 50-20(b)(4)(a), and thus will
presumably remain "neither separate nor marital" property and only a distributional
factor under Truesdale, there is still considerable incentive on the part of the wealthier
spouse to speed up the entire process.
550. 108 N.C. App. 66, 67-70, 422 S.E.2d 587, 589-90 (1992); see supra note 21
(discussing Chandler).
551. It is relatively safe to conclude that the single advantage of the absolute date of
separation rule was that it created no incentive whatsoever to dissipate marital property
after separation, because any increases or decreases in the value of marital property
would be, at best, "any other factor" under § 50-20(c)(12). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-
20(c)(12); see, e.g., Nye v. Nye, 100 N.C. App. 326, 327, 396 S.E.2d 91, 92 (1990); see also
supra note 19 (discussing Nye).
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North Carolina case law, like that of most states, has long been clear
that marital property that "disappears" or that is appropriated by one
spouse for her separate use at or shortly before the date of separation
will be reincluded in the marital estate as part of the guilty party's
distribution.552 In addition, of course, the behavior of either spouse
that has resulted in "waste, neglect, devalu[ation] or conver[sion]"
after separation and until the time of distribution is already a
statutory factor to be considered in determining if an equitable
distribution is equal.55 3 Dissipation resulting in the reinclusion of the
property so disposed of is obviously a much more effective deterrent
than considering such conduct as a "factor."554 The opportunity for
such dissipation of divisible and even marital property, however, is
greatly extended for at least two reasons. First, the extension of the
reach of divisible property to the date of distribution may well
prolong the period for acquisition of such assets for months, or even
years,555 after the date of separation. Second, the same extension of
time may well increase the incentive to dissipate as well. 56 The
phenomenon of cutting off one's nose to spite one's face is hardly
unknown to family law practitioners.5 7 Loss or destruction and non-
marital gifts of divisible (or marital) property,58 non-payment of a
552. See, e.g., Talent v. Talent, 76 N.C. App. 545, 553, 334 S.E.2d 256, 261-62 (1985)
(reincluding $68,000 which was appropriated by wife after date of separation in the
marital estate); McManus v. McManus, 76 N.C. App. 588, 591-92, 334 S.E.2d 270, 272-73
(1985) (determining that the existence of approximately $10,000 in funds controlled by
the husband one month before separation and unaccounted for at trial as sufficient to
raise an inference that he had disposed of the fund for non-marital purposes).
553. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(11a) (Supp. 1997). The statute also includes any acts
to preserve, maintain, develop, or expand marital property. See id.
554. It may be worth suggesting that only deliberate actions aimed at waste,
destruction, or other losses to marital or divisible property be considered as true
dissipation and that the statutory factor be used to include both intentional and negligent
losses.
555. See supra note 53 (citing examples).
556. Excessive spending, for living expenses or vacation trips that exceed the previous
standard of living, is held to be dissipation by a majority of states, for example. See, e.g.,
In re Marriage of Dunseth, 633 N.E.2d 82, 94 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); Barringer v. Barringer,
514 S.W.2d 114 (Ky. Ct. App. 1974); Noll v. Noll, 375 S.E.2d 338, 341 (S.C. Ct. App.
1988); see also supra note 499 (discussing potential problems with valuation of marital
property due to the acts of one party before the date of separation).
557. See infra notes 558-59 (discussing cases).
558. See, e.g., In re Hebbring, 255 Cal. Rptr. 488, 497-98 (Ct. App. 1989) (husband
threw his wife's expensive jewelry, most of which he had given her, into the sea); In re
Marriage of Kaplan, 500 N.E.2d 612, 618 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (gift to friend of the opposite
sex); Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 497 A.2d 485, 492 (Md. 1985) (husband made substantial
"loan" to his paramour). For a sample of cases involving gambling, see Harrison v.
Harrison, 787 S.W.2d 738 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Siegel v. Siegel, 574 A.2d 54 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1990), and Wilner v. Wilner, 595 N.Y.S.2d 978 (App. Div. 1993).
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mortgage resulting in a foreclosure sale at far less than fair market
value,5 9 deliberate reduction in the fair market value of an asset,
6°
excessive business expenses, especially for the self-employed,5 6 and
even failure to earn income after separation 562 have all been held to
constitute dissipation of income.5 63 Gambling losses or funds or
assets given to a paramour are, not surprisingly, held to be dissipation
in every state that has had occasion to address the issue.56
Yet another initial observation with regard to divisible assets is
that, with one exception,5 65 one would expect that the "vested but not
yet received" rule in effect prior to the creation of the divisible
property context 66 would continue to be fully applicable with
559. See, e.g., Heins v. Heins, 783 S.W.2d 481, 484-85 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (husband
deliberately refused to pay the marital home mortgage, and his parents subsequently
bought the home at a foreclosure sale); DiLacqua v. DiLacqua, 623 N.E.2d 118, 127-28
(Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (husband intentionally failed to make mortgage payments).
560. See, e.g., Berrios v. Berrios, 553 N.Y.S.2d 100, 100-01 (App. Div. 1990); Sharp v.
Sharp, 473 A.2d 499 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984) (asset unnecessarily encumbered with a
lien).
561. See Nelson v. Nelson, 651 So. 2d 1252, 1253-54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); State ex
rel. Nielsen v. Nielsen, 521 N.W.2d 735, 737 (Iowa 1994); McCarthy v. McCarthy, 480
N.W.2d 617,619-20 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
562. See Gastineau v. Gastineau, 573 N.Y.S.2d 819, 820-21 (Sup. Ct. 1991). In this
case, the husband left his professional football team during the middle of the season in
order to be with his paramour, who had just been diagnosed with cancer. See id. at 821.
The $500,000 salary loss thus incurred was held to be dissipation, because the loss was
clearly not related to a marital purpose. See id.; see also In re Tietz, 605 N.E.2d 670, 676-
77 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (involving a lawyer husband who intentionally lessened his billing
in order to reduce the value of his law practice). Intentional depression of income in
order to avoid support payments is a well-established area in the law of North Carolina
and thus should provide considerable guidance in dealing with this issue. See, e.g., Beall v.
Beall, 290 N.C. 669, 672, 228 S.E.2d 407, 410 (1976) (observing that capacity to earn may
serve as basis for award if husband is deliberately depressing income); Sharpe v. Nobles,
127 N.C. App. 705, 708, 493 S.E.2d 288, 291 (1997) ("Child support obligations are
ordinarily determined by a party's actual income at the time the order is made or
modified. A party's earning capacity may be used to calculate the award if he
deliberately depressed his income .... (citation omitted)); Broughton v. Broughton, 58
N.C. App. 778, 782, 294 S.E.2d 772, 776 (1984) (ruling that plaintiff had not deliberately
depressed his income).
563. For a more comprehensive treatment of this subject, see Lewis Becker, Conduct
of a Spouse That Dissipates Property Available for Equitable Property Distribution, 52
OHIO ST. L.J. 95 (1991), and Brett R. Turner, Here Today, Gone Tomorrow:
Identification and Division of Dissipated Marital Assets, DIVORCE LITIG. 21 (Feb. 1996).
564. See supra note 558 (citing cases).
565. The amendment to the definition of marital property to include unvested
pensions under § 50-20(b)(1) is obviously an exception. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-
20(b)(1) (Supp. 1997). "[R]etirement or other deferred compensation benefits" that
mature during this period surely should receive the same treatment as pension rights
already do. Id. § 50-20.1(b).
566. See Smith v. Smith, 111 N.C. App. 460, 433 S.E.2d 196 (1993), rev'd on other
grounds, 336 N.C. 575,444 S.E.2d 420 (1994).
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divisible property and the date of distribution termination. There
seems to be no principled analysis that would warrant application of
this rule with date of separation but not with date of distribution.
Thus, for example, employee stock options that are exercisable, but
not yet exercised, at the date of distribution should be included as
divisible property.567 The basic point is that timing of the receipt of
assets, including the right to receive them, although susceptible to
manipulation and perhaps some contingent elements as well, should
still be treated as are unvested pensions. Critical support for this
suggestion derives from the inclusion of "property, property rights, or
any portion thereof"568 in the definition of divisible property. The last
phrase can easily be interpreted in conformity with both the "vested"
rulings and with the source of funds rule.569 The critical difference
with the addition of divisible property and in-kind divisions is that
the right to receive property will not necessarily correlate with the
value of the property at the date of distribution.570 This will require
that courts cease treating payments or assets earned in whole or part
during the marriage and after the date of separation as a non-
divisible whole. However, case law analysis, including vesting, source
of funds, acquisition as a fluid process, and in-kind divisions all
provide the necessary principles-if not the math-to determine
what was actually earned during the marriage, rather than literally
received.5 71  The same definition of divisible property could,
moreover, offer a powerful antidote to attempts to manipulate the
accumulation of marital property until after the date of separation.
And economists, of course, can value portions of marital property
almost as easily as the property itself.
2. Contingent Fees
Of particular interest to readers of this Article is likely to be the
issue of attorneys' contingent fees. Although some state courts have
held that contingent fee contracts still pending at the time of
567. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Harrington, 935 P.2d 1357, 1365 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997)
(concluding that because the parties had both the right and the ability to exercise the
stock purchase right at any time by payment of the option price, the purchase right was
vested at time of trial and was community property).
568. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(4)(b) (Supp. 1997) (emphasis added).
569. See supra note 539 (illustrating the "vested but not yet received rule"); supra note
545 (explaining the "source of funds" rule).
570. This difference is especially true with stock options, discussed more fully in the
next section, infra notes 629-42 and accompanying text.
571. See infra text accompanying notes 587-91 (discussing various methods of
calculating the marital portion of pension benefits).
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dissolution or distribution are too "speculative" to be divided upon
divorce, 72 a very clear majority of state courts have held that such
contingency contracts are indeed divisible.5  Contingent fee
contracts that mature into a judgment or settlement prior to the date
of dissolution will of course be at least partially divisible property-a
result reached in virtually every other state through rules that
establish valuation at the date of distribution in the first instance.5 74
It is precisely the above scenario about which there is still some
disagreement.75 The majority of states, however, follow the rationale
572. See, e.g., Roberts v. Roberts, 689 So. 2d 378, 381-82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)
("The client owes the lawyer nothing until and unless the client recovers money.... The
contingency lawyer may labor like Hercules for more years than it takes a pension to vest,
reason like Cardozo, and orate like Webster but, in the end, recover nothing."); Goldstein
v. Goldstein, 414 S.E.2d 474, 476 (Ga. 1992) (concluding that pending contingency fees
are "too remote, speculative and uncertain to be considered marital assets in making an
equitable division of property"); In re Marriage of Zells, 572 N.E.2d 944, 945 (III. 1991)
(noting that the attorney lacks any assurance of ever receiving a fee, that "'its ultimate
value, if any, remains highly speculative during the pendency of the case,'" and that the
"'worth of a contingent fee to an attorney, if any, remains intangible until the firm
receives [payment] for the services rendered'" (quoting In re Marriage of Zells, 554
N.E.2d 289, 292-93 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990))); Musser v. Musser, 909 P.2d 37, 40 (Okla. 1995)
(explaining that the attorney "is not assured of anything for his efforts nor does he acquire
a vested interest in the income from those cases unless his client recovers, an event
impossible to accurately predict" (emphasis in original)).
573. See, e.g., Garrett v. Garrett, 683 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) ("While it
is true that an attorney is not entitled to the full benefit of his contract until the
contingency upon which it is based is fulfilled, this does not mean that valid enforceable
contract rights do not exist regardless of its fulfillment."); In re Marriage of Kilbourne,
284 Cal. Rptr. 201, 204 (Ct. App. 1991) (allowing trial court to reserve jurisdiction to
make a property division in the future); In re Marriage of Vogt, 773 P.2d 631, 632 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1989) (explaining that contingent fees are not mere expectancies but valuable
contract rights acquired during the marriage); Due v. Due, 342 So. 2d 161, 163-64 (La.
1977) (concluding that contingent fee contracts constitute a patrimonial asset despite the
theoretical nature of the right); Quinn v. Quinn, 575 A.2d 764, 770 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1990) (explaining that the court is "not prepared to say that the value of a contingent fee
can never be determined or considered as an asset of a law firm"); Lyons v. Lyons, 526
N.E.2d 1063, 1063 (Mass. 1988) ("Like the interest of a litigant in a pending lawsuit, the
interest of an attorney in a contingent fee arrangement constitutes property."); In re
Marriage of Estes, 929 P.2d 500, 502 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) ("The difficulty of valuation,
without more, does not preclude the court from awarding contingent fees; the proceeds of
a contract obtained during marriage in the conduct of the community's business may be
awarded to both parties and divided between them when received."); Metzner v. Metzner,
446 S.E.2d 165, 173 (W.Va. 1994) (concluding that contingent fee contracts are marital
property); Weiss v. Weiss, 365 N.W.2d 608, 613 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) (concluding that the
impossibility of valuing a contingent fee on the day of divorce is not a sufficient reason to
ignore that asset when dividing marital property).
574. See Sharp, supra note 2, at 236-37; see also O'Neal v. O'Neal, 929 S.W.2d 725, 726
(Ark. Ct. App. 1996) ("It is true that assets acquired after separation and prior to divorce
are marital property.").
575. See supra notes 572-74, and infra notes 576-82.
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that a contingency fee contract is not a "mere expectancy" without
value, contrary to the position taken by the minority of states.576
Instead, such a contract is deemed to be a "valuable property right,"
and the fact that it may not be wholly fulfilled "does not mean that
valid enforceable contract rights do not exist. ' 577  That property
right-well recognized in North Carolina and most states-is to sue
for a quantum meruit recovery of reasonable fees, even if the
attorney is dismissed from the case before completion.178 That right
to sue, arising from the marital community efforts, may be contingent
in amount, but it nonetheless has value that should not be ignored.
In any event, it seems clear that even if the acquisition or increase in
value of an asset cannot, for whatever reason, be classified as
divisible or marital property, it might nonetheless suffice as a
changed circumstance to review dependency status and the amount
of alimony.579 But the real point is that contingent fee contracts
performed or partially performed during marriage are indeed an
asset of value and should be-at least in part-treated as divisible
property.58 Additionally, professional licenses and degrees earned,
576. See supra note 573 (discussing cases). In North Carolina, presumably any such
contingent contract could be assigned a reasonable value, and under the also newly
enacted § 50-20(e), an in-kind distribution of any recovery could be ordered, regardless of
whether or not it met the "assigned" value, or indeed, regardless of whether or not there
was any ultimate recovery or not.
577. Garrett, 683 P.2d at 1169.
578. See, e.g., Mack v. Moore, 107 N.C. App. 87, 92, 418 S.E.2d 685, 688 (1992)
(observing that an attorney who withdrew from contingent fee case was entitled only to
action for quantum meruit recovery of any fees received by ex-client); Clerk of Superior
Court v. General Builders Supply Co., 87 N.C. App. 386, 389-90, 361 S.E.2d 115, 118
(1987) (following termination of contingent fee, the contract lawyer retained right to
reasonable value of work done up to the termination date); O'Brien v. Plumides, 79 N.C.
App. 159, 162,339 S.E.2d 54,55 (1986) (stating the same).
579. See discussion supra Part III.C.2.
580. Many states have simply left the final judgment open to deal with such fees. See,
e.g., Garrett, 683 P.2d at 1171 (allowing the trial court to retain jurisdiction to monitor the
value of the attorney's services as each contingent fee case is resolved, and to determine
"the community interest in the contingent fee contracts based upon the percentage of the
number of hours worked during the marriage bears to the total number of hours worked
in earning the fee, the community being entitled to that percentage of the fee received");
In re Marriage of Kilbourne, 284 Cal. Rptr. 201,204 (Ct. App. 1991) ("Civil Code section
4800 expressly empowers the trial court to reserve jurisdiction to make a property
division at a later time."); In re Marriage of Vogt, 773 P.2d 631,632 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989)
(upholding division of fee under the "'reserve jurisdiction method,' which "allows the
trial court to determine the division formula at the time of the decree but to retain
jurisdiction to distribute payment when the contingent funds are received"); In re
Marriage of Estes, 929 P.2d 500, 502 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (explaining that the proceeds
of a contingent fee contract obtained during marriage "may be awarded to both parties
and divided between them when received"); Metzner v. Metzner, 446 S.E.2d 165, 174
(W.Va. 1994) ("Because the ultimate value of a contingent fee case remains uncertain
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or largely earned, during the marriage are by definition separate
property. 81 Nonetheless, such a degree or license may be the object
of an increase in value, partly passive-although largely active-
yielding substantial funds between the date of separation and the
date of distribution and could be extremely useful in the
dependency/alimony/value of separate property context.58
3. Employment and Other Benefits
The same analysis also holds true with respect to "golden
parachutes," voluntary separation incentive plans, other early
retirement incentives and bonuses, and stock options."3 Cases from
other states addressing these types of assets are both fact-specific and
in disagreement concerning these types of property,5 4 with one
exception: when a spouse receives a lump sum distribution of the
other's pension, using the current net value discounted method of
valuation,58 there simply is no issue regarding early retirement
incentives, or other benefits linked to the pension. 86 Unless such
incentives were received before the date of distribution, the non-
employee spouse has no further claim to any employment
enhancements.
When the non-employee spouse receives a "deferred
distribution" of the other's pension benefits, however, and there is
some form of incentive for early retirement accepted by the
until the case is resolved, a court must retain continuing jurisdiction over the matter in
order to determine how to effectuate an equitable distribution of this property.").
581. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(2) (Supp. 1997).
582. See supra note 25 (discussing this option). Such degrees are not, of course,
marital property in North Carolina, as they may well be in a growing number of states.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(2) (classifying specifically all such licenses or degrees as
the separate property of their owners). It is noteworthy, however, that North Carolina
has declared that such degrees and licenses are in fact property. Judge Greene's
concurrence in Sonek v. Sonek, 105 N.C. App. 247, 412 S.E.2d 917 (1992), makes the
excellent point that these forms of separate property, as is true with all others, should be
subject to the active/passive analysis in determining the increased value of a degree,
particularly within the first few years of its receipt. See id. at 256, 412 S.E.2d at 922-23
(Greene, J., concurring).
583. See infra notes 628-42 and accompanying text.
584. See infra notes 628-42; see also Baumer & Poindexter, supra note 505, at 214-15
(focusing on the manner in which deferred distributions from defined benefit retirement
plans are grossly undervalued).
585. See, e.g., Seifert v. Seifert, 319 N.C. 367,369-70,354 S.E.2d 506,508-09 (1987).
586. See id. at 369-71, 354 S.E.2d at 508-09; see also In re Marriage of Kelm, 912 P.2d
545, 547 (Colo. 1996) (en banc) (explaining that under the net present value method, "the
net present value of the pension is distributed immediately and offset against other
property in the marital estate").
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employee spouse before or just after the date of distribution,
58
decisions in other states tend to fall into two distinct categories. One
approach, often called the "bright line" method, equates post
dissolution or distribution pension benefit enhancements with
earnings after the "cut-off" date or as replacement for future
earnings, as opposed to compensation for past services. 8 As one
court concluded, "in a deferred distribution of a defined benefit
pension, the spouse not participating may not be awarded any
portion of the participant-spouse's retirement benefits which are
based on post-separation salary increases, incentive awards or years
of service. '59 The other, and majority, approach uses what has been
called the "time rule" formula or the "marital foundation" theory.5 90
This theory, as its name might indicate, is considerably more
harmonious with the major equitable principles already developed
under North Carolina law.
591
The marital foundation approach, recognized by that name in a
substantial number of states and followed without the nomenclature
in the majority,592 holds that enhancements of retirement benefits are
in fact to be treated as deferred compensation benefits, available, at
least in large part, only because of the number of years of the
marriage that created the foundation for such future
enhancements.5 93 As two commentators have noted, courts have had
587. Just as an aside, it would appear to be a logical syllogism that if assets dissipated
in anticipation of divorce may be reincluded in the marital estate, then assets received as
a result of the marital efforts just after the date of separation (for marital property)
should be accorded the same analysis and possibly the same treatment.
588. Probably the leading case addressing this issue is In re Marriage of Hunt, 909 P.2d
525 (Colo. 1995), which describes both the bright-line and time-rule formulas and upon
which much of the analysis in this portion of the Article relies. See id. at 532-33.
589. Berrington v. Berrington, 633 A.2d 589, 594 (Pa. 1993). One might just as well
ask, however, why the employee spouse should be entitled to the full value of an
employment enhancement that was partly based on pre-separation years of service.
590. See Hunt, 909 P.2d at 533 (concluding that the time-rule formula constituted a
"sensible and fair" approach). Both of these concepts are substantially similar to the
coverture fraction approach already mandated by North Carolina statutes. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-21 (Supp. 1997).
591. See supra text accompanying note 571.
592. See OLDHAM, supra note 198, § 7.10[4], at 7-67 to -68.
593. Even in these states, however, the fact that the enhancements are not "vested" or
that the employee must continue to work for a number of years may defeat the inclusion
of such benefits as marital property. Conversely, payments that have vested, or payments
for which only minimal employment is necessary will result in inclusion of those
enhancements. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Hurd, 848 P.2d 185, 190-91 (Wash. Ct. App.
1993) (holding that accrued vacation pay and increases in retirement benefits should be
included as community property because the community had laid the foundation for the
benefits and the benefits were not subject to forfeiture in any event). In a New Jersey
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
an extremely difficult time with analysis and valuation of pension and
related benefits, to the point that even some decisions from the early
1990s no longer reflect the realities of marital contributions.5 94 The
same authors conclude:
Correct valuation of pensions requires recognition that
pension benefits can grow following separation not only
because of active efforts of the employee spouse; but also
because of passive adjustments for inflation and other
factors. The latter adjustments, more likely to occur than
not, should be considered marital property. Courts need
also to recognize explicitly that, with share-of-benefits
deferred distribution, nonemployee spouses share in ...
their marital share of the value of escalation of benefits.
They also, of course, share in any plan risks.5 95
Section 50-20(a)(4)(b), defining one form of divisible property as
"property, property rights, or any portion thereof, received after the
date of separation but before the date of distribution that was
acquired by the efforts of either spouse during the marriage ...
including, but not limited to, commissions, bonuses, and contractual
rights," 96 would certainly indicate that the legislature has, in effect,
adopted the marital foundation theory. And case law has already
established that the right to receive an asset, presumably regardless
of when it is received, is tantamount to "owning" the asset.
597
Although the results in Smith seem relatively simple, the implications
of the case are not.598 The fact that stock options are not exercised,
case, Ryan v. Ryan, 619 A.2d 692 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1992), the court held that
husband's severance pay, accrued vacation pay, and commissions, all of which were
received after separation but before divorce, were subject to equitable distribution
because they were various forms of deferred compensation for 46 years of work for the
company. See id. at 696. The same logic was used in Brotman v. Brotman, 528 So. 2d 550,
551-52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
594. See Baumer & Poindexter, supra note 505, at 233-34. This excellent article
reviews the law, and emerging law, of all fifty states.
595. Id. at 232-33.
596. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(a)(4)(b).
597. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 111 N.C. App. 460, 433 S.E.2d 196 (1993), rev'd in part
on other grounds, 336 N.C. 575, 444 S.E.2d 420 (1994). Two payments of $300,000 each
were received (in return for a previous sale of stock) after separation, but were
nonetheless included in marital property, because they were vested. See id. at 482-84, 433
S.E.2d at 209-11. The opinion predated the new amendments, and the case continued
until well after the parties' divorce, so presumably the same logic would have prevailed
had the last of the "vested" payments not been received for years.
598. Wrongful discharge, sex discrimination, and violations of the Americans with
Disabilities Act all come readily to mind when the "vesting" event occurs during the
marriage, but any recovery may well take years after a divorce and distribution occur.
This would also present the ideal opportunity to "estimate" the value of the claim and
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or not exercisable for a certain period of time, or that an employee
must continue to work for a few years or months after the date of
distribution in order to be eligible for a retirement bonus-or any
number of contingencies-should not blind courts to the years of
marital effort that laid the foundation for such employment benefits
to be treated, at least in part, as marital or divisible property. North
Carolina's statutes and most deeply embedded equitable principles
would appear to dictate this result.599 The approximate value of such
future benefits, such as with retirement bonuses or enhancements,
can be determined; the marital portion can be set by a judge, an in-
kind order regarding that asset could be entered, and the parties can
share the risk that the necessary contingent factors might not occur."'
The same result is more likely than not to attend commissions
issues as well. 01 Among the worst of the commission cases in North
Carolina is Godley v Godley.602 In that case, the North Carolina
court of appeals held that, despite the fact that the husband had
virtually completed sales of real estate in a large coastal development
divide it in-kind.
599. See infra notes 575-78 and accompanying text.
600. See supra notes 477-79 and accompanying text. This approach need not lead to
leaving judgments open for years. As with any property division, the parties would
always have the right to bring a motion in the cause to enforce a judgment calling for a
percentage or in-kind payment of a portion of a divisible or marital asset when it is
received. Indeed, § 50-20.1(c) restricts receipt of ordinary pension benefits until the
participant spouse begins to receive the payments. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20.1(c).
601. In In re Marriage of Wade, 923 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996, writ denied), the
court held that the right to termination benefits vested upon husband's contract of
employment made during the marriage, that the great majority of payments he would
receive were earned during the marriage, and that the fact that he would not receive the
enhancements until sometime during a 12 month period after dissolution was irrelevant
because "the commissions [were] cumulative over an agent's entire career." Id. at 738;
see also Pangburn v. Pangburn, 731 P.2d 122, 125 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that
because the contractual right to commissions for future renewals was earned during
marriage, the renewal value of those policies was community property); Niroo v. Niroo,
545 A.2d 35, 39-40 (Md. 1988) (clarifying that "an insurance agent has a vested right in
commissions on renewal premiums when provided for by contract" and that
"contractually vested rights in renewal commissions are a type of property interest
encompassed within the definition of marital property," and noting that "the husband's
right amounts to more than a 'mere expectancy,' or a 'mere historical possibility of gain'
as he alternatively characterizes it" (quoting husband's statement)); Bigbie v. Bigbie, 898
P.2d 1271, 1273-74 (Okla. 1995) (upholding trial court's division of renewal premiums on
insurance policies sold by husband during marriage, and joining "the court in Niroo in
holding the issue of whether future commissions on renewal of insurance policies are
marital assets is determined by the agent's rights to those commissions under his or her
contract with the insurance company").
602. 110 N.C. App. 99, 429 S.E.2d 382 (1993). The inclusion of "commissions" as part
of the definition of divisible property in § 50-20(b)(4)(b) is almost certainly a response to
the Godley case. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(4).
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during the marriage but had not yet received his "contractual right"
to the commissions (well over two million dollars) by the date of
separation, 3 the "mere contractual right to receive an uncertain
amount ... at some indefinite time in the future" meant that the
entirety of such income was not marital property.' Thankfully,
there no longer exists the opportunity for such manipulation of
benefits to total exclusion from marital property,60 5 and the Godley
case would surely have a different result under the new statutes. In
view of the developing law here and in other states, moreover, the
case stands as an egregious anomaly, in conflict with both the source
of funds theory, the "vested right" theory, and the analytical
approach.0 6 In one of the earliest cases addressing a similar issue, a
California court held that future insurance commissions and
termination benefits should be divisible because the initial
employment contract contained such a benefits-upon-termination
clause, and that even though the right to such had vested, but had not
been exercised, the additional benefits were nonetheless subject to
division, if and when the employee exercised his right to
termination.6°
The approaches to commission cases are very similar to, and
often draw analogies from, other forms of retirement
enhancements.0 8 Probably one of the best statements of this
603. Id. at 114,429 S.E.2d at 391.
604. Id. at 115, 429 S.E.2d at 392. It might be noted that this case illustrates the
significance of a good estimate of value coupled with an in-kind division under the new
laws. Even under the old laws, however, the husband clearly had a "vested" right to such
commissions.
605. See supra notes 498-501 and accompanying text (discussing this problem).
606. See supra note 601 (discussing cases). In Ray v. Ray, 916 S.W.2d 469 Tenn. App.
1995), for example, the husband was a State Farm insurance agent, and would be entitled
to benefits based on his books at the time-five years later-of his retirement. Although
he argued that the "asset" had no value because it was contingent, the court disagreed,
based on his testimony from an accountant that, even at the time of trial, the husband's
monthly benefit would have been $4,000 per month-a sum that translated into a present
value of $185,000, using an interest rate of 9%. See id. at 470. For further discussion of
this case, see JANET LEACH RICHARDS, RICHARDS ON TENNESSEE FAMILY LAW § 11-
6(b), at 249-50 (1997). The thoughtful and scholarly Professor Richards also notes that
"[p]ension rights are part of the marital estate, to the extent that they were acquired
during the marriage, without regard to whether pension rights are vested or nonvested,
mature or unmature, or contributory or noncontributory." Id. § 11-5(a), at 240 n.20. The
term "unmatured" refers to contracts, commissions, and stock options-virtually all
employment or retirement benefits or enhancements that were at least partially earned
during the marriage.
607. See In re Marriage of Skaden, 566 P.2d 249,251-54 (Cal. 1977).
608. See id. at 251 (analogizing vesting of termination benefits to the vesting of
pension rights).
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approach is from a Colorado case:
Specifically, we adopted the "marital foundation" theory
and held that ... enhanced pension benefits ... are
"acquired" during the marriage ... , if distribution is
delayed. As a corollary, we held that if the pension is
distributed upon dissolution under the net present value
method, post-dissolution enhancements ... are treated as
separate property.... Accordingly, we explicitly approved
the use of the "time rule" formula which not only
compensates the non-employee spouse for the delay but
also internalizes the notion that post-dissolution pension
enhancements due to employee advances are built upon
efforts undertaken during the marriage years. 09
While North Carolina case law has been somewhat at odds with
itself with regard to incentive retirement packages,61° the principles
that underlie the majority position are already well established here.
The "analytical approach," first used by the supreme court in 1986,611
is in many ways almost identical to the "marital foundation" theory,
in that each tries to compensate both the marital and separate estates
for contributions or losses to the marital estate. The source of funds
theory,612 dealing solely with mixed, separate, and marital property,
gives full recognition and credit to marital contributions to separate
estates and to the clear proposition that "acquisition" is an on-going
process, not a static one, and that even an active increase in value of
separate property may result in the depletion of the marital estate.613
Clearly, the appellate doors of justice should be open to any
argument that "vesting" of a retirement enhancement, either through
the initial employment contract or through a retirement offer made
and accepted before or shortly after the date of distribution, should,
at least to the extent of the normal coverture fraction, be considered
as divisible property.
609. In re Marriage of Kelm, 912 P.2d 545,550 (Colo. 1996) (en banc).
610. Compare Johnson v. Johnson, 317 N.C. 437,446-51,346 S.E.2d 430, 435-38 (1986)
(applying the "analytic approach" to proceeds from a personal injury settlement received
after date of separation), with Boger v. Boger, 103 N.C. App. 340, 343-45, 405 S.E.2d 591,
593-94 (1991) (applying the analytic approach to proceeds of early retirement package
which became available to husband due to tender offer following date of separation).
611. See Johnson v. Johnson, 317 N.C. 437,346 S.E.2d 430 (1986).
612. See discussion supra note 520.
613. See Sharp, supra note 2, at 225-26. Of particular interest is McLeod v. McLeod,
74 N.C. App. 144, 150-51, 327 S.E.2d 910, 910-12 (1985), in which the court of appeals
emphasized use of a "functional analysis" which recognized that even what appears to be
passive increases in value may in fact deplete the marital estate by protecting the separate
fund and forcing the marital estate to bear the burden of everyday living expenses.
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Moreover, even the concept of strict "vesting ' may require
reexamination of existing case law in view of the new statutory
amendments. The expansion of the definition of marital property to
include "nonvested pension, retirement, and other deferred
compensation rights '615 is itself a clear refutation of the absolute
vested requirement. More significantly, the statute recognizes that
the "active" continued employment of a spouse until vesting occurs
may never be fulfilled:
(b) The award of nonvested pension, retirement, or other
deferred compensation benefits may be made payable:
(3) By appropriate domestic relations order as a
prorated portion of the benefits made to the
designated recipient at the time the party against
whom the award is made actually begins to
receive the benefits.616
Thus, the statute itself clearly recognizes that contingencies, such
as a requirement that one spouse continue employment for a certain
number of years after separation or distribution, do not defeat the
marital portion of such benefits. In essence, the statute places the
risk upon both parties that "vesting" of retirement "or other deferred
compensation" 617 may never occur. This is, of course, a risk worth
taking, when the alternative is to receive nothing. Assuming,
however, that the benefit does mature-that, for example, an early
retirement option becomes available before the date of distribution-
there would appear to be no principled reason not to extend the
coverture fraction of the non-employee spouse to cover this
contingency. This suggested conclusion is also supported by the
statutory definition of divisible property to include "[a]ll property,
property rights, or any portion thereof received after the date of
614. See Smith v. Smith, 111 N.C. App. 460, 433 S.E.2d 196 (1993), rev'd on other
grounds, 336 N.C. 575, 444 S.E.2d 420 (1994). The court of appeals' opinion in Smith
confirmed that "our appellate courts have recognized that funds received after the date of
separation may appropriately be classified as marital property under certain
circumstances." Id. at 483, 433 S.E.2d at 210; see also Boger, 317 N.C. at 343-45, 405
S.E.2d at 593-94 (purporting to use the "analytic" theory in its determination that
husband's early retirement incentives should be his separate property).
615. Act of June 19, 1997, ch. 212, § 2, 1997 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 206, 207 (codified
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(1) (Supp. 1997)).
616. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20.1(b) (Supp. 1997). The same section of the statute also
allows for payments to be made in a lump sum or over period of time in fixed amounts,
but only by agreement between the parties. See id.
617. Id.
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separation but before the date of distribution ' 61 8 that resulted from
the marital efforts of either spouse.
It would defy logic and fairness principles to contend that a right
to a retirement incentive that is made available before the date of
distribution, whether exercised or not, was not deserving of treatment
as a distributive award (or a portion thereof). So long as an asset has
value, be it a contingency fee case, unexercised stock options, annuity
payments, nonvested pensions-none of which can be reduced to an
absolute value but may be divided in-kind-and was the product of
the marital community, such asset should clearly be included in the
marital estate (or possibly as a marital asset). Such a rule would have
the further advantage of deterring manipulation of the receipt of such
benefits,619 of removing incentives to delay by both parties, and, most
critically, encouraging parties to settle these issues. On the other
hand, appellate avoidance of this type of admittedly difficult analysis
carries with it only the advantage of the kind of "foolish consistency"
about which Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote.62 If our court system can
(as it has) adapt itself to the massive changes wrought by the
introduction of equitable distribution fewer than twenty years ago,6
it can certainly deal with retirement enhancements in a more
thoughtful and analytical manner.622 As a Missouri court succinctly
put the matter:
In this case the higher retirement benefits that may be
realized by the husband by continued employment after the
dissolution are made possible, in part, by his years of
employment during the marriage. To preclude the wife
from an opportunity to share in these increased benefits
would be unjust and inequitable.... A present division of
those rights which allows the wife her share of their value,
when and if they mature, does not award her after-acquired
separate property of her former spouse. Rather such a
division [should require] that the parties' qualitative parity
of interest will be maintained and that their respective
interests in the rights that the court divided will remain of
618. Id. § 50-20(b)(4).
619. See supra notes 544-46 and accompanying text.
620. RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Self-Reliance, in RALPH WALDO EMERSON:
COLLECTED ESSAYS 183 (Larzer Ziff ed., 1982).
621. See supra notes 467-68 and accompanying text.
622. For example, a qualified domestic relations order using a coverture fraction could
easily be devised to include future (nonvested or vested but not exercised) retirement
enhancements.
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equal stature.623
Lack of familiarity with such language of the courts, or from the
new amendments should not be equated, however, with lack of
familiarity with the principles involved. Indeed, "reserved
jurisdiction" is little more than deferred distribution, a concept,
especially with regard to pension and employment benefits, long
solidified by the supreme court in Seifert v. Seifert.624 As one treatise
has noted, under the deferred distribution method, " 'the "coverture"
fraction is applied to the benefits when they enter pay status."'  Our
own statute has long prescribed the same approach to deferred
distributions, albeit on a more limited basis than the current
amendments require.2 6 The basic point is simply that regardless of
whether employment enhancements are nonvested, unmatured, or
unexercised, such benefits-clearly resting in part on the marital
efforts-do have value, and must be included, according to some
proportion, in marital property.
This same type of analysis-which gives the marital unit credit
for what it has produced and simultaneously divides the risk as to
prospective enrichments, which might or might not occur, but which
were built upon the foundation of the marriage-is equally applicable
in many other contexts. With vacation pay, for example, which is
vested but not "matured" or exercised at the time of dissolution or
distribution, the great majority of courts have held that the value of
such unused vacation pay is marital property, even if received after
separation or distribution.62 7 The same is true with regard to unused
623. Lynch v. Lynch, 665 S.W.2d 20, 24 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). The Supreme Court of
California has recently ruled, quite unequivocally, that a wife of 17 years had the right to
share, proportional to the length of the marriage, in an early retirement benefit plan
which her husband elected 16 years after their divorce. See In re Marriage of Lehman,
955 P.2d 451,452-56 (Cal. 1998). The court emphasized that although various events and
conditions after divorce may affect the amount of retirement enhancements received by
the employee spouse, the character of the benefits, based upon the length of the marriage,
is unchanged. See id. at 455-56. It cautioned, however, that the retirement enhancement
issue was one of apportionment, not of characterization. See id. at 456. Clearly the
benefits partook of both marital and separate property. See id. at 461-62.
624. 319 N.C. 367,354 S.E.2d 506 (1987); see supra note 533 (discussing the discounted
present value method and the deferred distribution approach); see also N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 50-20.1(b)(3) (Supp. 1997) (allowing the same deferred distribution-or reserved
jurisdiction-with nonvested pension rights); GREGORY ET AL., supra note 213, § 9.10[D],
at 339-41.
625. GREGORY ET AL., supra note 213, § 9.10[D], at 340 (quoting Braderman v.
Braderman, 488 A.2d 613, 619 (Pa. Super. 1985)).
626. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20.1.
627. See, e.g., Brotman v. Brotman, 528 So. 2d 550, 551 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)
(holding that it was error not to value husband's accrued vacation and holiday time and
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sick leave and vacation days.6' The contingencies involved in all
these cases, in other words, may make valuation somewhat uncertain
or difficult, but should not determine the characterization of the
assets as marital or divisible in whole or in part. Our courts have
dealt successfully with valuation of such contingencies in the past,
and mathematics should never stand in the way of equity.
Stock options also present courts with difficulties. In an older
North Carolina case,629 the court of appeals reasoned essentially that
stock options that are "vested" or exercisable at the date of
separation are marital property, but that the contingencies inherent
in options not exercisable at that time warranted separate property
treatment.6 ° Nor is North Carolina the only state that has opted for
this admittedly simple solution, despite the fact that the result lacks
both fairness and principled analysis. 1  Illinois courts have been
notable for their propensity to equate inability to value exercisable
but unexercised stock options with a mandatory separate property
classification.632  North Carolina courts, however, should be
extremely wary of adopting this approach, particularly in view of our
current treatment of nonvested pensions
63 3 under the new laws. 634
consider it marital property, even though husband had not liquidated it at the time of
divorce); Ryan v. Ryan, 619 A.2d 692 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1992) (determining that a
large portion of unused vacation of $20,000 paid to employee upon termination should
have been characterized as marital property).
628. See, e.g., Lyons v. Lyons, 526 N.E.2d 1063, 1063 (Mass. 1988) (analogizing wife's
interest in pending contingent fee case of lawyer-husband to the interest a litigant has in a
pending lawsuit, which is also subject to distribution); Grund v. Grund, 573 N.Y.S.2d 840,
844 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (noting that, when husband's unused sick leave and vacation pay was
valued at $89,000, the fact that husband had chosen not to retire did not alter the fact that
he had a contract right to the money upon retirement, but concluding that because of the
contingency that he might develop a catastrophic illness and use up the vacation and sick
leave before retirement, it was error to award wife a lump sum distributive award,
although the funds were marital property); Nuss v. Nuss, 828 P.2d 627, 632 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1992) (concluding that when value of unused sick leave could be received at death
or retirement, this contractual provision was similar to deferred compensation and should
have been an asset for distribution).
629. See Hall v. Hall, 88 N.C. App. 297,363 S.E.2d 189 (1987).
630. See id. at 307, 363 S.E.2d at 195-96. These kinds of assets would almost certainly
be classified as deferred employment compensation under § 50-20(b)(1). See N.C. GEN.
STAT.§ 50-20(b)(1) (Supp. 1997).
631. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Moody, 457 N.E.2d 1023, 1026-27 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983).
As noted previously, supra text accompanying notes 572-83 (discussing contingent fees,
golden parachutes, early retirement incentives, etc.), virtually anything can be assigned a
value and then be divided in-kind and in proportion to the marital contribution thereto.
632. See Moody, 457 N.E.2d at 1026-27.
633. See supra Part V.B.1 for an expanded analysis of this issue. The analogy with
unvested pensions, plus the inclusion of deferred compensation benefits "or any portion
thereof" in § 50-20(b)(4) seems quite compelling.
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Moreover, a large majority of courts have treated unexercised
stock options quite to the contrary.635 In a particularly well-analyzed
case, a Washington appellate court reasoned that the husband's right
to elect stock options from his employer Microsoft, which right
occurred shortly before the marriage ended, was indeed marital
property.6 6 The husband's right to receive the options, along with
the company's obligation to make them available at some point in the
future, was not the equivalent of future earnings, said the court, but
rather was a right, acquired and earned, during the marriage. 637 In
part, this approach, increasingly considered the "better rule ,' 638 is
based on a sharing of the risk approach used with pension
enhancements not yet exercised.639 Although the shared risk or
634. See In re Marriage of Frederick, 578 N.E.2d 612, 619 (Il1. App. Ct. 1991)
(applying Illinois law and allowing ex-husband to retain stock options).
635. See, e.g., Pascale v. Pascale, 644 A.2d 638, 643 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994)
(concluding that stock option, awarded after the date the divorce complaint was filed,
given in recognition of past employment performance, should be included as marital
property); In re Marriage of Powell, 934 P.2d 612, 614-15 (Or. Ct. App. 1997) (including
husband's nonvested stock options as marital property because they were given to create
future employment incentive, and approving of trial court's calculation which gave wife
credit for time between husband's receiving of the options and the date of marital
dissolution and gave husband credit for the time between dissolution and vesting); Bodin
v. Bodin, 955 S.W.2d 380,381 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997, no writ) (explaining that "the unvested
stock options constitute a contingent interest in property and are a community asset").
The major exception to this statement covering the large majority of courts is South
Carolina. See Winchell v. Winchell, 353 S.E.2d 309, 311 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987) (noting that
stocks in retirement fund representing employer contributions are not subject to equitable
distribution).
636. See In re Marriage of Short, 859 P.2d 636,645 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
637. Id. at 643-44.
638. See, e.g., Lewis v. Lewis, 785 P.2d 550, 556 (Alaska 1990) (treating husband's
contingent stock interest like a nonvested pension and thus holding it to be marital
property because it was earned in part during the marriage); Richardson v. Richardson,
659 S.W.2d 510 (Ark. 1983) (upholding award to wife of one-half of husband's
unexercised employment stock options as marital property); In re Marriage of Renier, 854
P.2d 1382, 1385 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (concluding that husband's stock was marital
property because even though he received the stock options before the marriage, he used
marital funds to purchase the stock during the marriage); Salstrom v. Salstrom, 404
N.W.2d 848, 850-51 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (explaining that like vested pensions, stock
options that are exercisable after the date of dissolution are marital property because
they are an economic resource acquired during the marriage); Chen v. Chen, 416 N.W.2d
661, 662-63 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (including as marital property husband's stock options
that were granted during marriage but were not exercisable until after dissolution).
639. See discussion supra text accompanying note 570. Indeed, the analogy is hard to
resist. As the well-known scholar Thomas Oldham has observed:
Under the majority approach, the marital claim to the pension rights is
determined by multiplying the coverture fraction times the pension actually
received.... If the employee is still working at divorce, this allows the non-
employee spouse to share in post-divorce increases; however, the coverture
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marital foundation approach will usually involve a coverture portion,
most of these courts simply leave open the judgments until the stock
options are vested or exercised.64° Some make use of qualified
domestic relations orders ("QDROs"), 41 and others have held that
retirement plans or stock options may be discounted to reflect the
possibility of nonvesting or death of the employee. 4' 2
The variety of what is or is not, in whole or in part, marital or
distributable property received before or after any state's "cut-off"
date, and regardless of any contingencies, is virtually limited only by
one's imagination. The only real exception to this is the treatment of
degrees, licenses, and other forms of what are called "human
capital." 64s One author has aptly noted that "[t]he family law system
has not begun to digest the dialogue among economists" dealing with
this issue.644 Nor will this Article attempt to do so.
There are, however, numerous other types of marital or divisible
property, even though their value of eventual receipt may be subject
to contingencies, that have been the subject of litigation. Examples
include: patents and inventions,6" frequent flyer miles,646 copyrights
fraction becomes smaller as the period of post-divorce employment continues.
OLDHAM, supra note 198, § 7.10[5], at 7-75. The Oldham treatise is highly recommended
and contains a much more intricate analysis of types of employment enhancements and
stock options than has been undertaken here.
640. See OLDHAM, supra note 198, § 7.10[5], at 7-75.
641. Many employer retirement plans, however, allow for QDROs to include such
contingencies just as regular retirement pay. If the order is drawn correctly, the non-
participant's share will be directly forwarded to him. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (1994).
642. See, e.g., Fisher v. Fisher, 33 Pa. D. & C.3d 69 (1984) (using this approach to
arrive at a current discounted value). As two commentators have persuasively argued,
however, the dependent spouse virtually always profits more from a deferred percentage
award. See Baumer & Poindexter, supra note 504, at 220.
643. For a good general discussion of human capital, see GARY STANLEY BECKER,
HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO EDUCATION (2d ed. 1975)
644. OLDHAM, supra note 198, § 5.02[4], at 5-6.1.
645. See In re Marriage of Monslow, 900 P.2d 249, 253-54 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995)
(rejecting argument that dividing future income from patents acquired during marriage
violates "clean break" rationale, and upholding 60%-40% split of any potential future
income from patent between husband and wife); Hazard v. Hazard, 833 S.W.2d 911, 916
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) (explaining that although medical device developed by husband
had no present marketable value, it "has intrinsic value for its present stage of
development... [and] is in the nature of an intangible asset which was properly valued at
the time of trial as a contingent asset ... [that] should be considered marital property
subject to division"); Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1319 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (holding
$243,750 that remained to be paid to husband at time of trial under a license agreement
relating to artificial knee implantation instruments to be marital property, and opposing
plaintiff's argument that the "instruments were invented during the marriage,.., nothing
in the royalty contract conditions the payment of royalties upon [husband's] personal
services, and ... [husband] himself characterized the income as 'installment payments
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for books and motion pictures, 47 disability or workers' compensation
payments,"8  pending litigation, 9  trust distributions and
from the sale of property' on the parties' joint 1987 income tax return"). But see Yannas
v. Frondistou-Yannas, 481 N.E.2d 1153, 1160 (Mass. 1985) (upholding exclusion of
husband's future income from patent on artificial skin which he co-invented, and noting
that "[t]he judge could have concluded on the evidence that the present value of the
husband's future income from this source was too speculative to consider" and that the
"asset was not one which obviously has current value but is difficult to appraise (such as a
close corporation)").
646. While these are obviously impossible to value with specificity, the "miles" may
certainly be divided in kind. See Calarco v. Calarco, No. FA 950144817S, 1997 WL
607468, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 23, 1997) (ordering husband to assign 200,000
frequent flyer points to wife); Duck v. Duck, 664 So. 2d 970, 972 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)
(per curiam) (directing trial court to divide equally husband's frequent flyer points earned
during marriage as stipulated by the spouses in their joint pretrial statement); Hakkila v.
Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320, 1327 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991) (ordering that frequent flyer points
"be divided and distributed to the parties in kind, thus rendering valuation unnecessary").
647. See In re Marriage of Worth, 195 Cal. App. 3d 768, 774 (1987) (concluding that
wife was entitled to share in husband's post-divorce copyright infringement action
because the parties had agreed to split equally the continuing royalties after their divorce,
and clarifying that "[i]f the artistic work is community property, then it must follow that
the copyright itself obtains the same status"); In re Marriage of Zaentz, 267 Cal. Rptr. 31,
37 (Ct. App. 1990) (upholding award to wife of half of the $600,000 that husband,
producer of the movie "Amadeus," received after dissolution as compensation for his
producing and financing efforts because "[w]hether or not the movie was completed and
receiving income at the time of separation, the time and artistic energies expended
occurred in some appreciable degree during the marriage").
648. There is a wealth of case law on these property rights. North Carolina is probably
in the majority of states that hold that the portion of such benefits that truly compensate
for a disability are largely separate property. See Johnson v. Johnson, 117 N.C. App. 410,
413, 450 S.E.2d 923, 926 (1994). Several states have held that benefits that represent lost
earnings during marriage are marital property, even if they are received after divorce.
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Smith, 817 P.2d 641, 644 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991); West v.
Ortego, 325 So. 2d 242, 248-49 (La. 1975); Hicks v. Hicks, 546 S.W.2d 71, 73 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1976, no writ). If the earnings being replaced by the benefits are post-divorce
earnings, many states have held the benefits to be separate property. See, e.g., Bandow v.
Bandow, 794 P.2d 1346, 1348 (Alaska 1990); In re Marriage of Bugh, 608 P.2d 329, 331
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); Goode v. Goode, 692 S.W.2d 757, 758 (Ark. 1985); In re Marriage
of Fisk, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 95, 98 (Ct. App. 1992); In re Marriage of Smith, 817 P.2d 641, 644
(Colo. Ct. App. 1991); Cook v. Cook, 637 P.2d 799, 802 (Idaho 1981); Mosley v. Mosley,
682 S.W.2d 462, 463 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985); Fontenot v. Fontenot, 571 So. 2d 221, 223 (La.
Ct. App. 1990); Kirk v. Kirk, 577 A.2d 976, 979 (R.I. 1990). Many states have included
pending workers' compensation claims as marital property. See, e.g., Tyc v. Tyc, 672 A.2d
526, 529 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996) (including future workers' compensation benefits in
marital distribution because the benefits are not mere expectancies and are susceptible to
valuation), cert. denied, 676 A.2d 398 (Conn. 1996); Dees v. Dees, 377 S.E.2d 845, 847
(Ga. 1989); In re Marriage of DeRosset, 671 N.E.2d 654, 656 (Ill. 1996); Cummings v.
Cummings, 540 A.2d 778 (Me. 1988); Smith v. Smith, 317 N.W.2d 324, 326 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1982) (per curiam); Hughes v. Hughes, 334 A.2d 379, 381 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1975).
649. Most courts have held pending claims to be property acquired before divorce.
See In re Marriage of Fields, 779 P.2d 1371, 1373 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989); Moulton v.
Moulton, 485 A.2d 976, 978 (Me. 1984); Hanify v. Hanify, 526 N.E.2d 1056, 1059 (Mass.
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remainderman interests,65 lottery winnings,65' celebrity status,652 a
1988); Postill v. Postill, 323 N.W.2d 491, 492 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (per curiam); Nuhfer
v. Nuhfer, 599 A.2d 1348,1349 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991); Mears v. Mears, 417 S.E.2d 574, 575
(S.C. 1992) (per curiam).
650. If a future interest is acquired during marriage, many courts hold that the
remainder interest was acquired during marriage. See, e.g., McCain v. McCain, 549 P.2d
896, 900 (Kan. 1976); Davidson v. Davidson, 474 N.E.2d 1137, 1144 (Mass. App. Ct.
1985); Buxbaum v. Buxbaum, 692 P.2d 411, 413-14 (Mont. 1984); In re Marriage of
Bentson, 656 P.2d 395, 396 (Or. Ct. App. 1983); Chilkott v. Chilkott, 607 A.2d 883, 884
(Vt. 1992). However, most cases that have addressed whether income that accumulates in
a trust during marriage, but is not distributed to a spouse before divorce, is acquired
during marriage, and have answered the question in the negative. Many determine the
income to be acquired during marriage only if the spouse has actually received the
money. See, e.g., Sayer v. Sayer, 492 A.2d 238,240 (Del. 1985); Bacher v. Bacher, 520 So.
2d 299, 300 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (per curiam); In re Marriage of Muelhaupt, 439
N.W.2d 656, 661 (Iowa 1989); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 388 So. 2d 1135, 1139 (La. 1980);
Mey v. Mey, 398 A.2d 88, 89-90 (N.J. 1979). Texas courts have required that the spouse
have the right to demand the money before divorce. See In re Marriage of Burns, 573
S.W.2d 555,557-58 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978, writ dism'd w.o.j.); In re Marriage of Long, 542
S.W.2d 712,718 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976, no writ).
651. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Mahaffey, 564 N.E.2d 1300, 1305-07 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990) (upholding equal division of winnings from ticket purchased during marriage
because the right to receive payments was established during marriage, ticket was
purchased with marital funds, and winnings resulted from fortuitous circumstances rather
than either spouse's toil or labor); Alston v. Alston, 629 A.2d 70, 74-76 (Md. 1993)
(holding that winnings from lottery ticket purchased by husband after separation but
before divorce were marital property, but rejecting an equal division of the winnings
between the spouses because when one party, wholly through her own efforts and without
any contribution by the other, acquires marital property after separation and after the
marital family has ceased to exist, an equal division of the property would generally not
be equitable); Nuhfer v. Nuhfer, 599 A.2d 1348, 1350 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (holding that
when lottery ticket was purchased before separation, winnings from that ticket that were
collected after divorce were marital property); Giha v. Giha, 609 A.2d 945, 948-49 (R.I.
1992) (ruling that when husband won lottery after an interlocutory order was entered in a
divorce action, but before final judgment was rendered, the winnings were subject to
equitable distribution, and explaining that despite separation and interlocutory order, the
property rights of spouses remain unaffected until final divorce decree).
652. In Elkus v. Elkus, 572 N.Y.S.2d 901 (App. Div. 1991), the wife's opera singing
career had increased in value during the marriage, due partly to husband's contributions
and efforts as teacher and coach. See id. Holding that the increase in the wife's career
value was the product of the marital partnership and thus subject to equitable
distribution, the court explained that the nature and extent of the contribution by the
husband, not the type of career, determine whether an asset is subject to equitable
distribution. See id. at 904-05. For other decisions regarding celebrity status, see Piscopo
v. Piscopo, 557 A.2d 1040, 1042-43 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (rejecting argument
that future earnings resulting from celebrity status were so uncertain they were not
quantifiable, and determining that because celebrity status was attained entirely during
marriage, celebrity goodwill is a marital asset, and past earnings may be used to predict
probable future earnings), and Golub v. Golub, 527 N.Y.S.2d 946, 949-50 (Sup. Ct. 1988)
(holding increase in value of acting and modeling career to be marital property to the
extent fame was attributable to the efforts of spouse, and stating that when traceable to
marital efforts, "the skills of an artisan, actor, professional athlete or any person whose
expertise in his or her career has enabled him or her to become an exceptional wage
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green card,653 the expectation of an inheritance,654 unharvested
crops655 or federal crop insurance,656 unborn pedigree or farm
animals,657 syndication of stud fees for horses, 658 and military
retirement fringe benefits.6 9  This list is intended to be merely
suggestive, and by no means exhaustive. At a minimum, it should
excite or dismay both the bench and the bar with the possibilities
opened by the simple, but highly inclusive, definition of distributable
property to include "property, property rights, and other deferred
compensation rights" earned even in part before the date of
distribution.
earner should be valued as marital property subject to equitable distribution").
653. In Gubin v. Lodisev, 494 N.W.2d 782 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992), the husband had
fraudulently induced his wife to marry him so that he could immigrate to the United
States. See id. at 784. When wife sought to have her husband's "green card" declared
marital property, the court held that in light of national public policy to avoid sham
marriages, a monetary value could not be assigned to a right to immigrate when marriage
was eventually dissolved. See id. at 786-87. The court noted that it may encourage
marriages for profit if it assigned a value to the green card, and that any award on that
basis would be speculative and premature because the card may be revoked. See id. at
787.
654. See OLDHAM, supra note 198, § 6.03, at 6-14 to -16.
655. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Hawkins, 513 N.E.2d 143, 146-47 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)
(holding that when crops were produced from an orchard after marital dissolution but
before property distribution, the crops are marital property and the orchard should be
valued at time of dissolution, but income deriving from the orchard until time of property
division is marital property); In re Marriage of Martin, 436 N.W.2d 374, 376 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1988) (ruling that crops are marital property separate from the real estate on which
they grow, and holding that their proper value is their probable value at the time of
harvest, less labor and expenses, rather than their value at the time of the spouses'
separation). But see Cobb v. Cobb, 107 N.C. App. 382, 420 S.E.2d 212 (1992) (declaring
that the future value of timber growing on marital property that was not to be cut for 15
years did not become vested during marriage and was not subject to equitable
distribution, and finding further that the future value was not a distributional factor to be
considered in distribution, but that the actual value of the land in timber on date of
spousal separation was proper for distribution purposes).
656. See, e.g., Martin v. Martin, 307 N.W.2d 541, 543 (N.D. 1981) (upholding trial
court award of two-thirds share of disaster and crop insurance payments to husband and
one-third share to wife).
657. See, e.g., Holznagel v. Holznagel, 369 N.W.2d 344, 346-47 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
(noting that when a pregnant mare was valued for purposes of equitable distribution, the
value of the unborn foal should be considered in determining the value of the mare).
658. See, e.g., Hauge v. Hauge, 427 N.W.2d 154, 155-56 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1988)
(rejecting trial court allocation to husband alone of debt arising from purchase of horses
through a syndicated ownership and directing trial court to either establish the amount of
the debt or order each party to pay an appropriate percentage, and noting that "had the
investments continued to be profitable under the same circumstances, [the husband]
would have had no right to claim the proceeds solely as his own").
659. See, e.g., Rogers v. Sims, 671 So. 2d 714, 716 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995), In re Long,
921 P.2d 67 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996); Pegler v. Pegler, 895 S.W.2d 580, 582 (Ky. Ct. App.
1995).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The length, conclusions, suggestions and possibilities set forth in
this Article have surprised no one more than its author. The more
deeply one explores the scope and potential within both the new
alimony laws (that do indeed create a labyrinth at times) and
equitable distribution amendments (that are less of a maze but carry
the same mandate for change and create the potential for even more
change) however, the more evident become the analyses,
complexities, and conclusions reached in this Article.
At a bare minimum, the new spousal support laws have greatly
expanded the calculation of income, both for the purposes of
determining dependency and particularly with regard to setting both
the amount and duration of alimony. The fifteen new factors that
courts shall henceforth consider, including in particular medical
benefits supplied to an employee, is but one example of this
expansion in the definition of income. Simultaneously, the new
alimony act has laudably and realistically eliminated the previous
standard of living as the unequivocal first among equals in
determining the duration and amount of alimony and postseparation
support, and has opened the door to imposition of a meaningful duty
to disclose. For all these reasons, and more as pointed out in the
text,660 our new statute has greatly expanded the practical, if not the
literal, definition of dependency, while simultaneously eliminating it
as a permanent status.
The postseparation support portions of the new statute, while far
from perfect, nonetheless share many of the virtues in the alimony
sections of the new Act, and, just as critically, provide a crucial (and,
it is to be hoped, expeditious) source of income for a dependent
spouse when it is needed most. Finally, our courts, freed from the
fairly severe shackles of the previous law, now possess the freedom
and the flexibility to do justice, to inject the spirit inherent in the
much more flexible letter of the new laws. One of the best examples
of this is the ability our judiciary now has with regard to determining
dependency, and the amount and duration of alimony awards, as it
wades through the new fifteen factors that must be considered in
determining such issues.
The new alimony act is hardly without blemish, of course. The
persistent inability of North Carolina to divorce itself from the role of
fault, the gender based inequality in the inability to present evidence
660. See discussion supra Part III.A-B.
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of fault in the postseparation support hearings, the utter lack of
clarity in determining when living with another party after divorce
would be a termination event for alimony purposes, and the looming
impact of the use and abuse (and even a precise definition) of
condonation all bespeak a distinct unwillingness to throw off the
barnacles of the past. Nonetheless, as the title of this Article
indicates, domestic law in North Carolina-long the step-child of the
legal profession, the legislature, and most law schools 61-is moving,
step by step, towards a more realistic and definitely fairer and more
progressive approach to spousal support.
The same progressive and unequivocably more realistic
accolades are at least as applicable, if not more so, with regard to the
new equitable distribution amendments. In brief, the amendments in
this area virtually erase most of the more glaring inequities in the
Equitable Distribution Act and afford our courts the opportunities,
and mandate changes in equitable distribution, that at long last
breathe life into the very concepts that the supreme court initially
stated as the goals of equitable distribution-the concept of a
partnership marriage, a realistic treatment of the active/passive
distinction, recognition of acquisition as an on-going process, and of
the source of funds rule, in addition to a much more expanded
opportunity to make use of the "analytical approach." In short, our
judiciary has been freed to implement its own clearly stated purposes.
Moreover, the addition of a presumption in favor of in-kind
property divisions has created what had been a sorely lacking
opportunity not only to create considerably more just results in a
property division trial, but almost by necessity, greatly to relax the
previous inflexibility on valuation of property. Given the statutory
mandate of the presumption, moreover, courts should be more than
willing to accept virtually any semi-realistic stipulation of the parties
as to valuation, particularly with an asset whose value may be
somewhat contingent. While this may disappoint many expert
witnesses, it would create an immense savings of judicial resources,
not to mention resources of the parties. This conclusion as to the
existence of infinitely greater flexibility with valuation of property is
strengthened even further by the inclusion of nonvested pension
benefits and employment enhancements, certainly until the date of
distribution, and analytically and practically as well, even beyond the
date of distribution. Thus, the combination of in kind distributions,
661. See Martha Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything that Grows:" Towards a
History of Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 819,819.
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nonvested pensions and their analogue, post date of distribution with
employment enhancements, all combine to create contingencies as to
value that must create a much greater tolerance for approximate
valuations. Indeed, the major change in the existing statute must
focus upon the "bright line" insistence upon valuation of all assets
and upon recognition of the analytically almost identical "marital
foundation theory" with our own partnership marriage theory and
the analytical approach. Legislative action to amend § 50-20(c) of the
North Carolina General Statutes to read that the court shall, "where
possible, arrive at an approximate value" of marital and separate
property would be the preferred solution to this clear contradiction in
the law.662 Even absent such action from the legislature, however,
courts will now be forced to accept contingency values as to some
types of property, and presumably values that approximate net value
of assets that are to be divided in kind.
Finally, the creation of "divisible" property-rewarding both
marital and separate estates for increases or decreases in value
between the date of separation and the date of distribution-not only
corrects what was probably the most inequitable portion of the
previous statutory and case law on equitable distribution it is also
likely to have profound effects on the divorce process as well, in that
it removes most of the previous incentives for obstruction and delay
in equitable distribution. To a very large degree, moreover, it also
eliminates the "Truesdale rule," which for so long had made a
mockery of legal analysis, the very purposes of the statute itself, and
common sense.
663
The creation of divisible property does not, nor could it, remove
all incentives for divorce planning, but it certainly eliminates the ease
with which such planning behavior in which spouses previously
engaged. Basically, it seems correct and appropriate to conclude
that, unlike the unknown landscape into which the alimony act may
lead us, the equitable distribution amendments, while not without
new concepts with which courts will have to deal, have nonetheless
taken straight and true aim at the most glaring deficiencies in our
previous law.
The changes inherent in both the new alimony act and the
amendments to the Equitable Distribution Act will clearly not be
easy for either the bench or the bar to digest. But change is the very
662. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c) (Supp. 1997).
663. For an analysis of the Truesdale rule and the havoc it caused, see supra notes 512-
20 and accompanying text.
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soul of the law. The indigestion may be particularly acute with
deferred employment enhancements, although as previously noted,
the "time line" or "marital foundation" approach used in most states
is basically the same as our existing coveture fraction/deferred
distribution combined with our "analytical approach." For somewhat
different reasons, the new alimony laws may also be difficult to
digest, in part because most of the previous law must be unlearned,
but largely because the new provisions on spousal support contain so
many more inconsistencies and complexities. But like the
amendments to the Equitable Distribution Act, these provisions
contain and create an enormous potential for equitable changes.
Most importantly, when presented with the opportunity to do justice
in the domestic relations area, our courts have consistently done so-
when they have the necessary knowledge and background to do so.
The opportunities to do justice abound with our new laws. It is
profoundly to be hoped that this Article will provide the background
and certainly some of the knowledge that will aid our judiciary in
understanding and interpreting these new laws.664
664. If I may interject one personal note, the potential, complexities, and occasional
outright inconsistencies, particularly with regard to the new alimony act, have proven to
be extremely frustrating to this author. I naively undertook the Article in the summer of
1997, with the assumption-which I thought entirely reasonable at the time-that I could
easily complete it within three months. As I complete the conclusion, it has now been
thirteen months-all of which will be worthwhile if the Article is of not insignificant value
to the bench and the bar.
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